{"id":334,"date":"2017-10-23T18:55:38","date_gmt":"2017-10-23T15:55:38","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/misak.millidusunce.com\/?p=334"},"modified":"2018-03-10T11:30:28","modified_gmt":"2018-03-10T08:30:28","slug":"guney-kafkasya-raporu","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/guney-kafkasya-raporu\/","title":{"rendered":"G\u00fcney Kafkasya Raporu*"},"content":{"rendered":"<style>\ntable, th, td{border-width:1px; color: grey; border-collapse:collapse;]<br \/>\n<\/style>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-337\" src=\"http:\/\/misak.millidusunce.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/KafkasGri.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"650\" height=\"406\" srcset=\"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/KafkasGri.jpg 650w, https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/KafkasGri-150x94.jpg 150w, https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/KafkasGri-300x187.jpg 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 650px) 100vw, 650px\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><strong>*<\/strong>Yazar\u0131n Kuzey Kafkasya<br \/>\nincelemesi i\u00e7in <a href=\"http:\/\/www.21yyte.org\/tr\/arastirma\/rusya-slav-arastirmalari-merkezi\/2017\/10\/11\/8722\/kuzey-kafkasyanin-calinmis-savaslari\">t\u0131klay\u0131n\u0131z<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Giri\u015f<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Kafkasya genellikle Kuzey ve G\u00fcney diye iki b\u00f6l\u00fcmde ele al\u0131n\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn1\" name=\"_ednref1\">[1]<\/a>. Kuzey ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya, ayr\u0131 b\u00f6lgeler gibi alg\u0131lan\u0131r ama b\u00f6lgenin merkezinde olan Kafkas Da\u011f\u0131 ay\u0131r\u0131c\u0131 nitelikte de\u011fildir yani Kafkasya bir b\u00fct\u00fcnd\u00fcr. Bununla beraber etno-dil farkl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131 yan\u0131nda b\u00f6lgenin tarihi ve co\u011frafyas\u0131 da olduk\u00e7a karma\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r. Trans-Kafkasya olarak da adland\u0131r\u0131lan G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc ile Karadeniz k\u0131y\u0131lar\u0131 d\u00e2hil edilir<a href=\"#_edn2\" name=\"_ednref2\">[2]<\/a>. \u201cTrans-Kafkasya<a href=\"#_edn3\" name=\"_ednref3\">[3]<\/a>\u201d terimi, Sovyetler Birli\u011fi da\u011f\u0131lana kadar Moskova\u2019n\u0131n tercih etti\u011fi isimlendirme idi ama yeni devletler Rusya Federasyonu\u2019ndan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olduklar\u0131n\u0131 vurgulamak i\u00e7in G\u00fcney Kafkasya terimini tercih ettiler. Bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmada ele alaca\u011f\u0131m\u0131z, G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019daki \u00fc\u00e7 k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck \u00fclke halen s\u00fcper g\u00fc\u00e7lerin etki ve bask\u0131s\u0131 alt\u0131nda mill\u00ee ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ve d\u0131\u015f politika \u00f6nceliklerini koruma gayreti i\u00e7indedir. Her biri farkl\u0131 bir d\u0131\u015f politika odaklanmas\u0131na sahiptir. G\u00fcrcistan; Amerika yanl\u0131s\u0131, Ermenistan; Rusya yanl\u0131s\u0131, Azerbaycan ise b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00fc\u00e7ler aras\u0131nda daha dengeli bir yakla\u015f\u0131mla T\u00fcrkiye ile yak\u0131n ba\u011flar i\u00e7indedir. Rusya, hayati g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc Kuzey Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesine \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc taraflar\u0131n m\u00fcdahil olmas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmaktad\u0131r. Kafkas tarihi ve sorunlar\u0131 \u00f6ylesine karma\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r ki, siyasi kararlar\u0131n verilmesi ve b\u00f6lge analizi i\u00e7in gerekli detaylar\u0131n anla\u015f\u0131lmas\u0131 \u00f6zel bir uzmanl\u0131k gerektirmektedir. Analiz zorluklar\u0131n\u0131n temel nedenlerinden birisi b\u00f6lge ile ilgili akademik (objektif) yay\u0131n ve yeterli bilgi toplama zorlu\u011fudur. Mevcut yay\u0131nlar genellikle \u015fovenist veya propaganda ama\u00e7l\u0131d\u0131r. Bu y\u00fczden, ele al\u0131nan hemen her konu farkl\u0131 akt\u00f6rler i\u00e7in tart\u0131\u015fmal\u0131 olabilir. Bununla beraber, bu \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmada b\u00f6lgeye ili\u015fkin farkl\u0131 bak\u0131\u015f a\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131na sahip kaynaklar da incelenmi\u015ftir. Bu raporda, G\u00fcney Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesine ili\u015fkin temel hususlara, mevcut durum ve gelece\u011fe ili\u015fkin de\u011ferlendirmelere yer verilmi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>So\u011fuk Sava\u015f Sonras\u0131 Kafkasya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>20. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n b\u00fcy\u00fck b\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcnde Kafkasya tamamen Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin bir par\u00e7as\u0131 idi. \u0130\u00e7 s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 yoktu, tek bir y\u00f6netim ve yarg\u0131 sistemi vard\u0131. Perestroyka (yeniden yap\u0131lanma) d\u00f6neminde milliyet\u00e7i hareketler sonucu G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclke ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. \u00d6nce 9 Nisan 1991\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti ama Sovyetler Birli\u011fi kabul etmedi. Azerbaycan 30 A\u011fustos\u2019ta, Ermenistan 23 Eyl\u00fcl\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z oldu. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ise 8 Aral\u0131k 1991\u2019de resmi olarak da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131. G\u00fcney Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesinde \u00fc\u00e7 cumhuriyet; Azerbaycan, G\u00fcrcistan ve Ermenistan ile biri Azerbaycan\u2019a (Nah\u00e7\u0131van), ikisi G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a (Abhazya ve Acaristan) ba\u011fl\u0131 olmak \u00fczere 3 \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet ile biri Azerbaycan\u2019a (Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f<a href=\"#_edn4\" name=\"_ednref4\">[4]<\/a>) ve birisi de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a ba\u011fl\u0131 (G\u00fcney Osetya<a href=\"#_edn5\" name=\"_ednref5\">[5]<\/a>) iki \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lge bulunmaktayd\u0131<a href=\"#_edn6\" name=\"_ednref6\">[6]<\/a>. Halen Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n i\u015fgali alt\u0131nda bulunan Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zerkli\u011fi Kas\u0131m 1991\u2019de Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan kald\u0131r\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Ermeniler, Ermenistan d\u0131\u015f\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan (Cevaheti), Tiflis, Abhazya ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131nda ya\u015f\u0131yorlar. Yar\u0131m milyondan fazla Ermeni, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n farkl\u0131 yerlerine da\u011f\u0131lm\u0131\u015f durumdad\u0131r. Ermeni diasporas\u0131 (2,5 milyon) ABD, Kanada, Fransa ve Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da ya\u015famaktad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn7\" name=\"_ednref7\">[7]<\/a>. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler d\u00f6rt ana gruba ayr\u0131l\u0131r; as\u0131l G\u00fcrc\u00fcler (G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7ine yay\u0131lm\u0131\u015f), Megrelyanlar (Orta-Bat\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da), Svanetyanlar (Orta-Kuzey b\u00f6lgede) ve Lazlar (G\u00fcneybat\u0131 da\u011flar\u0131 ve en \u00e7ok T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de). Abhazlar (100 bin), Abhazya ve Krasnador\u2019da ya\u015far. Yakla\u015f\u0131k 500 bin Abhaz, yak\u0131n do\u011fuda, en \u00e7ok T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de ya\u015famaktad\u0131r. Bu ki\u015filer 1860\u2019lardaki b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00f6\u00e7 esnas\u0131nda T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye geldiler. Abhazya\u2019daki Abhazlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu Ortodoks H\u0131ristiyan olup, g\u00f6\u00e7 edenler genellikle Osmanl\u0131 d\u00f6neminde M\u00fcsl\u00fcman olanlard\u0131. Abazalar ise Abhazlardan 8-12. y\u00fczy\u0131l aras\u0131nda kopmu\u015f bir etnik gruptur. \u00c7o\u011fu Abaza (40 bin) Kara\u00e7ay-\u00c7erkezya\u2019da ya\u015far. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de de b\u00fcy\u00fck bir grup vard\u0131r. Osetyal\u0131lar ya da Osetler (557 bin) \u00e7o\u011funlukla Kuzey Osetya ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da ya\u015farlar. \u0130ki alt etnik Osetyal\u0131 gruptan \u00e7o\u011funluk olan \u0130ron grubu kuzeydo\u011fuda ya\u015far ve H\u0131ristiyan\u2019d\u0131r. Az\u0131nl\u0131k olan Digor grubu ise S\u00fcnni \u0130slam\u2019\u0131 benimsemi\u015ftir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Tablo: G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da N\u00fcfus ve Etnik Gruplar<\/strong><\/p>\n<table>\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"121\"><strong>B\u00f6lge<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"71\"><strong>N\u00fcfus <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>(1.000)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"106\"><strong>Y\u00fcz\u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcm\u00fc (1.000 km<sup>2<\/sup>)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"118\"><strong>N\u00fcfus Yo\u011f. (km<sup>2<\/sup>\u2019ye ki\u015fi)<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"298\"><strong>Etnik <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Gruplar<\/strong><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"121\"><strong>Ermenistan<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"71\">3.213<\/td>\n<td width=\"106\">29,8<\/td>\n<td width=\"118\">108<\/td>\n<td width=\"298\">Ermeni: %98, Yezidi: %1, Di\u011ferleri:%1.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"121\"><strong>Azerbaycan<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"71\">7.953<\/td>\n<td width=\"106\">86,6<\/td>\n<td width=\"118\">92<\/td>\n<td width=\"298\">T\u00fcrk: %90, Lezgi: %2, Rus: %2, Ermeni: %2, Tal\u0131\u015f: %1, Di\u011ferleri: %3.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"121\"><strong>G\u00fcrcistan<\/strong><\/td>\n<td width=\"71\">4.646<\/td>\n<td width=\"106\">69,7<\/td>\n<td width=\"118\">67<\/td>\n<td width=\"298\">G\u00fcrcistan: %80, Ermeni: %6, T\u00fcrk: %2, Abhaz: %2, Rus: %2, Oset: %2, Di\u011ferleri: %2.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>Kaynaklar: National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Abkhazia, Department for Statistics of Georgia, Department of State Statistics of the Republic of Abkhazia, Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (2007).<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0G\u00fcrcistan<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n ilk devlet ba\u015fkan\u0131 olan Zviad Gamsahurdiya, \u00fclkesinin izolasyonunu \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in ABD yanl\u0131s\u0131, Rus kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 bir d\u0131\u015f politika izlemeye ba\u015flad\u0131<a href=\"#_edn8\" name=\"_ednref8\">[8]<\/a>. SSCB\u2019nin Aral\u0131k 1991\u2019de resm\u00ee olarak \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinden bir ka\u00e7 hafta sonra Gamsahurdiya g\u00f6revinden ayr\u0131lm\u0131\u015f yerine SSCB eski d\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri bakan\u0131 Eduard \u015eevardnadze gelmi\u015fti. \u015eevardnadze, Bat\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan da iyi bilinen ve So\u011fuk Sava\u015f\u2019\u0131n sonunu getiren kilit isimlerden biriydi. \u015eevardnadze, Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ayr\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in dengeli bir d\u0131\u015f politika g\u00f6zetti. \u00d6nceki ba\u015fkan\u0131n aksine daha Rus yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir politika izledi. G\u00fcrcistan, Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Devletler Toplulu\u011fu\u2019na (BDT) girmeye kar\u015f\u0131 olan bir \u00fclke iken, ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 hareketler ve i\u00e7 sava\u015f sonucu 1993 sonunda BDT\u2019ye girmi\u015f ve Kolektif G\u00fcvenlik Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 (KGA) imzalam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn9\" name=\"_ednref9\">[9]<\/a>. Bu d\u00f6nemde, Rusya ve G\u00fcrcistan \u201cBDT\u2019nin g\u00fcvenli\u011fini sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in\u201d G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da Rus \u00fcslerinin kurulmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6ng\u00f6ren antla\u015fma imzalad\u0131lar. Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya liderleri, Rus-G\u00fcrc\u00fc asker\u00ee i\u015fbirli\u011finin b\u00f6lgede gerilimi art\u0131raca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ileri s\u00fcrerek bu antla\u015fmaya kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131lar. Ekonomik, jeopolitik etkenlerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 hareketlerin (ve milliyet\u00e7i muhalefetin g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc olmas\u0131) bu \u00fclkeyi Rusya ile i\u015fbirli\u011fine itmekte idi. 1995\u2019te kabul edilen Anayasa ile birlikte toprak sorunlar\u0131 ba\u015flad\u0131. Nisan 1996\u2019da da Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan ile dostluk ve i\u015fbirli\u011fi antla\u015fmalar\u0131 imzalayan G\u00fcrcistan, AB \u00fcyeleri ve T\u00fcrkiye ile ikili antla\u015fmalar imzalayarak Rusya\u2019ya olan ba\u011f\u0131n\u0131 azaltmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktayd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan ve Rusya ili\u015fkileri, 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda Ruslar\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 Pankisi Vadisi\u2019nde \u00c7e\u00e7en isyanc\u0131lar\u0131 destekledi\u011fi su\u00e7lamas\u0131ndan sonra bozuldu<a href=\"#_edn10\" name=\"_ednref10\">[10]<\/a>. \u015eevardnadze, daha Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 bir politikaya d\u00f6nerek D\u00fcnya Ticaret \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc ve NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fini hedeflemeye ba\u015flad\u0131. 2003\u2019teki G\u00fcl Devrimi ile birlikte 11 y\u0131ld\u0131r \u00fclkeyi y\u00f6neten ba\u015fkan \u015eevardnadze g\u00f6revi b\u0131rakt\u0131 ve yerini Mihail Saaka\u015fvili ald\u0131. ABD\u2019de e\u011fitim alm\u0131\u015f ve \u00e7al\u0131\u015fm\u0131\u015f olan Mihail Saaka\u015fvili, \u00f6nce Rusya ile ili\u015fkileri normalle\u015ftirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ama ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olunca a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 ve Rus kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 d\u0131\u015f politikaya d\u00f6nd\u00fc<a href=\"#_edn11\" name=\"_ednref11\">[11]<\/a>. 2008 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki se\u00e7imleri de \u00e7ok daha d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck oy oran\u0131 ile de olsa gene Saaka\u015fvili kazand\u0131. 2012 y\u0131l\u0131nda Saaka\u015fvili\u2019nin partisi se\u00e7imleri kaybetti ama yerine 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda gene Amerika\u2019da e\u011fitim g\u00f6rm\u00fc\u015f ba\u015fka bir liberal olan Giorgi Margvela\u015fvili geldi. Perde arkas\u0131nda ise milyarder Bidzina \u0130van\u015fivili bulunuyordu. 2008\u2019deki Rusya ile sava\u015f G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Bat\u0131ya yakla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 h\u0131zland\u0131rd\u0131. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda AB ile Ortakl\u0131k Anla\u015fmas\u0131 y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girdi. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, \u015eengen b\u00f6lgesinde vize serbestisine sahipler. G\u00fcrcistan, NATO\u2019nun Afganistan\u2019daki harek\u00e2t\u0131na da destek veriyor.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n pek \u00e7ok problemi var. \u00dclkedeki muhalif gruplar\u0131n sadakati test ediliyor. Ekonomik geli\u015fme sa\u011flansa da ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na gelir Rusya ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin yar\u0131s\u0131ndan azd\u0131r. Zengin tar\u0131m potansiyeline ra\u011fmen, toprak reformu ihtiyac\u0131 var. Pek \u00e7ok insan \u00e7iftliklerde d\u00fc\u015f\u00fck verimlilikle \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor. Zay\u0131f ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131 Karadeniz ve karadan T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olan G\u00fcrcistan, \u00f6zellikle Azerbaycan\u2019dan T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye gelen Hazar Denizi enerji kaynaklar\u0131 i\u00e7in hayati bir ihracat rotas\u0131 \u00fczerindedir. \u00c7in, Yeni \u0130pek Yolu projesi d\u00e2hilinde ula\u015ft\u0131rma ve alt yap\u0131ya yat\u0131r\u0131m yaparken, T\u00fcrk kamyonlar\u0131 G\u00fcney Kafkasya ile T\u00fcrkistan\u2019\u0131 birbirine ba\u011flamaktad\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan, \u00fclkesinde i\u015fgal etti\u011fi topraklar nedeni ile Rusya ile diplomatik ili\u015fki kesti ama ticaret, iletl\u015fim ve g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015f\u00e7i vizeleri konusunda i\u015fbirli\u011fini yeniden ba\u015flatt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <\/strong>G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n kendi petrol\u00fc, do\u011fal gaz\u0131 ya da k\u00f6m\u00fcr\u00fc yoktur. Rus pazar\u0131 da kapal\u0131d\u0131r. Emekli ayl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n kald\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da savunma i\u00e7in ayr\u0131lan para \u00e7ok azd\u0131r. En b\u00fcy\u00fck ticaret orta\u011f\u0131 Avrupa Birli\u011fi olan G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n en \u00e7ok ticaret yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00fclke ise T\u00fcrkiye\u2019dir. Onu Rusya izlemektedir. G\u00fcrcistan, Rusya\u2019ya \u015farap ve di\u011fer e\u015fyalar sat\u0131yor. Yakla\u015f\u0131k 500 bin G\u00fcrc\u00fc Rusya\u2019da \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor ya da ya\u015f\u0131yor. Rusya\u2019dan g\u00f6nderilen paralar ve daha az \u00f6l\u00e7ekte ABD\u2019den gelen paralar \u00fc\u00e7 G\u00fcney Kafkasya cumhuriyeti i\u00e7in de \u00e7ok \u00f6nemlidir. Resm\u00ee rakamlara g\u00f6re; 2006\u2019da bu paralar Ermenistan\u2019da GDP\u2019nin %18,3\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da %6,4\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc, Azerbaycan\u2019da ise %4\u2019\u00fcn\u00fc olu\u015fturdu<a href=\"#_edn12\" name=\"_ednref12\">[12]<\/a>. Bu oranlar\u0131n ger\u00e7ekte \u00e7ok daha y\u00fcksek oldu\u011fu tahmin edilmektedir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Ermenistan<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan, 21 Eyl\u00fcl 1991 tarihinde yap\u0131lan referandumla ile ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z oldu. 1991\u2019de ilk ba\u015fkan se\u00e7ilen Levon Ter-Petrosyan d\u00f6neminde Ermenistan d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 iki prensibe sahipti. \u0130lki Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcvenli\u011fi, kom\u015fularla ili\u015fkilerde normalle\u015fme ve Karaba\u011f sorununun bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc idi. Bunun i\u00e7in T\u00fcrkiye ile ili\u015fkileri geli\u015ftirmeye \u00f6nem vermi\u015fti. \u0130kinci prensip ise herhangi bir asker\u00ee ve siyasi ittifaka girmeksizin \u00fclkenin d\u0131\u015f d\u00fcnya ile entegrasyonunu sa\u011flamak, izolasyonu \u00f6nlemekti. Ter Petrosyan\u2019\u0131n 1997\u2019de Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tan\u0131maya yana\u015fmas\u0131 ve Karaba\u011f konusundaki politika de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fi, \u00fclke i\u00e7inde kar\u015f\u0131la\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 diren\u00e7 neticesi istifa etmesine yol a\u00e7t\u0131. Yeni ba\u015fkan Ko\u00e7aryan, Karaba\u011f konusunda sert bir tutum tak\u0131n\u0131rken di\u011fer konularda \u00fclke politikas\u0131n\u0131 de\u011fi\u015ftirmedi. Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye ile ili\u015fkileri normalle\u015fmeyen Ermenistan, Rusya\u2019ya yana\u015fmaya devam etti. ABD ile ter\u00f6re kar\u015f\u0131 koalisyon i\u00e7inde yer al\u0131n\u0131rken, Rusya ile yak\u0131n ekonomik ve siyasi ba\u011flar muhafaza edildi ve \u0130ran ile dost\u00e7a ili\u015fkiler kuruldu. B\u00fct\u00fcnleyicilik prensibi \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde, Rusya ve Bat\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na ayk\u0131r\u0131 olmaktan ziyade Ermenistan i\u00e7in kap\u0131lar\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k tutan \u015fartlar yarat\u0131lmak istendi<a href=\"#_edn13\" name=\"_ednref13\">[13]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan-G\u00fcrcistan ili\u015fkileri iki \u00fclkenin de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olmas\u0131 nedeni ile dost\u00e7a oldu ve bir ka\u00e7 dostluk anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalad\u0131lar. Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye ile s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 olmas\u0131 nedeni ile Ermenistan, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a Rusya ile hayati ba\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek i\u00e7in ihtiya\u00e7 duymaktad\u0131r. Rusya\u2019dan (Abhazya \u00fczerinden) Ermenistan\u2019a gelen demiryolunun yeniden a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00fcmit etmektedir<a href=\"#_edn14\" name=\"_ednref14\">[14]<\/a>. Bununla beraber, ili\u015fkiler her zaman g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc de\u011fildir \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc iki \u00fclkenin farkl\u0131 d\u0131\u015f politika oryantasyonlar\u0131 vard\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n uydusu gibi g\u00f6r\u00fcr, Ermenistan ise G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye ile iyi ili\u015fkilerinden memnun de\u011fildir.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f nedeni ile a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131k seviyesindedir. \u0130ki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda diplomatik ili\u015fki yoktur ve s\u0131n\u0131rlar kapal\u0131d\u0131r. Ancak \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc taraflar\u0131n bask\u0131lar\u0131 ile iki \u00fclke bir ka\u00e7 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Azerbaycan, Hazar petrol ve do\u011fal gaz ge\u00e7i\u015flerini ambargo uygulad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ermenistan \u00fczerinden yapmamaktad\u0131r. Ermeni i\u015fgali sonras\u0131 2 Eyl\u00fcl 1991\u2019de Cumhuriyet rejimi ilan edilen Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f ne BM \u00fcyesi bir \u00fclke taraf\u0131ndan ne de Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>1989 sonras\u0131 di\u011fer eski Sovyet \u00fclkeleri ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olup, d\u00fcnyaya a\u00e7\u0131l\u0131rken, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n h\u00e2l\u00e2 iki uzun s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 d\u00fcnyaya kapal\u0131d\u0131r. Ermenistan\u2019a karadan G\u00fcrcistan veya \u0130ran \u00fczerinden ula\u015fabilirsiniz. Erivan\u2019\u0131 d\u00fcnyaya ba\u011flayan Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n ince telidir. Bug\u00fcn Ermenistan\u2019da Cumhuriyet\u00e7ilerin y\u00f6netiminde etkin olan b\u00fcrokrasi \u201cKaraba\u011f Kabilesi\u201d denen ve orada gerilla sava\u015f\u0131na kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015f ki\u015filerdir. Bunlar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda ise daha \u00f6nce Karaba\u011f\u2019a ba\u015fkanl\u0131k eden, daha sonra Ermenistan ba\u015fkan\u0131 olan Robert Ko\u00e7aryan gelmektedir. \u015eimdiki Ermenistan Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Serj Sarkisyan ise onun savunma bakan\u0131 idi.<\/p>\n<p>Sava\u015f nedeni ile ekonomisi \u00e7\u00f6ken, Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan abluka alt\u0131ndaki Ermenistan, b\u00fcy\u00fck bir g\u00f6\u00e7e maruz kald\u0131. Sovyetlerden koptu\u011funda yakla\u015f\u0131k 3,5 milyon olan n\u00fcfusundan<a href=\"#_edn15\" name=\"_ednref15\">[15]<\/a> ilk on y\u0131lda 800 bin ki\u015fi g\u00f6\u00e7 etti<a href=\"#_edn16\" name=\"_ednref16\">[16]<\/a>. \u00dclke d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki b\u00fcy\u00fck Ermeni diasporas\u0131n\u0131n bu ki\u015fileri kabul etmeye ve desteklemeye istekli olmas\u0131 da g\u00f6\u00e7\u00fc art\u0131rd\u0131. Di\u011fer yandan sava\u015f nedeni ile Ermenistan\u2019da 200 bin ki\u015fi yer de\u011fi\u015ftirdi<a href=\"#_edn17\" name=\"_ednref17\">[17]<\/a>. Ermenistan, eski Sovyet devletlerinden en fakirlerinden biri olmaya devam ediyor. 2015 y\u0131l\u0131 rakamlar\u0131na g\u00f6re, ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na mill\u00ee gelir Rusya ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019de 9.000$, Estonya\u2019da 17.000$ iken, Ermenistan\u2019da 3.500$\u2019d\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn18\" name=\"_ednref18\">[18]<\/a>. \u0130ki d\u00fczine oligark\u0131n kontrol etti\u011fi \u00f6zelle\u015ftirmeler ile Ermeni ekonomisi bu co\u011frafyada en tekelci konumdad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn19\" name=\"_ednref19\">[19]<\/a>. \u00dclkenin m\u00fctevaz\u0131 zenginli\u011fi tar\u0131m \u00fcr\u00fcnleri, konyak fabrikalar\u0131 ve madenlerden gelen paradan olu\u015fuyor ama k\u00f6yl\u00fclerin kazanc\u0131 ile olu\u015fan b\u00fct\u00e7enin \u00fc\u00e7te biri Rus silahlar\u0131na gidiyor. Belediyeler a\u00e7l\u0131\u011f\u0131 \u00f6nlemek i\u00e7in \u00e7uval \u00e7uval patates da\u011f\u0131t\u0131yor, elektrik s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131s\u0131 devam ediyor.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Azerbaycan<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Haziran 1993\u2019teki ilk demokratik se\u00e7imleri kazanan Ebulfez El\u00e7ibey, bir y\u0131l sonra silahl\u0131 ayaklanma neticesi Nah\u00e7\u0131van\u2019a gitmek zorunda kald\u0131. 1969-1981 y\u0131llar\u0131 aras\u0131nda Azerbaycan Kom\u00fcnist Partisi Sekreteri ve eski Sovyet Politb\u00fcro \u00fcyesi ve Sovyetler Birli\u011fi Ba\u015fbakan Birinci Yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 olan Haydar Aliyev, 1993 ve 1998\u2019de ba\u015fkan se\u00e7ildi ve 2003\u2019te \u00f6ld\u00fc. Yerine ge\u00e7en o\u011flu \u0130lham Aliyev, 2003 ve 2008\u2019den sonra 2014\u2019te de (Anayasa de\u011fi\u015fikli\u011fine gidilerek), tekrar ba\u015fkan se\u00e7ildi. 2017\u2019de e\u015fi Mihriban Aliyev\u2019i ba\u015fkan yard\u0131mc\u0131s\u0131 yapt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Ba\u015flang\u0131c\u0131ndan itibaren, Azerbaycan d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131 ulusal ve b\u00f6lgesel seviyede g\u00fcvenlik konular\u0131na odakland\u0131. \u00d6ncelikli konu Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sorununun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc oldu. El\u00e7ibey\u2019in ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6neminde \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n kuzeyindeki Azerbaycanl\u0131lar i\u00e7in \u00f6zerklik iste\u011fi bu \u00fclke ili\u015fkileri gerginle\u015ftirdi. Rusya ile ili\u015fkileri ise gittik\u00e7e daha geriye gidiyordu. 1993\u2019te Aliyev\u2019in geli\u015fi ile birlikte d\u0131\u015f politikan\u0131n istikameti olduk\u00e7a de\u011fi\u015fti. El\u00e7ibey\u2019in uzakla\u015ft\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemeye y\u00f6nelik darbeyi T\u00fcrkiye desteklemi\u015f olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, \u0130lham Aliyev ile T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiler en \u00fcst seviyeye geldi. Aliyev bir yandan iki b\u00fcy\u00fck kom\u015fusu Rusya ve \u0130ran ile de ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirdi. Azerbaycan, Rusya ve Bat\u0131 aras\u0131nda oldu\u011fu kadar ABD ve \u0130slam d\u00fcnyas\u0131na y\u00f6nelik de dengeli politikalar izlemektedir<a href=\"#_edn20\" name=\"_ednref20\">[20]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiler \u00f6zellikle ekonomi kalk\u0131nma ve enerji projelerinin uygulanmas\u0131nda stratejik ortak olacak kadar iyidir. G\u00fcrcistan, Azerbaycan petrol\u00fc i\u00e7in ge\u00e7i\u015f b\u00f6lgesidir.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan, Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n en fakir \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u00fclkesi iken Azerbaycan, 2000\u2019lerden itibaren d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en h\u0131zl\u0131 geli\u015fen ekonomileri aras\u0131nda yer ald\u0131. 1993\u2019te Azerbaycan\u2019da iktidara gelen Haydar Aliyev, \u00fclkenin petrol ve gaz zenginli\u011fini ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 \u015fekilde kullanmaya ba\u015flad\u0131 ve ABD ile di\u011fer b\u00fcy\u00fck enerji \u015firketlerinin ilgisini \u00e7ekti. Rusya ve Kazakistan ile Hazar Denizi\u2019nin payla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 konusunda anla\u015fma yapt\u0131. Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan projesi ile ba\u015flayan boru hatlar\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 devam etti ama petrol ve gaz gelirleri beklenen d\u00fczeye ula\u015famad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ithalat\u0131n\u0131n %85\u2019i Rusya\u2019dand\u0131r ve bunun \u00e7o\u011fu silah al\u0131m\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan, 2014\u2019te savunmaya 4,8 milyar dolar harcarken, Ermenistan 3,2 milyar harcad\u0131. Azerbaycan, Ermenistan\u2019a g\u00f6re silahlanmaya Ermenistan y\u0131ll\u0131k b\u00fct\u00e7esinin iki kat\u0131 kadar harc\u0131yor ama siyas\u00ee \u015fartlardan \u00f6t\u00fcr\u00fc sonu\u00e7 alam\u0131yor. Topraklar\u0131n\u0131n be\u015fte biri Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan i\u015fgal edilen Azerbaycan\u2019da bir milyonun \u00fczerinde ki\u015fi yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmek zorunda kald\u0131<a href=\"#_edn21\" name=\"_ednref21\">[21]<\/a>. Aradan 30 y\u0131l ge\u00e7mesine ra\u011fmen Karaba\u011f\u2019dan g\u00f6\u00e7 edenler h\u00e2l\u00e2 demiryolu arabalar\u0131nda veya Saatli gibi Bak\u00fc\u2019ye birka\u00e7 saat mesafede gecekondu kamplar\u0131nda ya\u015f\u0131yorlar. Yani iki \u00fclke medeniyet olarak olduk\u00e7a farkl\u0131 olsa da y\u00f6neticilerinin durumu birbirine benziyor. Azerbaycan, Aliyev taraf\u0131ndan aile \u015firketi gibi y\u00f6netiliyor. Ermenistan\u2019da hi\u00e7 olmayan petrol, Azerbaycan\u2019a istikrar da sa\u011fl\u0131yor. \u0130lham Aliyev, devletin her liman, maden veya ana in\u015faat\u0131na karar veriyor. Bu bolluk i\u00e7inde Karaba\u011f sorunu sadece bir i\u00e7 politika meselesine indirgenmi\u015f durumdad\u0131r. Petrol ve do\u011fal gaz gelirleri ile ordusunu modernize ederek, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019da kontrol\u00fc yeniden sa\u011flamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn22\" name=\"_ednref22\">[22]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><strong>G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00c7at\u0131\u015fma ve Anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f Anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Hem Azerbaycan hem de Ermenistan taraf\u0131, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n atalar\u0131ndan beri kendilerine ait oldu\u011funu ve bununla ilgili tarihi kan\u0131tlar\u0131n\u0131n oldu\u011funu s\u00f6ylemektedir. Ermenilere g\u00f6re b\u00f6lge, M.\u00d6. 4. y\u00fczy\u0131lda B\u00fcy\u00fck Ermenistan Krall\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131 idi. Ancak, kaynaklar bunu teyit etmiyor. Ermeni kimli\u011fi din ve alfabe ile tan\u0131nabiliyordu. \u0130ki bin y\u0131lda Ermeniler bir imparatorluktan di\u011ferinin kontrol\u00fcne ge\u00e7tiler ve devletleri hi\u00e7 olmad\u0131. T\u0131pk\u0131 Yahudiler gibi ticaretle u\u011fra\u015fan zengin diasporalar\u0131 oldu. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f, en az\u0131ndan 4. y\u00fczy\u0131ldan itibaren s\u0131ras\u0131 ile Albanlar, 7. y\u00fczy\u0131lda Araplar, sonras\u0131nda Sel\u00e7uk, \u0130lhanl\u0131 ve T\u00fcrkmenler taraf\u0131ndan ele ge\u00e7irildi. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f, 18. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda Rusya, Pers ve Osmanl\u0131 \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu aras\u0131ndaki g\u00fc\u00e7 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na sahne oldu. Orta \u00c7a\u011f boyunca T\u00fcrkistan\u2019dan gelen T\u00fcrk g\u00f6\u00e7leri ile b\u00f6lge etnik olarak karma\u015f\u0131k hale geldi . T\u00fcrkler, Hazar Denizi etraf\u0131nda ve Karaba\u011f\u2019da yazlar\u0131 hayvanlar\u0131n\u0131 otlat\u0131yorlard\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Osmanl\u0131 kontrol\u00fcndeki bir hanl\u0131k olan Karaba\u011f, 1813 G\u00fclistan ve 1828 T\u00fcrkmen\u00e7ay anla\u015fmalar\u0131 ile Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcne girdi. Bu d\u00f6nemde T\u00fcrkler ve di\u011fer M\u00fcsl\u00fcmanlar \u0130ran\u2019a ka\u00e7arken, tersi istikametten de Ermeniler b\u00f6lgeye gelmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. 1877-1878 Osmanl\u0131-Rus Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan sonra bu g\u00f6\u00e7ler daha da artt\u0131. Birinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 Ermeniler Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f, Zangezur ve Nah\u00e7\u0131van\u2019\u0131 kazanmak i\u00e7in \u0130ngiliz ve Ruslar\u0131 kullanmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131lar. Mustafa Kemal Atat\u00fcrk ve Sovyet ili\u015fkilerinin geli\u015fmesi etkisini g\u00f6sterdi ve Nah\u00e7\u0131van ile Karaba\u011f, Azerbaycan kontrol\u00fcne verildi.<\/p>\n<p>1920\u2019lerde Sovyetler, \u201cb\u00f6l ve y\u00f6net\u201d takti\u011fi ile etnik sorunu kendilerine g\u00f6re \u00e7\u00f6zd\u00fc. \u00d6zerk Karaba\u011f, Sovyet Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 i\u00e7inde kald\u0131. Temmuz 1921\u2019de Stalin, Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 Ermeni Sovyet Cumhuriyeti kontrol\u00fcne vermek istemi\u015f olsa da karar geri al\u0131nd\u0131 ve Karaba\u011f\u2019a Azerbaycan Sovyet Cumhuriyeti kontrol\u00fcnde \u00f6zerklik verildi. Karaba\u011f\u2019da \u00e7ok az Ermeni vard\u0131 ve Ermenistan ile fiziksel ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131 da yoktu. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi d\u00f6neminde Ermeniler durumu de\u011fi\u015ftirmek isteseler de merkez\u00ee otorite buna izin vermedi. 1945, 1967 ve 1977\u2019de Ermenistan ile Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 birle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in istek yapanlar oldu. 1980\u2019lerde durum gerginle\u015fti. \u015eubat 1988\u2019de ilk \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar oldu ve Kom\u00fcnizm\u2019in \u00e7\u00f6kmesi \u00fczerine \u00f6nce Azerbaycan ad\u0131na m\u00fcdahale eden Ruslar, daha sonra Ermeniler yan\u0131nda yer ald\u0131lar<a href=\"#_edn23\" name=\"_ednref23\">[23]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ermeniler, Sovyetlerin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f d\u00f6nemine giden on y\u0131lda tarihsel olarak kendini H\u0131ristiyanl\u0131\u011f\u0131n koruyucusu g\u00f6ren Ruslar ile ili\u015fkileri yak\u0131nla\u015ft\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Sovyet devlet b\u00fcrokrasisinde \u00f6zellikle KGB\u2019de di\u011fer etnik gruplara oranla \u00e7ok daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc konum edinmi\u015flerdi. Bu etnik bilinci art\u0131rd\u0131 ve Ermeni milliyet\u00e7ili\u011fini tetikleyen ana unsur oldu. Ermeniler Sovyetlerin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f d\u00f6neminde etnik temizli\u011fe giri\u015fti. 7 Aral\u0131k 1988\u2019de Ermeni \u015fehri G\u00fcmr\u00fc\u2019de meydana gelen depremde 25 bin ki\u015fi \u00f6l\u00fcnce Ermeniler bir s\u00fcre h\u0131z kesti. 12 Ocak 1989\u2019da Sovyetler, Karaba\u011f\u2019da \u00f6zel bir y\u00f6netim kurduysa da \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar tekrar ba\u015flad\u0131 ve 29 Kas\u0131m 1989\u2019da Sovyet y\u00f6netimi kalk\u0131nca, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f tekrar Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131 oldu. Ancak, bir ka\u00e7 g\u00fcn sonra Sovyet Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 resm\u00ee olarak Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 ilhak etti\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klay\u0131nca Rus birlikleri Bak\u00fc ve Karaba\u011f\u2019a hareket etti. 1991 y\u0131l\u0131nda bir ka\u00e7 cumhuriyet ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ilan edince Sovyet Karaba\u011f\u0131 da 2 Eyl\u00fcl 1991\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k ilan etti ve bu karar Karaba\u011f ile birle\u015fmek isteyen Ermenistan \u015fiddet hareketlerini ba\u015flatt\u0131. Aral\u0131k 1991\u2019de Sovyetler \u00e7ekilirken, Azerbaycan b\u00f6lge \u00fczerindeki asker\u00ee ve siyasi kontrol\u00fcn\u00fc kaybetmeye ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Da\u011fl\u0131k veya Yukar\u0131 Karaba\u011f\u2019da topyek\u00fbn sava\u015f \u015eubat 1992\u2019de ba\u015flad\u0131. \u00d6nce bir ka\u00e7 Azerbaycan k\u00f6y\u00fc i\u015fgal edildi ve halk\u0131 g\u00f6\u00e7 ettirildi. Hocal\u0131 k\u00f6y\u00fcnde ise y\u00fczlerce Azerbaycanl\u0131 sivilin \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc\u011f\u00fc katliam yap\u0131ld\u0131. G\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fclerle g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc art\u0131ran Ermeniler May\u0131s ay\u0131nda La\u00e7in koridorunu ele ge\u00e7irerek Ermenistan ile Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f aras\u0131nda koridor tesis ettiler. Haziran 1992\u2019de ba\u015flayan Azerbaycan kar\u015f\u0131 taarruzunda baz\u0131 k\u00f6y ve \u015fehirler geri al\u0131nd\u0131. Ancak, \u015eubat 1993\u2019de ba\u015flayan yeni Ermeni sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131nda yaz aylar\u0131 boyunca Karaba\u011f ile \u0130ran aras\u0131nda kalan topraklar da i\u015fgal edildi. Ordunun iyi motive olmamas\u0131, k\u00f6t\u00fc liderlik ve Bak\u00fc\u2019de ya\u015fanan siyasi kaos Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 zay\u0131f konuma d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcrm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Azerbaycan ordusundan ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta bir ka\u00e7 zafer kazanan Albay Suret H\u00fcseyinov, g\u00f6revinden al\u0131n\u0131nca Ba\u015fkan El\u00e7ibey\u2019e kar\u015f\u0131 isyan ba\u015flatt\u0131. Yeni ba\u015fkan Haydar Aliyev ise onu \u00f6nce ba\u015fbakan yapt\u0131, sonra darbe planlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in g\u00f6revden ald\u0131. Temmuz 1993\u2019te ilan edilen ate\u015fkes uzun s\u00fcrmedi, ancak 16 May\u0131s 1994\u2019teki ate\u015fkes baz\u0131 k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ihlallerle devam etti. 1988-1994 aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarda 20 binden fazla insan \u00f6ld\u00fc ve yakla\u015f\u0131k 350 bin Ermeni ve 1,1 milyon Azeri g\u00f6\u00e7 etmek zorunda kald\u0131<a href=\"#_edn24\" name=\"_ednref24\">[24]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan, Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 resmen tan\u0131masa da self-determinasyon hakk\u0131n\u0131 destekliyor. Azerbaycan, Karaba\u011f\u2019da Ermenilerin \u00e7o\u011funluk olu\u015fturmalar\u0131n\u0131n tarihinin yaln\u0131zca 150 y\u0131l oldu\u011funu, \u00c7arl\u0131k Rusya\u2019s\u0131n\u0131n bu toplulu\u011fu \u0130ran\u2019dan g\u00f6\u00e7 etmeye cesaretlendirdi\u011finden beri bu b\u00f6lgede ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ileri s\u00fcrmekte; Sovyetlerin zoruyla da Karaba\u011f\u2019a \u00f6zerklik verdiklerini ifade etmektedir. Azerbaycan, 1920\u2019lerde Azerbaycan topra\u011f\u0131 iken Ermenistan\u2019a verilen (Ermenistan ve \u0130ran aras\u0131nda k\u00f6pr\u00fc i\u015flevi g\u00f6ren) Zengezur \u00fczerinde de hak iddia etmektedir. El\u00e7ibey iktidar\u0131 d\u00f6neminde Azerbaycan, siyasal \u00f6zerkli\u011fe kar\u015f\u0131 olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, Karaba\u011f Ermenilerine dinsel ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel \u00f6zerklik teklif etti. Azerbaycan, Karaba\u011f sorununun i\u00e7 sorunu oldu\u011funu, ancak sava\u015f nedeniyle Ermenistan ile aras\u0131nda bir sorun h\u00e2line getirildi\u011fini ifade etmektedir. Karaba\u011f\u2019daki Ermenileri kendi vatanda\u015f\u0131 sayan ve bunlarla do\u011frudan g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fme arzusunda olan Bak\u00fc y\u00f6netimi, Karaba\u011f \u00fczerinde egemenli\u011fini azaltaca\u011f\u0131ndan dolay\u0131 uluslararas\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fcne kar\u015f\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan sava\u015ftan beri Karaba\u011f ve Ermenistan\u2019a ekonomik yollarla abluka uygulamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n temelinde, Ermeni kuvvetlerinin Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131ndan ve Ermenistan ile Karaba\u011f aras\u0131ndaki ba\u011flant\u0131 olu\u015fturan La\u00e7in koridorundan \u00e7ekilmesi ve Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc bulunmaktad\u0131r. Bu sorun, hem Ermenistan\u2019\u0131, hem de Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 zay\u0131flatm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ermeniler halen Karaba\u011f ve \u00e7evresinde Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131n\u0131n be\u015fte birini i\u015fgal etmi\u015f durumdad\u0131rlar. B\u00f6lgedeki istikrars\u0131zl\u0131k yaln\u0131zca Rusya\u2019n\u0131n de\u011fil di\u011fer \u00fclkelerin de, taraflar\u0131 etkileme g\u00fcc\u00fc elde etmesine olanak sa\u011flad\u0131. Bu sava\u015f\u0131n yaratt\u0131\u011f\u0131 bunal\u0131m sayesinde Rusya bir anlamda b\u00f6lgede tekrar denetim kurma olana\u011f\u0131 elde etti. Sava\u015f\u0131n dramatik sonu\u00e7lar do\u011furmas\u0131ndan \u00e7ok b\u00f6lgenin stratejik \u00f6nemi, uluslararas\u0131 toplumu harekete ge\u00e7irdi. \u00c7e\u015fitli devletlerin yan\u0131 s\u0131ra BM, AG\u0130T gibi \u00f6rg\u00fctler \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n \u00f6nlenmesi y\u00f6n\u00fcnde giri\u015fimlerde bulundular. Soruna \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulmak i\u00e7in BM GK\u2019nin karar tasar\u0131lar\u0131 ile 1992\u2019de Fransa, Rusya ve ABD\u2019nin ortak ba\u015fkan\u0131 oldu\u011fu AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu olu\u015fturuldu. \u201cMinsk Grubu\u201d Haziran 1992\u2019de g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flad\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n arabuluculu\u011funda ate\u015fkes 12 May\u0131s 1994\u2019te sa\u011fland\u0131, 27 Temmuz 1994\u2019te ate\u015fkes anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzaland\u0131. Azerbaycan ate\u015fkesi denetlemek \u00fczere olu\u015fturulan BDT \u201cbar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc\u201dn\u00fcn yerle\u015ftirilmesine y\u00f6nelik Rus \u00f6nerisini reddetti ve AG\u0130T b\u00fcnyesinde bar\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerinin s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclmesini talep etti. B\u00f6lge d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki \u00fclkelerin Kafkasya\u2019daki sorunlar dolay\u0131s\u0131yla etkinlik kurmalar\u0131ndan rahats\u0131zl\u0131k duyan Rusya, AG\u0130T b\u00fcnyesinde yer alarak ayn\u0131 zamanda olumsuz g\u00f6rd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc bu geli\u015fmeyi denetlemeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm Aray\u0131\u015flar\u0131 ve D\u00f6rt G\u00fcn Sava\u015f\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f sorununa hen\u00fcz bir siyasi \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulunamad\u0131 ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma potansiyeli h\u00e2l\u00e2 y\u00fcksektir. Diplomatik bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme ula\u015f\u0131laca\u011f\u0131na inananlar \u00e7ok fazla de\u011fildir. \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm form\u00fclleri aras\u0131nda \u015funlar bulunuyor: Eski duruma d\u00f6nmek, \u00f6zerkli\u011fin yeniden g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015f\u00fclmesi, toprak de\u011fi\u015fimi, m\u00fc\u015fterek egemenlik, Azerbaycan karar organ\u0131 \u00fczerinde Ermeni etkisinin garanti edilmesi, Karaba\u011f\u2019a tarafs\u0131zl\u0131k stat\u00fcs\u00fc verilmesi. Karaba\u011f hen\u00fcz Ermenistan taraf\u0131ndan da bir devlet olarak tan\u0131nmam\u0131\u015f olsa da ABD\u2019de 2012\u2019den bug\u00fcne Ermeni lobisinin gayretleri ile 7 eyalet taraf\u0131ndan \u201cKaraba\u011f Cumhuriyeti\u201d olarak tan\u0131nd\u0131. ABD, resm\u00ee olarak Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc destekliyor olsa da eyaletlerin bu t\u00fcr kararlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6n\u00fcne de ge\u00e7miyor. Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n lobi faaliyetleri ise genellikle ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z oldu ve sadece Arizona eyaletinde Azerbaycan ile i\u015fbirli\u011fini destekleyen bir karar tasar\u0131s\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Petrol gelirlerini art\u0131ran Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc bir ordu kurarak b\u00f6lgeyi geri almas\u0131 da bir se\u00e7enek olarak g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor. Nitekim Nisan 2016\u2019da Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n d\u00f6rt g\u00fcn s\u00fcren askeri harek\u00e2t\u0131 Ermenileri zor durumda b\u0131rakt\u0131. D\u00f6rt G\u00fcn Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 Ermeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n tan\u0131nmas\u0131na ili\u015fkin bir karar tasar\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 Parlamentoya g\u00f6nderdi. Azerbaycan ise b\u00f6yle bir karar\u0131n daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya yol a\u00e7aca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 beyan etti. ABD ve Rusya D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanlar\u0131, Karaba\u011f-Azerbaycan sorununa AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu d\u00e2hilinde yap\u0131lacak g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler yoluyla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulunmas\u0131 gerekti\u011fini ifade ettiler. Ancak, Ermeni taraf\u0131 Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 tan\u0131maktan korkmad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131, belirli durumlarda ad\u0131mlar atmaya kararl\u0131 olduklar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yleyerek Minsk Grubu\u2019na da k\u0131rm\u0131z\u0131 \u00e7izgileri oldu\u011funu ifade etmi\u015f oldular. Pek \u00e7ok Ermeni politikac\u0131ya g\u00f6re son \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar Minsk Grubu ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 ABD, Rusya ve Fransa\u2019n\u0131n tek tarafl\u0131 ve pasif tutumunu g\u00f6sterdi. Ermeni halk\u0131n\u0131n mant\u0131\u011f\u0131na g\u00f6re h\u00fck\u00fcmet ekonomik ve sosyal politikalar\u0131nda hatal\u0131 olabilir ama \u00fclkenin toprak kay\u0131plar\u0131 ve savunmas\u0131ndaki zafiyet vatana ihanettir ve bu da h\u00fck\u00fcmetin sonu demektir<a href=\"#_edn25\" name=\"_ednref25\">[25]<\/a>. Azerbaycan taraf\u0131nda ise Karaba\u011f konusu h\u00fck\u00fcmetin i\u00e7eride me\u015fruiyet sa\u011flamak i\u00e7in kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir siyasi vas\u0131tay\u0131 temsil etmektedir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Harita: G\u00fcney Kafkasya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"size-full wp-image-336 aligncenter\" src=\"http:\/\/misak.millidusunce.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/GuneyKafkasHaritasi.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"607\" height=\"355\" srcset=\"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/GuneyKafkasHaritasi.jpg 607w, https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/GuneyKafkasHaritasi-150x88.jpg 150w, https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/10\/GuneyKafkasHaritasi-300x175.jpg 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 607px) 100vw, 607px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>Nisan 2016\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalardan sonra Aliyev, rejim i\u00e7indeki durumunu g\u00fc\u00e7lendirerek siyasi amac\u0131na ula\u015ft\u0131. Ermenistan ise Kolektif G\u00fcvenlik Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (CSTO<a href=\"#_edn26\" name=\"_ednref26\">[26]<\/a>) ve Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019ndeki (AEB) m\u00fcttefik ve ortaklar\u0131ndan bekledi\u011fi deste\u011fi alamad\u0131. Bu deste\u011fi alamamas\u0131n\u0131n temel nedeni Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 olmamas\u0131d\u0131r. Ermenistan, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da b\u00f6yle d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnd\u00fc\u011f\u00fc i\u00e7in Azerbaycan\u2019a milyarlarca dolarl\u0131k silah yard\u0131m\u0131 yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 de\u011ferlendiriyor. Ruslar ise Ermenilere verdikleri s\u00f6zde durduklar\u0131n\u0131, bu silahlar\u0131n do\u011frudan Ermenistan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 kullan\u0131lmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 s\u00f6yl\u00fcyorlar. Ermenistan, bu ikilemi \u00e7\u00f6zmek i\u00e7in Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 tan\u0131ma ve b\u00f6ylece ilhak etme yolunu se\u00e7ebilir<a href=\"#_edn27\" name=\"_ednref27\">[27]<\/a>. Bu ise bir sonraki sava\u015f\u0131n sadece Karaba\u011f\u2019da de\u011fil, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 da i\u00e7ine alacak \u015fekilde geni\u015flemesi demektir. Bu durumda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n m\u00fcdahalesi gelecektir ki bu da arabulucu rol\u00fcnden \u00e7\u0131k\u0131p, taraflardan birini daha \u00e7ok destekleyece\u011fi durum yaratabilir. Bu durumda, Ermenilerin \u00fcmidi, Minsk Grubu\u2019nun di\u011fer iki ba\u015fkan\u0131 olan ABD ve Fransa\u2019daki diasporan\u0131n lobi faaliyetleridir. \u00d6zetle, Ermenistan kendine g\u00f6re ataca\u011f\u0131 kararl\u0131 ad\u0131mlarla \u00f6nce Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 tan\u0131may\u0131, ard\u0131ndan \u00e7\u0131kacak \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma ortam\u0131nda Rusya, ABD ve Fransa\u2019n\u0131n kendisini daha \u00e7ok dikkate alaca\u011f\u0131, aktif bir tutum belirleyece\u011fini d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnerek, bunu siyasi bir sonuca g\u00f6t\u00fcrmeyi hesaplamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Abhazya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Abhaz \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131, eski Sovyet topraklar\u0131ndaki en kanl\u0131 \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalardan biridir. 10 bin ki\u015finin \u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fcne, 250 bin ki\u015finin de yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmesine neden olmu\u015ftur. Bununla beraber, Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k i\u00e7in \u0131srar etmesi ve hi\u00e7bir \u00f6zerklik derecesini kabul etmemesi nedeni ile kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 olarak \u00fczerinde anla\u015fma sa\u011flanacak bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm de g\u00f6z\u00fckmemektedir. Bug\u00fcnk\u00fc Abhazya topraklar\u0131 Laz (Kolha) ve Lazika (G\u00fcrc\u00fcce E\u011frisi) topraklar\u0131 idi. M.S. 1-4. y\u00fczy\u0131lda Romal\u0131lar\u0131n, daha sonra bir prenslik olarak Arap halifeli\u011finin ve Bizans \u0130mparatorlu\u011funun, 8. y\u00fczy\u0131l\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda Hazarya\u2019n\u0131n par\u00e7as\u0131 oldular. 780 y\u0131l\u0131nda Abhaz prensli\u011fi ve \u0130mereti vilayeti Abhaz Krall\u0131\u011f\u0131\u2019na, 1080 y\u0131l\u0131nda ise birle\u015fik G\u00fcrcistan Krall\u0131\u011f\u0131na ba\u011fland\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n par\u00e7alanmas\u0131ndan sonra Abhazya, \u015eerva\u015fidze hanedan\u0131n\u0131n y\u00f6netti\u011fi bir prenslik oldu ve 1578\u2019de Osmanl\u0131 \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu\u2019nun himayesine girdi. 18. y\u00fczy\u0131lda Osmanl\u0131lar n\u00fcfusun bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 M\u00fcsl\u00fcmanla\u015ft\u0131rarak kendilerine ba\u011flamak isteyince, \u015eerva\u015fidzeler Ruslardan yard\u0131m istediler. 1810\u2019da Rus hamili\u011fine girdiler ama kendi kendini y\u00f6netimleri ancak 1864\u2019e kadar s\u00fcrd\u00fc. Abhaz halk\u0131 1866 toprak reformlar\u0131 ve vergi sistemine kar\u015f\u0131 isyan ettiler ve devam eden 8 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye do\u011fru b\u00fcy\u00fck g\u00f6\u00e7 ya\u015fand\u0131. B\u00f6ylece Abhazya\u2019daki Abhaz n\u00fcfusu \u00e7ok azal\u0131rken topraklar\u0131 H\u0131ristiyanlara ge\u00e7ti.<\/p>\n<p>4 Mart 1921\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Sovyet Abhazya Cumhuriyeti ilan edildi. Bir ka\u00e7 ay sonra Abhazya ve G\u00fcrcistan bir birlik anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalayarak e\u015fitlik esas\u0131na dayal\u0131 Transkafkasya Federasyonu\u2019nu kurdular. Ancak, 1931\u2019de Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fc G\u00fcrcistan Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti\u2019ne (SSC) ba\u011fl\u0131 \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet stat\u00fcs\u00fcne d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. Sovyet d\u00f6neminde Abhazlar, G\u00fcrc\u00fcle\u015ftirme ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrlerinin yok edilmesinden \u015fik\u00e2yet ettiler. Abhaz topraklar\u0131na b\u00fcy\u00fck say\u0131da G\u00fcrc\u00fc, Rus, Ermeni ve di\u011fer gruplar dolduruldu. 1886\u2019da (\u00e7o\u011fu T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye gittikten sonra) Abhaz oran\u0131 %42 iken, 1959\u2019da bu oran %15\u2019e d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc. Abhazlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011fu M\u00fcsl\u00fcman\u2019d\u0131r ve 1920\u2019lerden beri G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131rlar,<\/p>\n<p>1978\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da meydana gelen g\u00f6sterilerin Sovyetler taraf\u0131ndan bast\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 f\u0131rsat bilen Abhazlar, eski stat\u00fclerine d\u00f6nmek istediler. Moskova\u2019da kurulan bir komisyon Abhazlar\u0131n iddialar\u0131n\u0131 kabul etse de pek bir \u015fey de\u011fi\u015fmedi. Ekim 1978\u2019de Abhazya\u2019da, 1981\u2019de ise Tiflis\u2019te g\u00f6steriler oldu. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler de G\u00fcrc\u00fc kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 politikalar\u0131 protesto ediyorlard\u0131. 17 Temmuz 1988\u2019de Abhazya, Sovyet liderli\u011fine G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lmak i\u00e7in bir mektup g\u00f6nderdi. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da Nisan 1989\u2019da milliyet\u00e7i g\u00f6steriler \u00e7o\u011fal\u0131nca Sovyet birlikleri m\u00fcdahale etti. M\u00fcdahale gerilimi art\u0131rd\u0131 ve baz\u0131 militan \u00f6rg\u00fctler ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. 1989\u2019da bu cumhuriyetin n\u00fcfusunun yaln\u0131zca %18\u2019ini Abhazlar, % 46\u2019s\u0131n\u0131 G\u00fcrc\u00fcler olu\u015fturmaktayd\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan h\u00fck\u00fcmeti bu demografik yap\u0131y\u0131 g\u00f6stererek Abhazlar\u0131n taleplerine kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kmaktayd\u0131. Abhaz okullar\u0131 kapat\u0131l\u0131p, G\u00fcrc\u00fc alfabesi kullan\u0131lmaya ba\u015fland\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>A\u011fustos 1990\u2019da Abhazya kendi cumhuriyetini ilan etti. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lsa da 1921-1931\u2019de oldu\u011fu gibi Federasyon kap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k b\u0131rakt\u0131. 28 Ekim 1990\u2019da G\u00fcrcistan se\u00e7imlerini kazanan Gamsakurdiya\u2019n\u0131n homojenle\u015ftirme, G\u00fcrc\u00fcle\u015ftirme ve H\u0131ristiyanla\u015ft\u0131rma politikalar\u0131 durumu daha da k\u00f6t\u00fc hale getirdi. G\u00fcrc\u00fclere g\u00f6re Abhaz problemi Ruslar\u0131n oyunu idi ve Abhazlar, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 ilan ettiler. Etnik gruplar aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma 1991\u2019de de s\u00fcrd\u00fc, Temmuz 1992\u2019de de Abhazya meclisi \u201cAbhazya Cumhuriyeti\u201d olarak Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n egemenli\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131. Haziran 1992\u2019de Abhaz ba\u015fkan\u0131 Vladislav Ardzinba, federasyon veya konfederasyon \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc \u00f6nerdi ama G\u00fcrcistan reddetti. 14 A\u011fustos 1992\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan, mill\u00ee muhaf\u0131z ve polis g\u00fc\u00e7lerini Abhazya\u2019da d\u00fczen kurmak i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderince sava\u015f \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Bu sava\u015f esnas\u0131nda, Rus asker\u00ee \u00fcss\u00fcn\u00fc korumak \u00fczere b\u00f6lgede bulunan Rus kuvvetlerinin ve Kuzey Kafkasya ve G\u00fcney Rusya\u2019da ya\u015fayan etnik gruplar\u0131n birli\u011fini olu\u015fturan Kafkasya Da\u011f Halklar\u0131 Konfederasyonu g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc sava\u015f\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131n\u0131n Abhazya\u2019ya yard\u0131m etti\u011fi belirtilmektedir. G\u00fcrcistan ile Rusya aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkiler bu destek nedeniyle bozuldu. Eyl\u00fcl sonunda b\u00fct\u00fcn G\u00fcrc\u00fc kuvvetleri Abhazya\u2019dan \u00e7ekildi ve b\u00f6lgenin \u201cliberalle\u015ftirildi\u011fi\u201d a\u00e7\u0131kland\u0131. Ekim 1992\u2019de Abhaz kuvvetleri Kuzey Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n t\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc kontrol alt\u0131na ald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Abhaz g\u00fc\u00e7leri, Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019da ba\u015fta \u00c7e\u00e7enler ve Kozaklar olmak \u00fczere g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fclerden destek ald\u0131lar ve \u015eubat 1993\u2019\u00fcn sonuna kadar abluka alt\u0131nda savundular. Temmuz sonunda iki taraf aras\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n denetiminde yap\u0131lan ate\u015fkesin ard\u0131ndan Eyl\u00fcl\u2019de Abhaz kuvvetlerinin s\u00fcrpriz sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131 ile Sukhumi\u2019yi de kapsayan b\u00f6lge Abhazlar\u0131n eline ge\u00e7ti. Abhaz taarruzlar\u0131 ilerledi ve Tiflis\u2019i tehdit etmeye ba\u015flad\u0131lar. Ruslar bu durumu G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 BDT\u2019ye zorlamak ve topraklar\u0131nda Rus birliklerinin konu\u015flanmas\u0131n\u0131 kabul etmesi i\u00e7in kulland\u0131. Aral\u0131k 1993\u2019teki ate\u015fkes 1998\u2019e kadar s\u00fcrd\u00fc. Nisan ay\u0131nda ba\u015flayan Abhaz taarruzlar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan ba\u015fkan\u0131 \u015eevardnadze g\u00fc\u00e7 kullanmak istemedi ve 20 May\u0131s\u2019ta yeni ate\u015fkes ilan edildi. Ancak, bu d\u00f6nemde y\u00fczlerce \u00f6l\u00fcm yan\u0131nda 20 bin ki\u015fi yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmek zorunda kald\u0131<a href=\"#_edn28\" name=\"_ednref28\">[28]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Sava\u015f d\u00f6neminde \u00f6nce Rusya ve BM, daha sonra ABD, Fransa, Almanya ve \u0130ngiltere arac\u0131 olmak istedi. Aral\u0131k 1993\u2019te taraflar BM denetiminde Cenevre\u2019de g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015flad\u0131lar ve az say\u0131da asker\u00ee personelden olu\u015fan BM G\u00fcrcistan G\u00f6zlemci Heyeti (UNOMIG) bar\u0131\u015f-koruma i\u015flevini yerine getirmek \u00fczere Sukhumi\u2019ye yerle\u015ftirildi. 4 Nisan 1994\u2019te G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Abhaz \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 Siyasi \u00c7\u00f6z\u00fcm Tedbirleri Deklarasyonu yay\u0131nland\u0131. Bir ay sonra sadece Rus birliklerinden olu\u015fan BDT bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc sorunlu b\u00f6lgeye girdi. Daha sonra BM G\u00fcrcistan Misyonu (UNOMIG) g\u00f6zlemcileri daha \u00e7ok G\u00fcney Abhazya\u2019da g\u00f6reve ba\u015flad\u0131. \u0130ki taraf aras\u0131nda anla\u015fmazl\u0131k s\u00fcrmektedir. Anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n temelinde Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn ne olaca\u011f\u0131 hususu yatmaktad\u0131r. Abhazlar tam ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k isterken, G\u00fcrc\u00fcler G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc korumaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131rlar. Di\u011fer \u00f6nemli bir sorun da m\u00fcltecilerin durumudur. Sava\u015f esnas\u0131nda Abhazya etnik anlamda ar\u0131nd\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131, bu \u00fclkede ya\u015fayan G\u00fcrc\u00fc ve Ruslar ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131 yerleri terk etmek zorunda kald\u0131lar. Bu sava\u015f s\u00fcresince G\u00fcrc\u00fc ve di\u011fer uluslardan 250 binden fazla ki\u015fi Abhazya\u2019dan ka\u00e7mak zorunda kald\u0131. Rusya ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta Abhazya\u2019y\u0131 destekleyerek G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Rusya\u2019ya yak\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flad\u0131, tavizler elde etti; daha sonra Abhazlar\u2019dan deste\u011fini \u00e7ekti.<\/p>\n<p>May\u0131s\u2019ta tam anlam\u0131yla ate\u015fkes ilan edilmesinin ard\u0131ndan Haziran\u2019da 2.500 BDT (Rus) \u201cbar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc\u201d askeri G\u00fcrcistan ve Abhazya\u2019y\u0131 ay\u0131ran \u0130nguri Nehri civar\u0131nda kurulan g\u00fcvenlik b\u00f6lgesine yerle\u015ftirildi. Kas\u0131m 1994\u2019te Abhazya Meclisi kabul etti\u011fi yeni anayasa ile egemen bir devlet olarak \u201cAbhazya Cumhuriyeti\u201dnin kuruldu\u011funu ilan etti. G\u00fcrcistan h\u00fck\u00fcmeti taraf\u0131ndan egemenlik ilan\u0131 k\u0131nand\u0131. Rusya G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tan\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131. Ocak 1996\u2019da BDT zirvesinde \u015eevardnadze\u2019nin \u00f6nerisiyle, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a kat\u0131l\u0131ncaya kadar Abhazya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 ekonomik yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar uygulanmas\u0131 karar\u0131 al\u0131nd\u0131. BM destekli bar\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri 1997 Temmuz ay\u0131nda yeniden Cenevre\u2019de ba\u015flad\u0131. Kas\u0131m 1997\u2019deki Cenevre toplant\u0131s\u0131nda da taraflar haftada bir toplan\u0131p ate\u015fkes durumunu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fecek \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Konseyi ile m\u00fclteciler ve ekonomik, insani sorunlarla ilgilenecek alt-\u00e7al\u0131\u015fma gruplar\u0131 olu\u015fturdular. Abhazya, Rusya ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7inde federal bir birim stat\u00fcs\u00fcnde olma \u00f6nerisini kabul etmemekte; G\u00fcrcistan ile \u201ce\u015fit stat\u00fc\u201dde olmak istemektedir. Temmuz 2006\u2019da G\u00fcrc\u00fc Parlamentosu t\u00fcm Rus bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc birliklerinin \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 i\u00e7in karar ald\u0131 ama bu birlikler yerinde kald\u0131. A\u011fustos 2008\u2019de Osetya \u00fczerine Rusya-G\u00fcrcistan sava\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nemde, Abhaz g\u00fc\u00e7leri Kodori vadisine taarruz etti ve G\u00fcrc\u00fc kuvvetleri geri \u00e7ekildi.<\/p>\n<p><strong>G\u00fcney Osetya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Dilleri Fars\u00e7aya yak\u0131n olan Osetlerin k\u00f6ken olarak \u0130ranl\u0131 olduklar\u0131 iddia edilmektedir. Stalin d\u00f6neminde G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n topraklar\u0131n\u0131n bir k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 da kapsayacak \u015feklide G\u00fcney ve Kuzey Osetya olmak \u00fczere \u00f6zerk b\u00f6lgeler olu\u015fturulmu\u015ftur. 1979 say\u0131m\u0131nda Osetya\u2019da Osetler n\u00fcfusun %66\u2019s\u0131n\u0131 olu\u015fturmaktayd\u0131lar. G\u00fcrc\u00fc-Oset \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131, 1980\u2019lerde \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 ve binlerce ki\u015finin \u00f6lmesine ve on binlercesinin evlerini terk etmesine ra\u011fmen hen\u00fcz \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclemedi. Osetler kendi atalar\u0131n\u0131n \u0130skit-Saka ve Alanlar oldu\u011funu ve 2700 y\u0131ld\u0131r G\u00fcney Osetya topraklar\u0131nda ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 iddia etmektedirler. G\u00fcrc\u00fclere g\u00f6re Osetler, 200-300 y\u0131l \u00f6nce b\u00f6lgeye misafir gelmi\u015ftir. Baz\u0131 g\u00fcvenilir kaynaklar Osetlerin G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya 12. y\u00fczy\u0131l ve Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019daki Cengiz ordular\u0131n\u0131n i\u015fgali esnas\u0131nda 13. y\u00fczy\u0131lda geldi\u011fini g\u00f6stermektedir. \u0130lk b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma 1918-1921 aras\u0131nda meydana geldi. 20 May\u0131s 1918\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti\u011finde Osetler, G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7inde kalmak istemedi. 1774\u2019te g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc olarak Rus taraf\u0131na kat\u0131lm\u0131\u015flard\u0131. G\u00fcney Osetya, 8 Haziran 1920\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti. \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalarda 5 bin kadar Osetyal\u0131 \u00f6ld\u00fcr\u00fcld\u00fc. Nisan 1922\u2019de G\u00fcney Osetya Oblast\u0131 kuruldu.<\/p>\n<p>1980\u2019lerin sonunda yeni milliyet\u00e7i partiler ve hareketler ortaya \u00e7\u0131km\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Osetler, Halk\u0131n \u00d6nc\u00fcs\u00fc (Ademon Nykhas) Partisini kurmu\u015flard\u0131. Bu d\u00f6nemde, G\u00fcney Osetya n\u00fcfusunun \u00fc\u00e7te ikisini Osetler, \u00fc\u00e7te birinden az\u0131n\u0131 G\u00fcrc\u00fcler olu\u015fturuyordu. \u0130lk \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma sinyali Halk\u0131n \u00d6nc\u00fcs\u00fc Partisi liderinin 1989\u2019da Abhazlara ayr\u0131lmalar\u0131 ile ilgili destek mektubu ile geldi. Ard\u0131ndan G\u00fcrc\u00fcler kendi topraklar\u0131ndaki tek resm\u00ee dilin G\u00fcrc\u00fcce oldu\u011funa dair bir kanun \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131lar. Osetlerin \u00e7ok az\u0131 G\u00fcrc\u00fcce konu\u015fabiliyordu. Halk\u0131n \u00d6nc\u00fcs\u00fc, SSCB y\u00f6netimine Kuzey Osetya ile birle\u015ftirilmeleri i\u00e7in bir dilek\u00e7e g\u00f6nderdi. Ard\u0131ndan G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, G\u00fcney Osetya ba\u015fkentine b\u00fcy\u00fck bir y\u00fcr\u00fcy\u00fc\u015f yapmak istediler ancak Sovyet askerlerince engellendi. 1989\u2019da Kuzey Osetyal\u0131lar G\u00fcney ile birlikteli\u011fi, G\u00fcney Osetya da G\u00fcrcistan i\u00e7inde \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fcn g\u00fcvenceye al\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131 ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k istedi\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan Y\u00fcksek Sovyeti bu karar\u0131 anayasaya ayk\u0131r\u0131 buldu\u011funu belirtti. Bu y\u00f6ndeki a\u00e7\u0131klamalar ve siyasal y\u00f6nlendirmeler sonucu G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da ve Osetya\u2019da \u015fiddet hareketleri ba\u015flad\u0131. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n etkisiyle sa\u011flanan \u201cate\u015fkesten\u201d sonra 500 civar\u0131nda Rus askeri G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019ya yerle\u015ftirildi.<\/p>\n<p>A\u011fustos 1990\u2019da G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, Halk\u0131n \u00d6nc\u00fcs\u00fc\u2019n\u00fcn se\u00e7imlere girmesini yasaklay\u0131nca, 20 Eyl\u00fcl 1990\u2019da G\u00fcney Oset lideri ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z demokratik Sovyet cumhuriyeti olduklar\u0131n\u0131 ilan etti. \u0130ki taraf\u0131n da uzla\u015fmaya hatta g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeye yana\u015fmamas\u0131 \u00fczerine \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar ba\u015flad\u0131. Sava\u015f daha \u00e7ok G\u00fcney Osetya ba\u015fkenti Sinvali etraf\u0131nda oldu. 18 ay s\u00fcren G\u00fcrc\u00fc ablukas\u0131 \u00fczerine Sovyetler duruma el koydu ve 20 \u015eubat 1991\u2019de ablukan\u0131n kald\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 istedi<a href=\"#_edn29\" name=\"_ednref29\">[29]<\/a>. 23 Mart 1991\u2019de Yeltsin ve Gamsahurdiya aras\u0131nda yap\u0131lan ve \u015fiddeti sona erdiren protokol de uygulanmad\u0131. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler zamanla G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019y\u0131 terk etti, G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131lar da Kuzey Osetya\u2019ya ka\u00e7t\u0131. 1992 bahar\u0131nda da \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar tekrar ba\u015flad\u0131, Kuzey Osetya G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a ekonomik boykot uygulamaya ba\u015flad\u0131. 1989\u2019da ba\u015flayan ve Haziran 1992\u2019ye kadar s\u00fcren \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalarda 400\u2019den fazla G\u00fcrc\u00fc, 1.000\u2019den fazla Oset \u00f6ld\u00fc. Haziran 1992\u2019de Yeltsin ile \u015eevardnadze aras\u0131nda ba\u015flayan bar\u0131\u015f g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri sonucunda b\u00f6lgeden b\u00fct\u00fcn silahl\u0131 g\u00fc\u00e7lerin \u00e7ekilmesi, \u00fc\u00e7 taraf\u0131n da kat\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir g\u00f6zlemci heyetinin bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n korunmas\u0131nda g\u00f6rev yapmas\u0131 kabul edildi ve G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131 m\u00fcltecilerin topraklar\u0131na d\u00f6nmelerine izin verildi. Ancak tam anlam\u0131yla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm sa\u011flanamad\u0131\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in 11.000 G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131 Kuzey Osetya\u2019da kald\u0131, 7.000 G\u00fcrc\u00fc de ya\u015fad\u0131klar\u0131 topraklara d\u00f6nmedi.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Il\u0131ml\u0131 lider \u015eevardnadze d\u00f6neminde taraflar birbirine daha yak\u0131n davrand\u0131. 1996\u2019dan itibaren ili\u015fkiler yumu\u015fay\u0131p ortak a\u00e7\u0131klamalar yap\u0131ld\u0131ysa da bir anla\u015fmaya var\u0131lamad\u0131. Rusya a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan bu b\u00f6lge stratejik konuma sahiptir; ayr\u0131ca G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n bir sorun olarak varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 Rusya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinde denetim kurmas\u0131na olanak sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan-Osetya \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm bulmak amac\u0131yla AG\u0130T b\u00fcnyesinde Rusya, G\u00fcrcistan ve G\u00fcney ile Kuzey Osetya h\u00fck\u00fcmet temsilcilerinden olu\u015fan i\u015fbirli\u011fi komisyonu olu\u015fturulmu\u015f bulunuyor. Kas\u0131m 1997 ortalar\u0131nda \u015eevardnadze, G\u00fcney Osetya ba\u015fkan\u0131 Ludwig Chibirov ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015ft\u00fc, ancak bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeden herhangi bir bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcme ula\u015f\u0131lamad\u0131; bununla beraber enerji ve tar\u0131m alan\u0131nda i\u015fbirli\u011finin yap\u0131lmas\u0131, g\u00f6\u00e7menlerin yurtlar\u0131na d\u00f6nmesi, bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 korumaya \u00f6zen g\u00f6sterilmesi konular\u0131nda uzla\u015ft\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 belirten ortak bir bildiri yay\u0131nlad\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<p><strong>2008 Rus-G\u00fcrc\u00fc Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 G\u00fcney Osetya ve Abhazya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>2004 y\u0131l\u0131nda Saaka\u015fvili\u2019nin Ba\u015fkan olmas\u0131 ile ili\u015fkiler tekrar gerilmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. G\u00fcrc\u00fc polis, G\u00fcney Osetya ekonomisi i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli olan Rusya ile serbest ticaret noktas\u0131n\u0131 kapatt\u0131. Rus Dumas\u0131, Oset ayr\u0131lma isteklerini destekleyen bir karar \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. B\u00f6ylece 2008\u2019deki sava\u015fa gelindi. Kosova\u2019n\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkelerin \u00e7o\u011fu taraf\u0131ndan kabul edilmesinden sonra Rusya da bu konudaki politikas\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Abhaz ve G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131lar Ruslarla s\u0131k\u0131 ba\u011flara sahipti ve pek \u00e7o\u011fu Rus pasaportu ta\u015f\u0131yordu. Rusya b\u00f6lgeye olan angajman\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rd\u0131. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler ve Ruslar aras\u0131nda ya\u015fanan \u00e7e\u015fitli asker\u00ee gerginliklerin ard\u0131ndan, G\u00fcrc\u00fcler G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n ba\u015fkenti Sinvali\u2019ye sald\u0131rd\u0131lar ve bir s\u00fcre ellerinde tuttular. Ancak sava\u015f, G\u00fcney Osetya s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131nda kalmad\u0131 ve Ruslar, G\u00fcrcistan ordusunun altyap\u0131s\u0131na \u00f6nemli zarar verdiler. Rus ordusu, Tiflis\u2019e 55 km. mesafeye kadar ilerledi. Abhazya g\u00fc\u00e7lerini harekete ge\u00e7irirken, Abhazya\u2019daki Rus birlikleri 14 A\u011fustos\u2019ta Poti\u2019yi ald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Uluslararas\u0131 kamuoyunun devreye girmesi \u00fczerine Medvedev ve Saaka\u015fvili, alt\u0131 noktal\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f plan\u0131 \u00fczerinde anla\u015ft\u0131lar. Anla\u015fma G\u00fcney Osetya lideri Eduard Kokoyt\u0131 ve Abhazya lideri Sergey Bagap\u015f taraf\u0131ndan da imzaland\u0131. Rus birliklerinin \u00e7ekilmesi iki ay s\u00fcrd\u00fc. 1 Ekim\u2019de AB, Alt\u0131 Noktal\u0131 Bar\u0131\u015f Plan\u0131\u2019n\u0131n uygulanmas\u0131 i\u00e7in 340 ki\u015filik bir izleme heyeti g\u00f6nderdi. Dimitri Medvedev, Kosova\u2019y\u0131 \u00f6rnek g\u00f6stererek, Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019y\u0131 ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z ve egemen devletler olarak tan\u0131yan bir resm\u00ee belge yay\u0131nlad\u0131. Ancak bug\u00fcne kadar sadece Nikaragua bu cumhuriyetleri tan\u0131d\u0131. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f, bu kararlar\u0131 kendisinin de tan\u0131nmas\u0131 i\u00e7in desteklese de Rusya, bunun m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n i\u015faretini verdi.<\/p>\n<p>Abhazya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zerklik gelene\u011finin uzun bir ge\u00e7mi\u015fi var; bunu G\u00fcrcistan kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda oldu\u011fu gibi Rusya kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda da korumak istiyor. G\u00fcney Osetya ise her zaman Moskova\u2019ya derinden ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 oldu. Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya, Rusya\u2019ya tamamen ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 h\u00e2le geldi. 2008 Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 Ruslar, bu iki b\u00f6lgeye \u015funlar\u0131 getirdi; Rus pasaportu, Rusya\u2019dan turizm te\u015fviki, sa\u011fl\u0131k ve k\u00fclt\u00fcre yat\u0131r\u0131m, yerel h\u00fck\u00fcmetlerle yo\u011fun s\u00f6zle\u015fme ve anla\u015fmalar, s\u0131n\u0131r bariyerleri, artan Rus\u00e7a e\u011fitim veren okullar, artan hukuki yard\u0131m ve hava, demiryolu ve kara yolu trafi\u011finin restorasyonu. Ruslar bu b\u00f6lgelere h\u00fck\u00fcmetle \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmak i\u00e7in g\u00f6nderiliyor. Gazprom boru hatlar\u0131 in\u015fa ediyor. B\u00fct\u00fcn masraflar her y\u0131l 250 milyon dolara geliyor ve bu da Rusya b\u00fct\u00e7esinin % 0.016\u2019s\u0131 demektir<a href=\"#_edn30\" name=\"_ednref30\">[30]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019daki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma b\u00f6lgelerinde Rus askerleri bulunmaktad\u0131r. Abhazya\u2019daki BDT bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fcnde 2.500, G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019daki m\u00fc\u015fterek bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fcnde ise 530 Rus askeri vard\u0131r. BM G\u00fcrcistan \u0130zleme G\u00f6revi (UNIMOG) ise 30\u2019dan fazla \u00fclkeden 130 g\u00f6zlemci bulundurmaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Acara B\u00f6lgesi<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Acaralar, 1614 y\u0131l\u0131nda Osmanl\u0131 \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu\u2019nun y\u00f6netimine girdi. 17. ve 18. y\u00fczy\u0131llarda M\u00fcsl\u00fcmanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 se\u00e7tiler. 1877-78 sava\u015f\u0131nda b\u00f6lgenin kontrol\u00fc Rusya\u2019ya ge\u00e7ti 1920\u2019de ise \u0130ngilizler, b\u00f6lgeyi G\u00fcrc\u00fclere verdi. Sonraki y\u0131l T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin etkisi ile Sovyetler, ilk defa etnik de\u011fil dine dayal\u0131 olarak Acara \u00d6zerk Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyeti\u2019ni ilan ettiler. G\u00fcrcistan topraklar\u0131 i\u00e7inde \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet olan Acara \u00d6zerk Cumhuriyeti\u2019nde ya\u015fayan Acarlar etnik olarak (M\u00fcsl\u00fcman) G\u00fcrc\u00fc olmalar\u0131na ra\u011fmen, 1921\u2019de Sovyet-T\u00fcrk Dostluk Antla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n bir sonucu olarak \u00f6zerklik elde etmi\u015flerdir. Bu \u00f6zerklik onlara ayr\u0131 bir kimlik kazand\u0131rm\u0131\u015f ve dinsel (\u0130slam\u2019a) ba\u011fl\u0131l\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Sovyetler zaman\u0131nda G\u00fcrc\u00fclerin asimile gayretlerine ra\u011fmen Acaralar, \u0130slam\u2019a ba\u011fl\u0131 kald\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>1989\u2019da Abhazlar ve G\u00fcney Osetyal\u0131lar gibi Acaral\u0131lar da \u00f6zerklik istedi ama G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lmak istemediler. Bundan sonra Acara Y\u00fcksek Konseyi Ba\u015fkan\u0131 Aslan Aba\u015fidze\u2019nin Rusya ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye yak\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n, G\u00fcrcistan y\u00f6netiminde uyand\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131larla ilgili bir d\u00f6nem ya\u015fand\u0131. \u015eevardnadze ve Saak\u015favili, Aba\u015fidze\u2019yi kontrol alt\u0131na almak istediler. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcne tehdit olu\u015fturduklar\u0131n\u0131 ifade ettiler. Bu ba\u011flamda M\u00fcsl\u00fcmanlar ile H\u0131ristiyanlar aras\u0131ndaki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar, 1991 y\u0131l\u0131nda, M\u00fcsl\u00fcman halk\u0131n \u201cH\u0131ristiyanla\u015ft\u0131rma\u201dya ve Acaristan\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zerkli\u011fi kald\u0131rmaya y\u00f6nelik politikalara kar\u015f\u0131 g\u00f6sterileriyle ba\u015flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. \u015eubat 1993\u2019te Acaristan\u2019daki silahl\u0131 Acar gruplar\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan Rus kuvvetlerine kar\u015f\u0131 k\u0131\u015fk\u0131rtmalar meydana gelmi\u015ftir. Daha fazla ekonomik \u00f6zerklik i\u00e7in m\u00fccadele veren Acaristan, Rusya ile iyi ili\u015fkilere sahipti.<\/p>\n<p>Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin da\u011f\u0131lmas\u0131ndan sonra Acara, \u00f6zerk cumhuriyet stat\u00fcs\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00fcrd\u00fcrd\u00fc ve May\u0131s 2004\u2019e kadar merkez\u00ee otoriteden siyasi olarak ayr\u0131 bir konumda oldu. Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n tersine Acara, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan ayr\u0131lmay\u0131 istemedi. May\u0131s 2004\u2019teki ikinci G\u00fcl Devrimi sonras\u0131 Acara b\u00f6lgesi lideri Aslan Aba\u015fidze Rusya\u2019ya ka\u00e7t\u0131. O tarihten beri Acara ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan ba\u015fkan\u0131 taraf\u0131ndan atan\u0131yor. Problem \u015fimdilik ortadan kalkm\u0131\u015f olsa da Acara\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6zerk olmas\u0131 yeni sorunlara yol a\u00e7abilir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Kafkasya\u2019daki S\u0131n\u0131r Sorunlar\u0131<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Azerbaycan-G\u00fcrcistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a belirlenmi\u015f de\u011fildir ve Azerbaycanl\u0131 T\u00fcrk az\u0131nl\u0131k ayr\u0131mc\u0131l\u0131\u011fa tabi tutuldu\u011funu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmektedir. Ancak, iki \u00fclkeye de \u00e7ok zarar verece\u011fi i\u00e7in aralar\u0131nda bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma potansiyeli yoktur. Ermenistan-G\u00fcrcistan aras\u0131nda Samtshe-Cavaheti b\u00f6lgesi sorun kayna\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan-Ermenistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131nda pek \u00e7ok alan sorunludur. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 tam olarak belirlenmemi\u015ftir. Ancak, b\u00f6lgenin da\u011fl\u0131k olmas\u0131 ve yerle\u015fimin zor olmas\u0131 sorunu g\u00fcndeme ta\u015f\u0131mamaktad\u0131r. Rus-G\u00fcrc\u00fc toprak anla\u015fmazl\u0131klar\u0131 eskiye dayan\u0131r. 1918\u2019de d\u00f6nemin ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z G\u00fcrc\u00fc devleti \u201ctarih\u00ee s\u0131n\u0131rlara yeniden d\u00f6n\u00fclmesini\u201d talep ederken yaln\u0131zca Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019y\u0131 de\u011fil, Krasnodar b\u00f6lgesini de kastetmekteydi. 1921\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Sovyet cumhuriyeti olmas\u0131ndan sonra bug\u00fcnk\u00fcne yak\u0131n bir s\u0131n\u0131r \u00e7izilmi\u015fti. G\u00fcrcistan, Rusya\u2019dan Verhniy Lars b\u00f6lgesi ile ilgili toprak talebinde bulunmaktad\u0131r. Verhniy Lars b\u00f6lgesi 1929\u2019da Rusya\u2019dan G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a verilmi\u015fti.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>(1) Samtshe\u2013Cavaheti <\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan topraklar\u0131 i\u00e7inde yer alan Samtshe\u2013Cavaheti b\u00f6lgesi sert iklimi nedeni ile G\u00fcrcistan Sibiryas\u0131 diye de an\u0131l\u0131r. Buras\u0131 tarihsel olarak iki alt b\u00f6lgeye ayr\u0131l\u0131r; \u015fimdiki G\u00fcrc\u00fclerin ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ah\u0131ska b\u00f6lgesi ile \u00e7o\u011funlukla Ermenilerin ya\u015fad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Cavaheti b\u00f6lgesi. Samtshe\u2013Cavaheti b\u00f6lgesini Ruslar, 1828-29 sava\u015f\u0131 esnas\u0131nda Osmanl\u0131lardan alm\u0131\u015flard\u0131. Cevahati Ermenileri, Erzurum\u2019dan g\u00f6\u00e7 edenlerdir. Aral\u0131k-Kas\u0131m 1918\u2019de G\u00fcrcistan ve Ermenistan, b\u00f6lge i\u00e7in k\u0131sa bir sava\u015fa giri\u015ftiler. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, Birinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 sonunda T\u00fcrklerin bo\u015faltt\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00f6lgeye girmi\u015f, Ermeniler ise buralar\u0131n kendine ait oldu\u011funu iddia etmi\u015fti. \u00c7ok fakir kalmaya devam eden bu b\u00f6lge ile ilgili gerilim bug\u00fcne kadar bitmedi. 1999 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan, AB \u00fcyeli\u011fi kapsam\u0131nda baz\u0131 Ah\u0131ska T\u00fcrklerinin d\u00f6nmesine \u015fartl\u0131 olarak izin verece\u011fini a\u00e7\u0131klay\u0131nca Samtshe\u2013Cavaheti b\u00f6lgesindeki hem G\u00fcrc\u00fcler hem de Ermeniler buna kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>(2) Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k isteyen Lezgiler<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Da\u011f\u0131stan ve Azerbaycan aras\u0131ndaki Samur nehri ile b\u00f6l\u00fcnen Lezgi halk\u0131n\u0131n 170 bini Da\u011f\u0131stan, 205 bini Azerbaycan taraf\u0131nda ya\u015f\u0131yor ancak toplam n\u00fcfuslar\u0131n\u0131n 1,2 milyon civar\u0131nda oldu\u011fu tahmin ediliyor. Hi\u00e7bir zaman ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olamayan Lezgiler, ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z Lezgistan\u2019\u0131 kurmak istiyorlar. 1860 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rus \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu, s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 \u00e7izerken bu grubu ikiye b\u00f6ld\u00fc. 1959\u2019dan beri birle\u015fmek isteyen Lezgiler, 1990\u2019da Da\u011f\u0131stan\u2019da Birlik (Sadval), 1991\u2019de Azerbaycan\u2019da Samur \u00f6rg\u00fct\u00fcn\u00fc kurdular. \u015eiddete ba\u015fvurmaktan ka\u00e7\u0131nan Lezgilere, Ermeni Gizli Servisi\u2019nin para ve silah sa\u011flad\u0131\u011f\u0131na ili\u015fkin kan\u0131tlar var.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>(3) Tal\u0131\u015flar\u0131n Ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k \u0130ste\u011fi<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Tal\u0131\u015f Hanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, 17. y\u00fczy\u0131lda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131 ve Nadir \u015eah\u2019\u0131n \u0130ran Af\u015far \u0130mparatorlu\u011fu da\u011f\u0131l\u0131nca 1747\u2019de ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z oldu. \u0130ran bask\u0131s\u0131 devam edince 1802\u2019de Rus hamili\u011fini kabul etti. 1828\u2019deki T\u00fcrkmen\u00e7ay Anla\u015fmas\u0131 ile Tal\u0131\u015f devleti ikiye b\u00f6l\u00fcnd\u00fc. Aras Nehri kuzeyindeki par\u00e7as\u0131 Ruslara, g\u00fcneyi Perslere b\u0131rak\u0131ld\u0131. \u0130kinci D\u00fcnya Sava\u015f\u0131 esnas\u0131nda Sovyetler \u0130ran\u2019\u0131n kuzeyini i\u015fgal edince b\u00f6lge de Rus kontrol\u00fcnde kald\u0131. Bug\u00fcn Azerbaycan topraklar\u0131 i\u00e7inde ya\u015fayan Tal\u0131\u015flar, 1993 y\u0131l\u0131nda Karaba\u011f\u2019da Azerbaycan i\u00e7in sava\u015fmak istemediler. B\u00f6lgede bir ayaklanma tehlikesi olmasa da potansiyel problem devam ediyor.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>(4) Hazar Denizi\u2019nin Yasal Stat\u00fcs\u00fc<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rusya ve \u0130ran aras\u0131nda 1723, 1828, 1921 ve 1940\u2019ta Hazar Denizi\u2019nin kullan\u0131m\u0131 ile ilgili \u00e7e\u015fitli anla\u015fmalar yap\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131<a href=\"#_edn31\" name=\"_ednref31\">[31]<\/a>. Sovyetler Birli\u011fi da\u011f\u0131ld\u0131\u011f\u0131nda Hazar Denizi etraf\u0131nda be\u015f \u00fclkenin k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131 vard\u0131; Rusya, Azerbaycan, \u0130ran, T\u00fcrkmenistan ve Kazakistan. Bu \u00fclkelerden baz\u0131lar\u0131 tek tarafl\u0131 olarak baz\u0131 petrol b\u00f6lgelerini sahiplendi. 1992\u2019de be\u015f \u00fclke de kendi \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcn\u00fc \u00f6nerdi. 1994\u2019te Azerbaycan yabanc\u0131 bir konsorsiyumla anla\u015fma imzalay\u0131nca kutupla\u015fma ba\u015flad\u0131. Azerbaycan, \u00f6zellikle T\u00fcrkmenistan ve \u0130ran ile baz\u0131 b\u00f6lgeler \u00fczerinde anla\u015fmazl\u0131k i\u00e7indedir. Azerbaycan, Kazakistan ve T\u00fcrkmenistan Hazar Denizi\u2019ni orta noktas\u0131ndan sekt\u00f6rlere b\u00f6lmeyi savunmaktad\u0131r. B\u00f6ylece her \u00fclke sahil uzunlu\u011fu kadar bir b\u00f6lge alacakt\u0131r. En az sahile sahip \u0130ran ise Hazar Denizi\u2019nin e\u015fit be\u015f par\u00e7aya b\u00f6lmeyi \u00f6nermektedir. Rusya ise be\u015f \u00fclkenin petrol ve do\u011fal gaz kaynaklar\u0131n\u0131n kullan\u0131m\u0131 i\u00e7in ortak karar alaca\u011f\u0131 bir y\u00f6netim (kondominyum) \u00f6nermektedir. 1990\u2019lar\u0131n sonundan itibaren diplomatik g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelerde Rusya, Kazakistan ve Azerbaycan Hazar Denizi\u2019nin kuzey k\u0131sm\u0131n\u0131 sekt\u00f6rlere b\u00f6lmek konusunda bir ortak anla\u015fmaya vard\u0131lar. \u0130ran ise bu anla\u015fmalar\u0131 tan\u0131mad\u0131 ve %20 pay i\u00e7in ikili g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere devam ediyor. T\u00fcrkmenistan ise BM\u2019nin hakemlik rol\u00fcn\u00fc savunuyor. Temmuz 2001\u2019de, \u0130ran\u2019a ait bir sava\u015f gemisi ve iki jet, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n kendi sekt\u00f6r\u00fc olarak adland\u0131rd\u0131\u011f\u0131 b\u00f6lgede bir BP\/Amoco ara\u015ft\u0131rma arac\u0131n\u0131 uzakla\u015ft\u0131rmak istedi. 29 Eyl\u00fcl 2014 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Astrahan \u015fehrinde 4. Hazar Denizi Zirvesi \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde Hazar Denizi\u2019ne kom\u015fu \u00fclke liderleri bir araya geldiler. Hazar denizine k\u0131y\u0131s\u0131 olan \u00fclkeler, Hazar\u2019da bulunan zengin petrol ve do\u011falgaz kaynaklar\u0131ndan daha fazla pay kapmak istemeleri nedeniyle stat\u00fc konusunda bug\u00fcne kadar bir anla\u015fmaya varamad\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<p><strong>B\u00fcy\u00fck G\u00fc\u00e7ler ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya <\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>Rusya ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya <\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Rusya, Kafkaslarda g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc yitirirse Karadeniz\u2019de, Bo\u011fazlardan Akdeniz\u2019e ge\u00e7i\u015fte, Orta Do\u011fu\u2019da ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019da da etkinli\u011fini kaybeder. Bu b\u00f6lge Rusya a\u00e7\u0131s\u0131ndan ya\u015famsal \u00f6nemde stratejik bir konumdad\u0131r. Rusya Azerbaycan, G\u00fcrcistan, Ermenistan ile ekonomik, diplomatik ve asker\u00ee ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirerek etkinli\u011fini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmeyi ama\u00e7lamaktad\u0131r. Bu y\u00f6nde Ermenistan ve k\u0131smen Azerbaycan ile etkili ili\u015fkiler kurmu\u015ftur. Rusya bu devletlere asker\u00ee-stratejik alanda \u00f6nemli etki g\u00fcc\u00fcne sahiptir; bu etki g\u00fcc\u00fc ekonomik alanda azd\u0131r ve i\u00e7 politika alan\u0131nda daha da aza iner ve i\u00e7 politika alan\u0131nda \u00f6nceli\u011fi bu b\u00f6lgelerde ya\u015fayan etnik az\u0131nl\u0131klar\u0131n durumu olu\u015fturur. Di\u011fer cumhuriyetlere nazaran G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinde Rus az\u0131nl\u0131\u011f\u0131n y\u00fczde olarak n\u00fcfusa oran\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fckt\u00fcr: Ermenistan\u2019da %0.5, Azerbaycan\u2019da %1,8 ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da %1,5<a href=\"#_edn32\" name=\"_ednref32\">[32]<\/a>.\u00a0 Rusya, \u201cistenilmeyen\u201d etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 durdurmak, Kafkasya\u2019da ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131 ideolojilerin etkilerini azaltmak ve b\u00fct\u00fcn b\u00f6lgelere yayg\u0131nla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nlemek, silah ve uyu\u015fturucu trafi\u011fini \u00f6nlemek gibi gerek\u00e7elerle, \u00f6zellikle Ermenistan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da asker\u00ee \u00fcsler kurma ve bu \u00fclkelerin s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131 kontrol etme olana\u011f\u0131 elde etmi\u015ftir. \u201cBar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc\u201d uygulamalar\u0131 da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgede kalmas\u0131na olanak sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>Geli\u015fen Rus sermayesinin yay\u0131labilece\u011fi bo\u015f alan Kafkasya ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019d\u0131r. \u00c7\u00fcnk\u00fc Rus sermayesinin Avrupa ile rekabet \u015fans\u0131 yoktur. Kafkaslar\u0131 arka bah\u00e7esi olarak g\u00f6ren Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bu b\u00f6lgedeki politikas\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde petrole ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn33\" name=\"_ednref33\">[33]<\/a>. Ge\u00e7mi\u015fte \u015eevardnadze\u2019ye, Aliyev\u2019e suikast giri\u015fimleri; Ermenistan\u2019da Ter-Petrosyan\u2019\u0131n istifaya zorlanmas\u0131 ve sald\u0131rgan \u015fovenist Ta\u015fnak hareketinin faaliyetlerine izin verilmesi, b\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar do\u011fal gaz ve petrol\u00fcn d\u00fcnya piyasalar\u0131na naklinin Rusyas\u0131z olmayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6stermek i\u00e7indi. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da sadece Bak\u00fc-Novorossisk gaz boru hatt\u0131 var. Bak\u00fc-Ceyhan boru hatt\u0131 Rusya\u2019y\u0131 devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rak\u0131nca Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 azald\u0131. Lukoil, Azerbaycan\u2019da olsa da i\u015fletmeci de\u011fildir ve b\u00fcy\u00fck bir hissesi de yoktur.<\/p>\n<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019daki etkisi temelde asker\u00ee g\u00fcc\u00fcnden, fakat ondan daha az olmakla birlikte ekonomik varl\u0131\u011f\u0131ndan da kaynaklanmaktad\u0131r. Ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131z Hareketi, Ekonomik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc, GUAM (G\u00fcrcistan, Ukrayna, Azerbaycan ve Moldova), Karadeniz Ekonomik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (KE\u0130\u00d6) gibi olu\u015fumlar \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclke \u00fcye olsa da G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in sa\u011flad\u0131klar\u0131 ile anlams\u0131zd\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn34\" name=\"_ednref34\">[34]<\/a>. Bu \u00f6rg\u00fctler, G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerine sadece d\u00fcnya sahnesinde k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir yere ait olduklar\u0131n\u0131 hat\u0131rlat\u0131yor. Bunlardan GUAM a\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131, KE\u0130\u00d6 ise Rus yanl\u0131s\u0131 olup, 2008 sava\u015f\u0131ndan sonra \u00f6nemleri azald\u0131. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclkesi ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n d\u00e2hil oldu\u011fu AG\u0130T, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n b\u00f6lgesel krizlerdeki tutumu nedeni ile zay\u0131flad\u0131. Avrasya Birli\u011fi ise Putin\u2019in pop\u00fclist fantezilerinden biri olmaya devam ediyor.<\/p>\n<p>Rusya, Ermenistan\u2019a vize serbestisi uygularken, CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization, bak\u0131n\u0131z dipnot: 26) \u00fczerinden Ermeni g\u00fcvenli\u011fini garanti etmektedir. E\u011fer Azerbaycan, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n uluslararas\u0131 olarak tan\u0131nm\u0131\u015f topra\u011f\u0131na sald\u0131r\u0131rsa CSTO y\u00fcr\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe girebilecektir. Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n tan\u0131nmam\u0131\u015f olmas\u0131 nedeni ile bu garantiye d\u00e2hil olmamas\u0131 Ermenilerle uyu\u015fmazl\u0131k olu\u015fturmaktad\u0131r. Rusya ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ortak s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 yoktur, arada G\u00fcrcistan vard\u0131r yani bu m\u00fcdahale de kolay de\u011fildir. Azerbaycan\u2019a bir m\u00fcdahale s\u00f6z konusu oldu\u011funda,\u00a0 CSTO\u2019nun Orta Asya \u00fclkelerinin de yard\u0131ma g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fc olacaklar\u0131 beklenmiyor. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n her \u015feye ra\u011fmen m\u00fcdahalesi ise T\u00fcrkistan\u2019daki konumuna b\u00fcy\u00fck zarar verir. Ermenistan\u2019da Gazprom (ArmRosGazprom), Ermeni enerji alt yap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n %80\u2019ini kontrol ediyor. Bu Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z bir enerji ge\u00e7i\u015f \u00fclkesi olamayaca\u011f\u0131 anlam\u0131na geliyor. Rusya, bor\u00e7lar\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Ermenistan\u2019dan iki hidroelektrik ve n\u00fckleer santrali sat\u0131n ald\u0131<a href=\"#_edn35\" name=\"_ednref35\">[35]<\/a>. Rus hava yollar\u0131 (Sibir), Ermeni hava yollar\u0131n\u0131n (Armavia) %70\u2019ini, Rus devlet bankas\u0131 (Vneshtorgbank) ise Ermeni Tasarruf Bankas\u0131\u2019n\u0131n %70\u2019ini kontrol etmektedir. Ruslar, 570 milyon $ yat\u0131r\u0131m ile Ermeni demiryollar\u0131n\u0131 da sat\u0131n ald\u0131lar<a href=\"#_edn36\" name=\"_ednref36\">[36]<\/a>. 2008\u2019de Serj Sarkisyan ba\u015fkan olmadan \u00f6nce ba\u015fkan olan Rus yanl\u0131s\u0131 Ko\u00e7aryan zaten \u00fclkenin ekonomik zenginliklerinin \u00e7o\u011funu satm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda Rusya, finansal kriz nedeni ile 15 y\u0131l boyunca her y\u0131l Ermenistan\u2019a 500 milyon ABD dolar\u0131 bor\u00e7 vermeye ba\u015flad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan \u00fczerinde kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 di\u011fer bir zorlama vas\u0131tas\u0131 bu \u00fclkelerin g\u00f6\u00e7men i\u015f\u00e7ileri ve bunlar\u0131n \u00fclkelerine g\u00f6nderdi\u011fi havale paralar\u0131d\u0131r. \u00d6rne\u011fin, Rusya\u2019da yakla\u015f\u0131k 2 milyon Azerbaycanl\u0131 \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmakta ve y\u0131lda mill\u00ee gelirin %10\u2019u kadar olan 2,5 milyar dolar g\u00f6ndermektedirler<a href=\"#_edn37\" name=\"_ednref37\">[37]<\/a>. Rusya, bu \u00fclkelere kar\u015f\u0131 illegal g\u00f6\u00e7 trafi\u011fi ve vize rejimi tehdidi kullanmaktad\u0131r. Ermeni ve G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, di\u011fer etnik gruplara g\u00f6re Rusya\u2019da daha s\u00fcrekli kalan i\u015f\u00e7i g\u00f6\u00e7menlerine sahiptir. \u00c7o\u011fu \u00e7ifte vatanda\u015fl\u0131k al\u0131p, b\u00fcy\u00fck oranda Ruslarla evlenmektedir. E\u011fitim alan\u0131nda, Moskova Devlet \u00dcniversitesi Bak\u00fc\u2019de bir b\u00f6l\u00fcm olu\u015fturmu\u015f olup, kadrosunda genellikle ziyaret\u00e7i Rus profes\u00f6rler bulunmaktad\u0131r. Moskova\u2019da a\u00e7\u0131lm\u0131\u015f BDT A\u00e7\u0131k \u00dcniversitesi de internet \u00fczerinden e\u011fitim vermektedir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Rusya, 2008\u2019deki G\u00fcrcistan Sava\u015f\u0131 sonras\u0131 asker\u00ee vas\u0131talar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funu geri g\u00f6t\u00fcrmedi, Ermenistan\u2019daki G\u00fcmr\u00fc \u00fcss\u00fcne g\u00f6nderdi. \u00dcss\u00fcn kiralama s\u00f6zle\u015fmesi 2044 y\u0131l\u0131na kadar uzat\u0131ld\u0131 ve s\u00f6zle\u015fmenin kapsam\u0131 Ermeni g\u00fcvenli\u011fine b\u00fct\u00fcn tehditleri i\u00e7erecek \u015fekilde geni\u015fletildi. Rusya, Azerbaycan \u00fczerinde s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 bir do\u011frudan etkiye sahiptir. A\u00e7\u0131k\u00e7a Bat\u0131 yanl\u0131s\u0131 olmamas\u0131 nedeni ile Aliyev ile ili\u015fkilerinden memnundur. <em>B\u00f6lgedeki sava\u015flar ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar, anti-Rus e\u011filimleri gizleyerek \u00e7at\u0131\u015fan taraflar aras\u0131ndaki d\u00fc\u015fmanl\u0131klar\u0131 k\u00f6r\u00fcklemektedir. B\u00f6lgede birbirlerine muhta\u00e7 topluluklar aras\u0131ndaki bu e\u011filimler, b\u00f6lge \u00fczerinde Rusya d\u00e2hil di\u011fer b\u00f6lge d\u0131\u015f\u0131 \u00fclkelerin b\u00f6lgede egemenlik kurmalar\u0131na olanak sa\u011flamaktad\u0131r. <\/em>Rusya, maliyeti y\u00fcksek stratejik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 k\u00f6r\u00fckleme politikas\u0131ndan \u00e7ok, \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 dondurma politikas\u0131 izlemektedir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0ABD ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Sovyetler Birli\u011fi\u2019nin \u00e7\u00f6k\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnden sonra Kafkasya \u00fclkeleri Amerikan elitinin odak noktas\u0131 oldu. Amerikal\u0131lar i\u00e7in bunun birka\u00e7 nedeni vard\u0131. \u00d6ncelikle Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n jeostratejik olarak Rusya i\u00e7in Orta Do\u011fu ile aras\u0131ndaki k\u00f6pr\u00fc oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcyordu. E\u011fer ABD, Kafkas \u00fclkeleri ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirirse Rusya\u2019n\u0131n g\u00fcneye inmesinin \u00f6n\u00fcne ge\u00e7ilece\u011fi de\u011ferlendiriliyordu. Clinton ve Bush i\u00e7in, Kafkasya daha uzun d\u00f6nemli Orta Do\u011fu politikas\u0131n\u0131n bir par\u00e7as\u0131 idi. \u0130kinci olarak, ABD petrol \u015firketleri Hazar Denizi petrol kaynaklar\u0131na ula\u015fmak istiyordu. ABD, b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri ile enerji projeleri i\u00e7in Moskova\u2019y\u0131 devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rakarak lobi faaliyetlerine giri\u015fti. \u0130lave olarak, Karaba\u011f konusundaki AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019na kat\u0131larak etno-politik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcne de d\u00e2hil oldu. Ge\u00e7en 20 y\u0131l boyunca Kafkasya, B\u00fcy\u00fck Orta Do\u011fu Projesi\u2019nin \u00f6nemli bir unsuru olmaya devam etti. Bununla beraber, ABD; Kafkasya \u00fclkeleri olan Ermenistan, G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan ile hem b\u00f6lgesel kapsamda hem de ikili d\u00fczeyde ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirdi.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>ABD\u2019nin G\u00fcney Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131n parametrelerini \u00fclkesindeki g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc Ermeni lobisinin beklentileri, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Bat\u0131 ittifak\u0131na kat\u0131lma gayreti ve Azerbaycan\u2019daki enerji kaynaklar\u0131 yan\u0131nda b\u00f6lgenin Do\u011fu ile Bat\u0131 aras\u0131nda ticaret ve enerji ge\u00e7i\u015f hatlar\u0131n\u0131n rol\u00fc olu\u015fturdu. ABD d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n jeostratejik \u00f6nemi \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde; b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerini kom\u015fu \u00fclkeler olan Rusya ve \u0130ran ili\u015fkileri, NATO\u2019nun geni\u015flemesi, Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan aras\u0131ndaki Karaba\u011f Sava\u015f\u0131, bu \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmadan dolay\u0131 1993 y\u0131l\u0131ndan beri T\u00fcrkiye-Ermenistan s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n kapal\u0131 olmas\u0131 gibi boyutlar\u0131 b\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri ile ikili ili\u015fkilerine yans\u0131maktad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn38\" name=\"_ednref38\">[38]<\/a>. ABD\u2019nin Karadeniz stratejisi Kafkasya ve \u0130ran\u2019\u0131 da i\u00e7ine alan geni\u015f bir co\u011frafyay\u0131 kapsamaktad\u0131r. \u00d6ncelikle Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kontrol ve boyunduru\u011fundan kurtar\u0131lmas\u0131 gerekmektedir. Bunun ilk basama\u011f\u0131, T\u00fcrkiye-Ermenistan s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n\u0131n iki \u00fclkenin mutabakat\u0131 ile a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131d\u0131r. \u0130kinci basamak, Azerbaycan-Ermenistan anla\u015fmazl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 sona erdirerek, ayn\u0131 yoldan Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 da teritoriyal olarak Bat\u0131\u2019ya ba\u011flamakt\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn39\" name=\"_ednref39\">[39]<\/a>. G\u00fcrcistan da bu \u00fclke \u00f6be\u011fine d\u00e2hil edilecek ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da Rusya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 bir ittifak ku\u015fa\u011f\u0131 olu\u015fturulacakt\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da en b\u00fcy\u00fck endi\u015fe ve korkusu budur.<\/p>\n<p>ABD, G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in \u00fc\u00e7 proje geli\u015ftirdi<a href=\"#_edn40\" name=\"_ednref40\">[40]<\/a>. \u0130lki Clinton zaman\u0131nda Bak\u00fc-Ceyhan projesi idi ve ABD\u2019nin deste\u011fi ile hayata ge\u00e7ti. Ancak, 1990\u2019larda enerji \u015firketleri projeyi uzun \u00f6m\u00fcrl\u00fc bulmad\u0131 ve 2000\u2019lerde ekonomik durum de\u011fi\u015fince hakl\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131lar. \u0130kinci proje George W. Bush\u2019un 2003\u2019te G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da demokratik de\u011fi\u015fim i\u00e7in G\u00fcl Devrimi idi ama 2008 G\u00fcrcistan-Rus Sava\u015f\u0131 beklentileri bo\u015fa \u00e7\u0131kard\u0131. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc proje ise 2007-2009 aras\u0131nda Ermenistan-T\u00fcrkiye ili\u015fkilerini normalle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in ba\u015flat\u0131lan s\u00fcre\u00e7ti. Ama ABD\u2019nin s\u00fcrece \u00e7ok yak\u0131ndan dahli s\u00fcreci karma\u015f\u0131k, zor ve \u00e7ok h\u0131zl\u0131 h\u00e2le getirince sonu\u00e7 al\u0131namad\u0131. Bu da Ermenistan i\u00e7in y\u00fcksek d\u00fczeyli m\u00fcdahaleler yerine, \u00f6nce kalplere ve d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncelere daha sonra c\u00fczdanlara hitap edecek daha yava\u015f bir politikan\u0131n etkili olaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6sterdi. So\u011fuk Sava\u015f sonras\u0131 Ermenistan ve G\u00fcrcistan d\u00fcnyada ABD\u2019den ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na en fazla yard\u0131m alan \u00fclke oldular. Azerbaycan\u2019a ise 1992\u2019de Karaba\u011f nedeni ile ABD \u00d6zg\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011fe Destek Kanunu\u2019nun 907. B\u00f6l\u00fcm\u00fc<a href=\"#_edn41\" name=\"_ednref41\">[41]<\/a> kapsam\u0131nda yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ba\u015flat\u0131ld\u0131<a href=\"#_edn42\" name=\"_ednref42\">[42]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>ABD i\u00e7in Kafkasya politikas\u0131n\u0131n iki temeli vard\u0131r; enerji ve ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devletlerin Rus etki alan\u0131na d\u00fc\u015fmemesi. 11 Eyl\u00fcl 2001 sonras\u0131 buna ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele veya di\u011fer bir ad\u0131 ile b\u00f6lgede \u0130slamc\u0131 etkinin yay\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6nlenmesi eklendi. ABD, ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta Hazar enerji kaynaklar\u0131 i\u00e7in Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 anahtar m\u00fcttefik g\u00f6rd\u00fc. Daha sonra Hazar Denizi\u2019nden Karadeniz\u2019e \u00e7\u0131k\u0131\u015f i\u00e7in G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n stratejik \u00f6nemine odaklan\u0131ld\u0131. Ard\u0131ndan Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 ile birlikte Ermeni diasporas\u0131 devreye girince Azerbaycan\u2019a yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar ba\u015flad\u0131<a href=\"#_edn43\" name=\"_ednref43\">[43]<\/a>. Bir yandan da ABD petrol \u015firketleri 1994\u2019te en b\u00fcy\u00fck petrol payla\u015f\u0131m anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 yapt\u0131lar. 11 Eyl\u00fcl 2001 sald\u0131r\u0131lar\u0131 ise ABD-Azerbaycan ili\u015fkilerine \u00f6nemli etki yapt\u0131. Azerbaycan, ter\u00f6rle sava\u015f koalisyonuna kat\u0131larak Afganistan ve Irak sava\u015flar\u0131nda ABD\u2019ye hava sahas\u0131n\u0131 kullanma izni verdi. Azerbaycan iki \u00fclkedeki bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fc\u00e7lerine asker g\u00f6nderdi, 30 uluslararas\u0131 ter\u00f6risti tutuklad\u0131 ve \u015f\u00fcpheli ki\u015fileri s\u0131n\u0131r d\u0131\u015f\u0131 etti. Kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda ABD, yapt\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131 dondurdu ve g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ticaret, g\u00fcvenlik ve asker\u00ee i\u015fbirli\u011fi ba\u015flatt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>ABD, So\u011fuk Sava\u015f sonras\u0131nda b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerini t\u0131pk\u0131 Rusya ve Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi yumu\u015fak g\u00fcc\u00fc ile bar\u0131\u015f, demokrasi ve kapitalizmi geli\u015ftirmek sureti ile d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015ft\u00fcrmek istedi. Bu projeksiyon sadece Do\u011fu Avrupa\u2019da ba\u015far\u0131l\u0131 oldu. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da milliyet\u00e7i g\u00fcndemler, etnik \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar ve devletleraras\u0131 rekabet i\u00e7indeki \u00fclkeler Amerikan beklentilerine uzak kald\u0131lar. 2003 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki G\u00fcl Devrimi ile yeni bir d\u00f6nem ba\u015flat\u0131ld\u0131 ve G\u00fcrcistan ile Bat\u0131 kurumlar\u0131n\u0131n yerle\u015fece\u011fi bir devlet hedeflendi. G\u00fcrcistan istenen i\u00e7 d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli i\u015fler yapm\u0131\u015ft\u0131 ama gene de ABD isteklerinin gerisinde idi. 2008\u2019de CIA\u2019n\u0131n yanl\u0131\u015f hesaplar\u0131n\u0131n yol a\u00e7t\u0131\u011f\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan Sava\u015f\u0131 ise Bat\u0131n\u0131n geni\u015flemesini durdurdu ve sadece G\u00fcrcistan de\u011fil b\u00f6lgedeki kom\u015fular\u0131na da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kararl\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 konusunda ikaz oldu. O zamandan beri ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik politikas\u0131 daha hesapl\u0131 bir kulvarda ilerliyor. Kitaplarda yaz\u0131l\u0131 demokrasi beklentileri \u00f6zellikle Ermenistan konusunda olduk\u00e7a azalt\u0131ld\u0131. Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ABD ve Rusya aras\u0131nda bir denge olu\u015fturma zorunlulu\u011fu bir istisna olu\u015fturuyor. Azerbaycan\u2019da ise gittik\u00e7e Bat\u0131dan uzakla\u015fan ve otoriter olan bir y\u00f6netim oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcyor. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n h\u00e2l\u00e2 \u00fclkede Bat\u0131n\u0131n istedi\u011fi reformlar\u0131 yapmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve Bat\u0131 ile uyumlu d\u0131\u015f politika izledi\u011fi kabul ediliyor.<\/p>\n<p>Hazar Denizi petrol ve gaz imk\u00e2nlar\u0131 1990\u2019lar ve sonras\u0131nda ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye y\u00f6nelik politikalar\u0131n\u0131n ana parametrelerinden birini olu\u015fturuyor<a href=\"#_edn44\" name=\"_ednref44\">[44]<\/a>. ABD\u2019ye g\u00f6re Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n petrol ve gaz rezervleri de\u011feri enerji kayna\u011f\u0131 olmaktan \u00f6te bu \u00fclkenin kalk\u0131nmas\u0131 ve s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6tesindeki etkisi i\u00e7in de kuvvet \u00e7arpan\u0131 oldu. Kazakistan ve T\u00fcrkmenistan\u2019da bulunan rezervler de Hazar Denizi \u00fczerinden G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya ula\u015fma imk\u00e2n\u0131na sahiptir. Bu da G\u00fcrcistan ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin enerji koridoru olu\u015fturmada stratejik \u00f6nemini art\u0131r\u0131yor. Enerji koridoru hem G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinin kalk\u0131nmas\u0131 hem de Rusya\u2019dan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z olabilmeleri i\u00e7in \u00f6nemlidir. ABD enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ve Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n enerji alan\u0131nda Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131n azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 da s\u00f6z konusu olunca Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u015firketlerin Hazar Denizi projelerine yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmas\u0131 ka\u00e7\u0131n\u0131lmaz oldu<a href=\"#_edn45\" name=\"_ednref45\">[45]<\/a>. ABD D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakanl\u0131\u011f\u0131, Hazar Denizi enerji diplomasisi i\u00e7in b\u00fcy\u00fckel\u00e7ilik pozisyonu te\u015fkil etti. Bununla beraber, ABD\u2019ye g\u00f6re, enerji koridoru ve kat\u0131lanlar\u0131n ekonomik kalk\u0131nma y\u00f6n\u00fcndeki beklentileri hen\u00fcz sa\u011flanmad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>G\u00fcrcistan, ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lgedeki vekil devleti rol\u00fcnde oldu. ABD, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc destekledi, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019y\u0131 tan\u0131mas\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131. Her y\u0131l Tiflis\u2019e yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 ekonomik ve asker\u00ee yard\u0131mlar\u0131 artt\u0131rd\u0131. \u00d6rne\u011fin 2017 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan, ABD\u2019den 90 milyon dolar alacak ve bu Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye verilecek toplam yard\u0131m\u0131n iki kat\u0131d\u0131r. G\u00fcrc\u00fcler, ABD\u2019nin hep daha g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc deste\u011fini bekliyorlar ama Rusya ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 pazarl\u0131klarda kurban gidecekleri endi\u015fesini ta\u015f\u0131yorlar<a href=\"#_edn46\" name=\"_ednref46\">[46]<\/a>. 8 May\u0131s 2017\u2019de G\u00fcrc\u00fc Ba\u015fbakan Kvirika\u015fvili, Trump ile bir araya geldi. Trump\u2019\u0131n 2018 b\u00fct\u00e7esi kesintilerinin G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a sa\u011flanan deste\u011fi azaltaca\u011f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcl\u00fcyor. G\u00fcrcistan, ABD\u2019nin g\u00f6z\u00fcnde \u00f6nemini art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in g\u00fcvenlik rol\u00fcn\u00fc \u00f6zellikle Kafkasya\u2019ya y\u00f6nelik ter\u00f6rist trafi\u011fi \u00fczerinde bulunu\u015funu kullanmak istiyor. \u00d6zetle Bat\u0131 deste\u011fi olmaks\u0131z\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da mevcut rejimin ya\u015famas\u0131 zor g\u00f6z\u00fck\u00fcyor. Bu da G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n Rusya\u2019n\u0131n insaf\u0131na b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131 demektir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Di\u011fer yandan G\u00fcrcistan, Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne entegre olmak i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli ad\u0131mlar at\u0131yor. Kafkasya\u2019da ABD ile asker\u00ee-teknik i\u015fbirli\u011finde en aktif \u00fclkedir. Haziran 2016\u2019da ABD ve G\u00fcrcistan, savunma ve g\u00fcvenlik alan\u0131nda ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 derinle\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in yeni bir belge imzalad\u0131lar. Bu ortakl\u0131k s\u0131n\u0131r, deniz ve hava g\u00fcvenli\u011fini kapsayacak. Bununla beraber, NATO alan\u0131ndaki i\u015fbirli\u011fi s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131l\u0131 gidiyor. G\u00fcrcistan y\u0131llard\u0131r NATO \u00fcyesi olma iste\u011fini beyan ediyor. ABD ba\u015fta olmak \u00fczere NATO\u2019nun \u00f6nde gelen \u00fclkeleri de G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 ittifak i\u00e7inde tam \u00fcye olarak g\u00f6rme iste\u011fini ifade ediyorlar. Ancak, NATO\u2019nun Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya gibi \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmemi\u015f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 olan bir \u00fclkeyi ittifaka d\u00e2hil etmesi m\u00fcmk\u00fcn de\u011fildir. \u0130kinci olarak G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n NATO\u2019ya tam \u00fcye olmas\u0131 Rusya ile Kafkasya cephesinde kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya gelmek demektir. Avrupa \u00fclkeleri bir Rus-G\u00fcrc\u00fc sava\u015f\u0131n\u0131n kendi kapasitelerini zorlayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fcyorlar. Bununla beraber, G\u00fcrcistan ve NATO s\u0131k s\u0131k tatbikat yap\u0131yor. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda Tiflis\u2019te yap\u0131lan tatbikat\u0131, Moskova b\u00f6lge bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 i\u00e7in tehdit sayd\u0131. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan, Afganistan\u2019daki NATO g\u00f6revine asker veren d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc b\u00fcy\u00fck NATO \u00fcyesi olmayan \u00fclke idi. Trump d\u00f6neminde de ABD\u2019nin G\u00fcrcistan politikas\u0131n\u0131n de\u011fi\u015fmesi beklenmiyor. Tiflis; ABD, AB ve Rusya aras\u0131nda manevra yaparak, NATO ile ili\u015fkilerini geli\u015ftirmeye devam edecek.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Genel olarak Ermeni h\u00fck\u00fcmetleri ABD y\u00f6netimlerinden iki \u015fey beklemi\u015flerdir; as\u0131ls\u0131z Ermeni iddialar\u0131n\u0131n tan\u0131nmas\u0131 ve T\u00fcrkiye ile Ermenistan aras\u0131ndaki s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131n a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131na yard\u0131m edilmesi. 2009 y\u0131l\u0131nda Z\u00fcrih\u2019te T\u00fcrkiye ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda diplomatik ili\u015fki kurmak ve s\u0131n\u0131r\u0131 a\u00e7mak i\u00e7in iki farkl\u0131 protokol imzaland\u0131 ama s\u00fcre\u00e7 Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ve Ermeni karmuoyunun reaksiyonu nedeni ile ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z oldu. Ermenistan-ABD ili\u015fkileri bir ka\u00e7 nedenle olduk\u00e7a karma\u015f\u0131kt\u0131r. \u00d6ncelikle ABD\u2019de ya\u015fayan yakla\u015f\u0131k 1,4 milyon Ermeni\u2019nin olu\u015fturdu\u011fu diaspora siyasi olarak olduk\u00e7a aktiftir ve ABD d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131na \u00f6nemli \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde etki yapmaktad\u0131r. \u0130kinci olarak ABD\u2019nin So\u011fuk Sava\u015f d\u00f6neminde ana m\u00fcttefiki olan T\u00fcrkiye, b\u00f6lgedeki istikrar ve g\u00fcvenli\u011fin garant\u00f6r\u00fc olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc olarak ABD ve \u0130ran aras\u0131nda d\u00fc\u015fmanca ili\u015fkiler belirli bir etkiye sahiptir. Son olarak, Hazar petrol\u00fcne n\u00fcfuz edebilmek i\u00e7in ABD, Azerbaycan ile iyi ili\u015fkiler kurmal\u0131d\u0131r. Sonu\u00e7 olarak ABD-Ermenistan ili\u015fkileri ne iyidir ne de k\u00f6t\u00fcd\u00fcr. Ermenistan da Afganistan ve Irak sava\u015flar\u0131 i\u00e7in hava sahas\u0131n\u0131 ABD\u2019ye a\u00e7t\u0131. Kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131nda ABD, ter\u00f6rle m\u00fccadele i\u00e7in asker\u00ee te\u00e7hizat ve e\u011fitim sa\u011flad\u0131. Ayr\u0131ca, Ermenistan ABD\u2019nin ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na en \u00e7ok yard\u0131m etti\u011fi \u00fc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc \u00fclkedir. Bu da Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ABD yard\u0131m ve yat\u0131r\u0131m\u0131na ne kadar ba\u011fl\u0131 oldu\u011funu g\u00f6stermektedir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan ile k\u0131yasla, ABD\u2019nin Ermenistan\u2019da herhangi bir jeopolitik, ekonomik ve enerji \u00e7\u0131kar\u0131 yoktur. \u0130kili ili\u015fkilerin temelinde Washington ve Erivan aras\u0131ndaki Ermeni alg\u0131s\u0131 ve Ermeni halk\u0131 bulunmaktad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn47\" name=\"_ednref47\">[47]<\/a>. Erivan, \u0130srail\u2019den sonra ki\u015fi ba\u015f\u0131na ABD\u2019den en \u00e7ok yard\u0131m alan \u00fclkelerden biri oldu. Karaba\u011f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131\u011f\u0131nda da ABD, Ermeni taraf\u0131na sempati ile bakt\u0131. ABD Kongresi, 1994 y\u0131l\u0131ndan beri yasal olarak tan\u0131mad\u0131\u011f\u0131 Karaba\u011f\u2019a finansal yard\u0131m sa\u011fl\u0131yor<a href=\"#_edn48\" name=\"_ednref48\">[48]<\/a>. Ancak, \u00e7e\u015fitli \u00f6ncelikler ve \u015fartlar ABD ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda ikili diyalogun derinle\u015fmesini \u00f6nl\u00fcyor. Bunlar\u0131n ba\u015f\u0131nda ABD\u2019nin NATO\u2019daki m\u00fcttefiki T\u00fcrkiye ilgili \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ve Hazar Denizi petrol\u00fc geliyor. Erivan ise T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ambargosu nedeni ile Rusya ve \u0130ran\u2019a yakla\u015fmak zorunda kald\u0131. Buna kar\u015f\u0131n, ABD ve Ermenistan ili\u015fkilerini g\u00fc\u00e7lendirmek istiyor ve yeni i\u015fbirli\u011fi alanlar\u0131 yarat\u0131yorlar. Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi \u00fcyeli\u011fi ABD ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda ticaret ve yat\u0131r\u0131m anla\u015fmas\u0131 yap\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131 engellemedi ve ABD-Ermenistan Ticaret ve Yat\u0131r\u0131m Konseyi kuruldu.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan, CSTO \u00fcyesi olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen NATO ile i\u015fbirli\u011fini geli\u015ftiriyor. Ermeni askerleri Irak, Kosova ve Afganistan\u2019daki bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 koruma operasyonlar\u0131na kat\u0131l\u0131yor. Ayr\u0131ca NATO BiO- (Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130\u00e7in Ortakl\u0131k) program\u0131 kapsam\u0131nda e\u011fitimler al\u0131yorlar. Ermenistan i\u00e7in NATO ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi hem silahl\u0131 kuvvetlerini geli\u015ftirmek hem de T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n ittifak\u0131 kendisine kar\u015f\u0131 kullanmas\u0131n\u0131 \u00f6nleme amac\u0131 ta\u015f\u0131yor. Ermenilerin, Trump\u2019tan beklentilerinin ba\u015f\u0131nda Karaba\u011f konusunda kendi yanlar\u0131nda olmas\u0131 geliyor. G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in ABD politikalar\u0131nda yeni kayma meydana getiren geli\u015fme, 2014\u2019teki Ukrayna krizi ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131 ilhak\u0131 oldu. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinin de ne NATO\u2019ya ne de AB ile Ortakl\u0131k Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019na m\u00fcsaade etmeyece\u011fi anla\u015f\u0131lm\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Rus bask\u0131s\u0131 alt\u0131ndaki Ermenistan, AB ile g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri kesti ve yerine Rusya liderli\u011findeki Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019ne kat\u0131ld\u0131<a href=\"#_edn49\" name=\"_ednref49\">[49]<\/a>. G\u00fcrcistan ise Rus bask\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 reddetti ve AB ile 2014\u2019te Ortakl\u0131k Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 imzalad\u0131<a href=\"#_edn50\" name=\"_ednref50\">[50]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n aksine ABD ve Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri son on y\u0131lda k\u00f6t\u00fcle\u015fti. Bush\u2019un ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6neminde Azerbaycan ABD i\u00e7in sadece enerji sa\u011flay\u0131c\u0131 de\u011fil ayn\u0131 zamanda Afganistan operasyonlar\u0131 i\u00e7in bir lojistik k\u00f6pr\u00fc ve \u0130ran\u2019a y\u00f6nelik istihbarat faaliyetlerinin merkezlerinden biri idi. Bush y\u00f6netimi, Azerbaycan\u2019da insan haklar\u0131 ihlalleri, rejim muhalifleri ve gazetecilerin tutuklanmas\u0131n\u0131 ili\u015fkilerin g\u00fcndemine ta\u015f\u0131d\u0131. Obama ise Aliyev h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ile farkl\u0131 bir diyalog geli\u015ftirdi. \u00d6nce Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik finansal yard\u0131m program\u0131n\u0131 b\u00fcy\u00fck \u00f6l\u00e7\u00fcde kesti. Azerbaycan h\u00fck\u00fcmetine y\u00f6nelik ele\u015ftiriler devam etti. 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda Azerbaycan ile ilgili ele\u015ftirilere Aliyev\u2019in aile \u00fcyelerinin devlet idaresindeki konumlar\u0131 da d\u00e2hil edildi. Aliyev, Ukrayna\u2019daki Maydan protestosundan sonra ayn\u0131 siyasi istikrars\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n kendi \u00fclkesinde de oynanmas\u0131ndan korkarak, Rusya\u2019ya yakla\u015fmaya karar verdi. \u00d6zetle, ABD ve Azerbaycan ili\u015fkileri derin krizde iken Bak\u00fc ve Moskova ili\u015fkileri her istikamette geli\u015fiyor. Bununla beraber, Azerbaycan yeni ABD ba\u015fkan\u0131 ile birlikte ili\u015fkilerin eskiye d\u00f6nmesini umut ediyor. Azerbaycan, kendi i\u00e7 siyasi s\u00fcre\u00e7lerine kar\u0131\u015f\u0131lmadan ABD ile petrol ve enerji lojisti\u011fi ile pragmatik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131 geli\u015ftirmek istiyor. \u00d6zetle iki \u00fclke ili\u015fkilerinin geli\u015fmesi, Trump\u2019\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n i\u00e7 i\u015flerine ilgi g\u00f6stermemesine ba\u011fl\u0131d\u0131r. Bush\u2019un ikinci d\u00f6nemi ve Obama\u2019n\u0131n ba\u015fkanl\u0131\u011f\u0131 d\u00f6neminde ABD, Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik daha liberal m\u00fcdahaleci bir politika izledi ve bu ili\u015fkilere zarar verdi. Trump\u2019\u0131n ise Azerbaycan egemenli\u011fine daha \u00e7ok sayg\u0131 g\u00f6stermesi bekleniyor. Trump\u2019tan di\u011fer bir beklenti ise G\u00fcney Gaz Koridoru\u2019na daha \u00e7ok destek vermesidir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>So\u011fuk Sava\u015f Sonras\u0131 Kafkasya\u2019ya Y\u00f6nelik T\u00fcrkiye Politikalar\u0131<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>1990\u2019larda T\u00fcrk d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131n\u0131n ana tezi \u015fu oldu; e\u011fer \u00fclkeler aralar\u0131nda ekonomik i\u015fbirli\u011fine giri\u015firler, bu ekonomik i\u015fbirli\u011fi kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 bir ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k ve ayn\u0131 zamanda iktisadi geli\u015fme ve refah yarat\u0131rsa, potansiyel etnik veya din\u00ee \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar bertaraf edilebilir. T\u00fcrkiye bu ana tez \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde Karadeniz Ekonomik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (KE\u0130\u00d6) ve Ekonomik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc\u2019n\u00fcn (ECO) hayata ge\u00e7mesinde \u00f6nc\u00fc rol alm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n asimetrik g\u00fc\u00e7 dengesindeki yeri, b\u00f6lgenin \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclemeyen g\u00fcvenlik sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n ekonominin \u00f6n\u00fcne ge\u00e7meye devam etmesi ve b\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerinin Avrupa Birli\u011fi\u2019ne \u00f6ncelik vermesi y\u00fcz\u00fcnden bu \u00f6rg\u00fctler bir t\u00fcrl\u00fc beklenen d\u00fczeye gelememi\u015ftir. AB ve NATO\u2019nun Karadeniz\u2019e do\u011fru geni\u015flemesi ve Rusya Federasyonu d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki Karadeniz \u00fclkelerinin AB ve NATO\u2019ya \u00fcyelik iste\u011fi KE\u0130\u00d6\u2019y\u00fc g\u00f6lgede b\u0131rakm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. KE\u0130\u00d6 i\u00e7inde baz\u0131 \u00fcyeler aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin geli\u015ftirilmesindeki g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fckler, pek \u00e7ok \u00fcye \u00fclke ekonomisinin ge\u00e7i\u015f s\u00fcrecinde ve fakir olmas\u0131 nedeni ile KE\u0130\u2019nin i\u015flevselli\u011fini kazanmas\u0131n\u0131n uzun bir s\u00fcre alaca\u011f\u0131 de\u011ferlendirilmektedir<a href=\"#_edn51\" name=\"_ednref51\">[51]<\/a>. Eski Sovyetler Birli\u011fi ve Balkanlardaki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar durulmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00fcrece Karadeniz Projesi gelece\u011fe y\u00f6nelik bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve olmaktan \u00f6teye ge\u00e7emeyecektir. Karadeniz projesi bu safhada \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlemeye de\u011fil, bu \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlendikten sonra i\u015fbirli\u011fini geli\u015ftirmeye y\u00f6neliktir<a href=\"#_edn52\" name=\"_ednref52\">[52]<\/a>. Azerbaycan-Ermenistan ile Rusya ve Ukrayna aras\u0131ndaki sorunlar yan\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc, Moldova\u2019n\u0131n istikrar\u0131 gibi konular\u0131n alaca\u011f\u0131 \u015fekil KE\u0130\u00d6\u2019n\u00fcn de gelece\u011finin belirleyicisi olacakt\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn53\" name=\"_ednref53\">[53]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Rus ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n tarih boyunca T\u00fcrk ulusal \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ile ayn\u0131 paralelde olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 ve \u00e7o\u011funlukla da \u00e7at\u0131\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 ak\u0131lda tutulmas\u0131 gereken bir ger\u00e7ektir. Bug\u00fcn i\u00e7in ili\u015fkiler dostane bir \u015fekilde s\u00fcrd\u00fcr\u00fclmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131lsa da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bo\u011fazlar, Kafkasya ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019daki \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 ile ters d\u00fc\u015fmektedir. Enerji hatlar\u0131n\u0131n g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar\u0131n\u0131n \u00e7izilmesinde Rusya Federasyonu ile T\u00fcrkiye aras\u0131nda Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesinde rekabet vard\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye \u00fczerinden ge\u00e7ecek g\u00fczerg\u00e2hlar, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n devre d\u0131\u015f\u0131 b\u0131rak\u0131lmas\u0131 ve ona ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n azalmas\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin T\u00fcrkistan ve Kafkasya\u2019ya ilgisi ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7taki yeni bir g\u00fc\u00e7 olarak T\u00fcrk devletleri olu\u015fturma vizyonunu devam ettirmekle birlikte dikkati b\u00f6lgedeki enerji kaynaklar\u0131ndan pay\u0131n\u0131 almak i\u00e7in daha somut politik ve ekonomik kazan\u0131mlara y\u00f6nelmi\u015ftir<a href=\"#_edn54\" name=\"_ednref54\">[54]<\/a>. 2006 y\u0131l\u0131nda kullan\u0131ma haz\u0131r olan Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Ceyhan petrol boru hatt\u0131 \u015fu an T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7in Karadeniz-Hazar co\u011frafyas\u0131nda hayata ge\u00e7mi\u015f tek \u00f6nemli enerji projesidir. Do\u011fu-Bat\u0131 enerji koridorunun di\u011fer \u00f6nemli projeleri aras\u0131nda Mavi Ak\u0131m ve NABUCCO ile Bak\u00fc-Tiflis-Erzurum (BTE) do\u011fal gaz boru hatt\u0131 bulunmaktad\u0131r. Azerbaycan do\u011fal gaz\u0131n\u0131 G\u00fcrcistan \u00fczerinden T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye ta\u015f\u0131yacak olan bu projenin yasal \u00e7er\u00e7evesi tamamlanm\u0131\u015f olup, \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar devem etmektedir.<\/p>\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye i\u00e7in Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n \u00f6nemi iyi anla\u015f\u0131lmal\u0131d\u0131r. \u00d6ncelikle Kafkasya, pek \u00e7ok T\u00fcrk devleti, y\u00f6netimi, b\u00f6lgesi ve grubu ile co\u011frafi ba\u011flant\u0131 sa\u011flar ve T\u00fcrk\u00e7\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcncenin k\u00f6\u015fe ba\u015f\u0131d\u0131r. Bu bak\u0131mdan Azerbaycan ile ili\u015fkiler hayatidir. \u0130kinci olarak, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki Kafkas diasporas\u0131 (en \u00e7ok Azerbaycan T\u00fcrk\u00fc sonra \u00c7erkez, Abhaz, G\u00fcrc\u00fc ve \u00c7e\u00e7en) n\u00fcfusunun %10-15\u2019ini olu\u015fturur ve d\u0131\u015f politikas\u0131nda \u00f6nemli bir etki sahibidir. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnc\u00fc olarak, Ermenistan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin b\u00f6lgeye etkisini engelleyen ve yerine Rus etkisini ta\u015f\u0131yan kilit bir konumdad\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye, \u00fc\u00e7 G\u00fcney Kafkas \u00fclkesi ile farkl\u0131 ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirdi. Azerbaycan, k\u00fc\u00e7\u00fck karde\u015f kabul edildi. Ermeniler ile ili\u015fkiler nazik ve resmen d\u00fc\u015fmancad\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan ise Kafkasya ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019a stratejik giri\u015f kap\u0131s\u0131d\u0131r. Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye bak\u0131\u015f slogan\u0131 \u201cBir millet, iki devlet\u201d oldu. T\u00fcrkiye, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n en yak\u0131n asker\u00ee orta\u011f\u0131d\u0131r. T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan aras\u0131ndaki petrol ve do\u011fal gaz i\u015fbirli\u011fi s\u0131k s\u0131k Rusya\u2019n\u0131n aleyhine i\u015flemektedir<a href=\"#_edn55\" name=\"_ednref55\">[55]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>T\u00fcrkiye, s\u0131n\u0131r kom\u015fular\u0131 olan Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019\u0131n kap\u0131lar\u0131 durumundaki G\u00fcrcistan, Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan ile her zaman iyi ili\u015fkiler i\u00e7inde bulunmal\u0131d\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan ile zaten iyi durumda olan ili\u015fkileri stratejik ortakl\u0131k temelinde geli\u015fmektedir. T\u00fcrkiye ile Azerbaycan aras\u0131nda entegrasyon s\u00fcrecinin h\u0131zland\u0131r\u0131lmas\u0131n\u0131n, gelecekte konfederal bir yap\u0131da bir araya gelmenin, iki \u00fclkenin sorunlar\u0131n\u0131n ortak kaynaklar ve di\u011fer ortak olanaklar arac\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131yla \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmesinin sadece iki \u00fclke i\u00e7in de\u011fil t\u00fcm T\u00fcrk d\u00fcnyas\u0131n\u0131n ortak \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli ad\u0131mlar olaca\u011f\u0131 unutulmamal\u0131d\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn56\" name=\"_ednref56\">[56]<\/a>. T\u00fcrkiye ve Ermenistan, tarih\u00ee ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ortakl\u0131klar\u0131 bulunan iki kom\u015fu \u00fclkedir. \u0130li\u015fkilerin g\u00fcn\u00fcm\u00fcze kadar geli\u015ftirilememesinde en \u00f6nemli fakt\u00f6r Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ve Ermenilerin T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik soyk\u0131r\u0131m iddialar\u0131, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tan\u0131mamalar\u0131 ve \u00f6zellikle Ermeni diasporas\u0131 vas\u0131tas\u0131 ile T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye kar\u015f\u0131 d\u00fc\u015fmanca tutumlar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmeleridir. Ermenistan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019ye y\u00f6nelik tutumundan vazge\u00e7mesinin ve Rusya Federasyonu\u2019nun etkisinden \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131n\u0131n \u00fclkenin \u00f6n\u00fcn\u00fcn a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131na sa\u011flayaca\u011f\u0131 katk\u0131lar\u0131 hen\u00fcz g\u00f6rememektedir. T\u00fcrkiye taraf\u0131ndan ili\u015fkilerin normalle\u015ftirilmesi i\u00e7in i\u00e7 ve d\u0131\u015f Ermeni kamuoyunda belirli bir bilin\u00e7 seviyesinin olu\u015fturulmas\u0131 maksad\u0131 ile \u00f6zellikle medya ve sivil toplum kurulu\u015flar\u0131 vas\u0131tas\u0131 ile gerekli \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n yap\u0131lmas\u0131 yararl\u0131 olabilir.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin G\u00fcrcistan ile ili\u015fkileri ba\u015flang\u0131\u00e7ta iyi de\u011fildi. Diplomatik ili\u015fkiler ancak Gamsahurdiya\u2019n\u0131n g\u00f6revi b\u0131rakmas\u0131 ile kuruldu. G\u00fcrcistan, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Ah\u0131ska T\u00fcrklerine kar\u015f\u0131 tutumu nedeni ile memnun de\u011fildi. T\u00fcrkiye\u2019deki Abhaz lobisi de Abhaz \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 esnas\u0131nda Ankara\u2019n\u0131n G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a bask\u0131 yapmas\u0131n\u0131 sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Bununla beraber, T\u00fcrkiye, self-determinasyonu de\u011fil, her zaman G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc savundu. \u00c7ok ge\u00e7meden iki \u00fclke de ortak \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n fark\u0131na vard\u0131lar. Ermenistan ile dost\u00e7a olmayan ili\u015fkiler, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019yi Kafkasya ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019a uzanan ticaret yollar\u0131 i\u00e7in G\u00fcrcistan ile yak\u0131nla\u015ft\u0131rd\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan bir ka\u00e7 y\u0131l i\u00e7inde T\u00fcrkiye en b\u00fcy\u00fck ticaret orta\u011f\u0131 oldu, yol ba\u011flant\u0131lar\u0131 geli\u015ftirildi ve iki \u00fclke aras\u0131nda stratejik ili\u015fkiler geli\u015fmeye ba\u015flad\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan, Hazar Denizi\u2019nden gelen enerji altyap\u0131 projelerine d\u00e2hil edildi. 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda T\u00fcrkiye, G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan aras\u0131nda demiryolu i\u015fletmeye a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131. G\u00fcrcistan, Bak\u00fc-Ceyhan ve Bak\u00fc-Erzurum petrol ve do\u011fal gaz projelerine d\u00e2hil edildi.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 <em>NATO ve Kafkasya<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Kafkasya, jeopolitik ve stratejik konumu itibar\u0131 ile NATO\u2019nun \u00f6nem verdi\u011fi bir b\u00f6lgedir. G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinden \u00f6zellikle G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan, kendi istikrar ve g\u00fcvenlikleri i\u00e7in NATO ile ilgilenmektedirler. Azerbaycan, Ermenistan, G\u00fcrcistan ve Rusya PfP (Partnership for Peace ~ Bar\u0131\u015f \u0130\u00e7in Ortakl\u0131k) \u00e7er\u00e7eve dok\u00fcman\u0131n\u0131 1994\u2019te imzalad\u0131. 1997 y\u0131l\u0131nda NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council- Kuzey Atlantik \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Konseyi), Avro-Atlantik Ortakl\u0131k Konseyi ile yer de\u011fi\u015ftirdi. Kafkasya konusunda ge\u00e7ici bir \u00e7al\u0131\u015fma grubu te\u015fkil edilmi\u015fti. Ermenistan, Kolektif G\u00fcvenlik Anla\u015fmas\u0131 \u00d6rg\u00fct\u00fc (CSTO) kapsam\u0131nda Rusya\u2019n\u0131n resm\u00ee m\u00fcttefikidir. Azerbaycan ise 2011 y\u0131l\u0131nda Ba\u011flant\u0131s\u0131zlar Hareketi\u2019ne kat\u0131ld\u0131. Ama NATO ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi, iki \u00fclkenin de savunma doktrinlerini yeniden de\u011ferlendirmek ve geli\u015ftirmek i\u00e7in gerekli bir \u00e7er\u00e7eve sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Hem Azerbaycan hem de Ermenistan, NATO\u2019nun 2014-2016 d\u00f6nemi Bireysel Ortakl\u0131k Eylem Plan\u0131\u2019na kat\u0131ld\u0131lar.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan, NATO ile ili\u015fkilerinde olduk\u00e7a dinamikti ve pek \u00e7ok inisiyatife kat\u0131ld\u0131. 2002 y\u0131l\u0131ndaki Prag NATO Zirvesi\u2019nde resm\u00ee olarak ittifaka \u00fcyelik ba\u015fvurusu yapt\u0131. Ordusunu s\u00fcrekli olarak NATO standartlar\u0131na getirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ocak 2008\u2019de yap\u0131lan referandumda halk\u0131n %77\u2019si NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fi lehinde oy kulland\u0131. 2009 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n NATO\u2019ya kat\u0131lmas\u0131 beklenirken A\u011fustos 2008\u2019de Rusya ile patlak veren sava\u015f, baz\u0131 NATO \u00fcyelerinin isteksizli\u011fi \u00fczerine \u00fcyeli\u011fi geri plana itti. G\u00fcrcistan, <em>Noble Partner<\/em> tatbikatlar\u0131 \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde, daimi olarak topraklar\u0131nda NATO Kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k Kuvveti (NRF) bulundurmaya ba\u015flad\u0131. Vaziani \u00fcss\u00fcnde bulunan bir mekanize b\u00f6l\u00fck NATO\u2019ya tahsis edilmi\u015f durumdad\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan; \u0130sve\u00e7, Finlandiya ve Ukrayna\u2019dan sonra topraklar\u0131nda NRF kapsam\u0131nda kuvvet bulunduran d\u00f6rd\u00fcnc\u00fc NATO \u00fcyesi olmayan \u00fclke oldu. G\u00fcrcistan, NATO ve ABD ile savunma i\u015fbirli\u011fini geli\u015ftirirken, T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan ile de m\u00fc\u015fterek g\u00fcvenlik vas\u0131talar\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131r\u0131yor. T\u00fcrkiye, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fini destekliyor.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n NATO ile ili\u015fkilerinde belirleyici olan Rusya ve Bat\u0131 aras\u0131nda denge sa\u011flama gere\u011fidir. Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n NATO i\u00e7indeki en yak\u0131n m\u00fcttefiki Yunanistan\u2019d\u0131r ancak di\u011fer yanda NATO \u00fcyesi T\u00fcrkiye ise zorlu\u011fudur. NATO ve ABD, g\u00fcvenlik ve savunma konular\u0131nda Moskova\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n bir alternatifi olarak g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Bu kapsamda, Ermeni askerleri G\u00fcrcistan\u2019daki NATO e\u011fitim \u00fcss\u00fcne g\u00f6nderildi. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda NATO Asker\u00ee Komite ba\u015fkan\u0131 general Petr Pavel, Karadeniz b\u00f6lgesinde i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7in \u201ckendi kabiliyetlerimizle farkl\u0131 seviyelerde yard\u0131mda bulunabiliriz\u201d dedi. Bu da Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n NATO\u2019dan bekledi\u011fi \u015feydir<a href=\"#_edn57\" name=\"_ednref57\">[57]<\/a>. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da istikrar ve \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fclebilirli\u011fin artmas\u0131 i\u00e7in NATO yat\u0131r\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131n artmas\u0131, NATO standartlar\u0131na uygun savunma ve g\u00fcvenlik reformlar\u0131 anlam\u0131na gelecektir. Ermenistan i\u00e7in sorun gene en ba\u015fa d\u00f6nmektedir; G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da NATO kapasitesi artarken, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n buna verece\u011fi kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k ne olacakt\u0131r? Ermenistan, NATO ile siyasi i\u015fbirli\u011finden ziyade pratik konulara odaklanmak zorunda \u00e7\u00fcnk\u00fc Rusya, Bat\u0131 ile daha sert bir kar\u015f\u0131la\u015fma konumuna gelirse kendine bu \u00fclkenin yan\u0131nda yer bulmak zorundad\u0131r. Rus bask\u0131s\u0131 nedeni ile Erivan, 2013 y\u0131l\u0131nda AB ile i\u015fbirli\u011fini durdurdu ve Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019ne y\u00f6neldi<a href=\"#_edn58\" name=\"_ednref58\">[58]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Azerbaycan ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kazand\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u0131llardan itibaren NATO ve \u00fcyeleri ile yak\u0131n i\u015fbirli\u011fi kurmaya istekli oldu. Bunun ana nedeni Rusya endi\u015fesi kadar, petrol\u00fcn\u00fc Bat\u0131ya ihra\u00e7 etmekti. May\u0131s 1994\u2019te, Yukar\u0131 Karaba\u011f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131n zor d\u00f6neminde, PfP\u2019ye kat\u0131ld\u0131. Bununla beraber,\u00a0 NATO\u2019ya \u00fcye olmaktan ziyade AG\u0130T i\u00e7inde daha b\u00fcy\u00fck bir rol hedefledi. Karaba\u011f sorunun \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnde AG\u0130T\u2019in ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmas\u0131 \u00fczerine NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fi iste\u011fini bir ka\u00e7 kez ima etti. Amac\u0131 NATO\u2019nun Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc tekrar sa\u011flamas\u0131 idi<a href=\"#_edn59\" name=\"_ednref59\">[59]<\/a>. B\u00fct\u00fcn NATO \u00fcyesi \u00fclkeler ile ili\u015fkileri iyi olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen, m\u00fcttefikler ona modern silahlar satmakta isteksiz davrand\u0131lar. Azerbaycan i\u00e7in ise NATO ile ortakl\u0131k T\u00fcrkiye ile olan stratejik i\u015fbirli\u011finin bir yans\u0131mas\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p>2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda T\u00fcrkiye ve Azerbaycan, Stratejik Ortakl\u0131k ve Kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131kl\u0131 Destek Anla\u015fmas\u0131 yapt\u0131lar ve 2012\u2019deki Trabzon Deklarasyonu ile T\u00fcrkiye-G\u00fcrcistan-Azerbaycan stratejik i\u015fbirli\u011fi resmile\u015ftirildi. Bu stratejik ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131n, Azerbaycan taraf\u0131ndan da enerji ula\u015f\u0131m\u0131 ve altyap\u0131s\u0131 g\u00fcvenli\u011fi kapsam\u0131nda oldu\u011fu savunuluyor, Rusya\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6yleniyor. Azerbaycan, artan bir \u015fekilde Rusya\u2019ya alternatif bir \u015fekilde Avrupa enerji g\u00fcvenli\u011finde etkin bir rol oynamaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor. \u00d6te yandan, petrol fiyatlar\u0131ndaki d\u00fc\u015f\u00fc\u015fe ra\u011fmen asker\u00ee g\u00fcc\u00fcn\u00fc s\u00fcrekli Ermenistan aleyhine geli\u015ftiriyor.<\/p>\n<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 silahland\u0131rma tehdidi kar\u015f\u0131s\u0131nda Ermenistan kendine stratejik bir alternatif bulmakta olduk\u00e7a s\u0131k\u0131nt\u0131dad\u0131r. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n iki tarafl\u0131 politikalar\u0131 ve Azerbaycan ile ya\u015fanan son \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalardan sonra Ermenistan\u2019da Realizm anlay\u0131\u015f\u0131 do\u011fdu. Ermenilere g\u00f6re Rusya, b\u00f6lgedeki asker\u00ee varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rmak i\u00e7in iki \u00fclkeyi de kullan\u0131yor<a href=\"#_edn60\" name=\"_ednref60\">[60]<\/a>. Ermenistan, Azerbaycan ile son \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n zirve yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00fcnlerde kendine Rusya ile CSTO \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde bir denge bulmaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015ft\u0131. Ama CSTO\u2019yu kendi g\u00fcvenlik \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131n\u0131n korunmas\u0131nda \u00e7ok da g\u00fcvenilir bulmuyor. Bu nedenle, \u015fimdilerde eski Sovyet ordu sistemi yerine ordusunu yeniden yap\u0131land\u0131rmak ve modernize etmek i\u00e7in NATO\u2019ya d\u00f6nd\u00fc. Azerbaycan ile D\u00f6rt G\u00fcn Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n taktik ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131 Ermenileri yeni bir savunma orta\u011f\u0131 i\u00e7in U d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcne zorlad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya ili\u015fkin NATO kapsam\u0131ndaki geli\u015fmeler, daha geni\u015f \u00f6l\u00e7ekte Karadeniz b\u00f6lgesindeki stat\u00fckoyu etkileyebilir ve Rusya\u2019y\u0131 tahrik ederek, asker\u00ee bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmaya yol a\u00e7abilir. 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda bu y\u00f6nde \u00fc\u00e7 \u00f6nemli geli\u015fme oldu. G\u00fcrcistan, Vazani \u00dcss\u00fc\u2019nde NATO ile m\u00fc\u015fterek bir asker\u00ee tatbikata (Noble Partner 2016) kat\u0131ld\u0131 ama kat\u0131lanlar\u0131n \u00e7o\u011funlu\u011fu Amerikan ve \u0130ngiliz askerleri idi. NATO\u2019nun G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n savunma kabiliyetlerini geli\u015ftirmeye y\u00f6nelik bu \u00fclkede baz\u0131 e\u011fitim programlar\u0131 var. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda Karaba\u011f b\u00f6lgesinde ya\u015fanan asker\u00ee t\u0131rmanmadan sonra, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n NATO ile ortakl\u0131\u011f\u0131 yeni bir safhaya girdi. 1994 y\u0131l\u0131ndan beri NATO\u2019nun BiO program\u0131na d\u00e2hil olan Ermenistan, ikili savunma i\u015fbirli\u011fini geli\u015ftiriyor. G\u00fcrcistan savunma bakan\u0131 Tinatin Kida\u015feli, Azerbaycanl\u0131 mevkida\u015f\u0131 Zakir Hasanov ile yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmede 2017 y\u0131l\u0131nda yap\u0131lacak NATO tatbikat\u0131na Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 davet etti. B\u00fct\u00fcn bu geli\u015fmeler \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli gibi g\u00f6z\u00fckmese de orta vadede NATO\u2019nun b\u00f6lgedeki g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcrl\u00fc\u011f\u00fcn\u00fc art\u0131racak imk\u00e2nlar sa\u011fl\u0131yor. G\u00fcrcistan zaten geleneksel olarak Bat\u0131 asker\u00ee-siyasi yap\u0131s\u0131 i\u00e7inde yer almak isteyen bir \u00fclke, ancak kar\u015f\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131ya iki \u00fclke olan Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n da Avrupa-Atlantik ittifak\u0131na yak\u0131nla\u015ft\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. Bununla beraber, ABD\u2019nin NATO el\u00e7isi Douglas Lute, 22 Nisan 2016\u2019da Londra\u2019da yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 a\u00e7\u0131klamada NATO\u2019nun geni\u015flemesinin g\u00f6r\u00fcn\u00fcr gelecekte m\u00fcmk\u00fcn olmad\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 ifade etti<a href=\"#_edn61\" name=\"_ednref61\">[61]<\/a>. G\u00fcrcistan, NATO\u2019ya yak\u0131nla\u015farak g\u00fcvenlik sa\u011flamak istiyor ama Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkeler Rusya ile bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fman\u0131n kayna\u011f\u0131 olacak bir \u00fclkeye mesafeli durmak istiyorlar.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Avrupa Birli\u011fi ve G\u00fcney Kafkasya<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>AB\u2019nin Kafkasya\u2019da \u00e7oklu \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 vard\u0131r. AB\u2019nin geni\u015fleyen s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 Kafkasya\u2019ya dayand\u0131 ve bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131 ve i\u015fbirlik\u00e7i ili\u015fkiler i\u00e7in \u201cdostlar halkas\u0131\u201d olu\u015fturmak istiyor<a href=\"#_edn62\" name=\"_ednref62\">[62]<\/a>. 1990\u2019larda AB de\u011fil ancak baz\u0131 Avrupa \u00fclkeleri Kafkasya ile ilgilenmeye ba\u015flad\u0131lar. \u0130ngiltere, petrol \u015firketlerinin yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmas\u0131 i\u00e7in Azerbaycan ile yak\u0131n ili\u015fkiler geli\u015ftirdi. Fransa, Ermenistan\u2019a yak\u0131nla\u015f\u0131rken, Almanya kendine G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131 se\u00e7ti ve Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Avrupa\u2019daki ana ticaret ortaklar\u0131ndan biri oldu. 1996\u2019da AB, \u00fc\u00e7 G\u00fcney Kafkas \u00fclkesi ile Ortakl\u0131k ve \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Anla\u015fmalar\u0131 (PCAs<a href=\"#_edn63\" name=\"_ednref63\">[63]<\/a>) imzalad\u0131. Bu anla\u015fmalar ikili ili\u015fkilerde; siyasi diyalog, ticaret ve ekonomi, yat\u0131r\u0131m, yasama ve k\u00fclt\u00fcr alanlar\u0131ndaki i\u015fbirli\u011fi i\u00e7in \u00e7er\u00e7eve te\u015fkil etti. Bu kapsamda, i\u015fbirli\u011fi konseyi, parlamento i\u015fbirli\u011fi komitesi ve bir ka\u00e7 di\u011fer alt komite \u00e7er\u00e7evesinde d\u00fczenli diyalog ger\u00e7ekle\u015fti. Karaba\u011f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 gibi 11 Eyl\u00fcl 2001\u2019den beri b\u00f6lgenin gittik\u00e7e daha fazla ter\u00f6rist ve g\u00f6\u00e7men trafi\u011fine sahne olmas\u0131 Avrupa\u2019n\u0131n takibindedir. AB \u00fclkeleri i\u00e7in Hazar Denizi\u2019ndeki petrol ve do\u011fal gaz kaynaklar\u0131 Rusya\u2019ya olan ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131n azalt\u0131lmas\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir alternatiftir. Avrupa, ahlak\u00ee de\u011ferleri olarak b\u00f6lgede demokratik prensipleri savunmaktad\u0131r. G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerinde de Avrupa\u2019ya daha fazla entegre olma istekleri vard\u0131r. Bu bak\u0131mdan G\u00fcrcistan AB\u2019ye en yak\u0131n \u00fclke olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir. AB ile ortakl\u0131k anla\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 reddeden Azerbaycan, bunun yerine \u00f6zel, y\u00fcksek seviyeli bir anla\u015fma istemekte<a href=\"#_edn64\" name=\"_ednref64\">[64]<\/a> ve bu anla\u015fma d\u00e2hilinde Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f ayr\u0131l\u0131k\u00e7\u0131lar\u0131na y\u00f6nelik bask\u0131 g\u00f6sterilmesini istemektedir. Bu g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeler ba\u015flad\u0131, ama ne zaman sonu\u00e7 al\u0131naca\u011f\u0131 belirsizdir. Bu esnada AB ve Ermenistan aras\u0131nda geni\u015f kapsaml\u0131 anla\u015fma tamamland\u0131. Bak\u00fc ise Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019ne (AEB) kat\u0131lmamakla birlikte, Ruslara \u00e7ok uzak durmak istemiyor. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n yak\u0131n \u00e7evresinde jeopolitik etki b\u00f6lgesi olu\u015fturma iste\u011fi AEB ile hayata ge\u00e7iyor ve b\u00f6ylece AB\u2019yi de dengelemek istiyor. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a bask\u0131ya devam ediyor, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 AB ile anla\u015fma yapmaktan al\u0131koymaya \u00e7al\u0131\u015f\u0131yor ve ona da AEB\u2019yi imzalatt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Sonu\u00e7; G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019y\u0131 Neler Bekliyor?<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcney Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesinin \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclkesi olan Azerbaycan, Ermenistan ve G\u00fcrcistan 2016 y\u0131l\u0131nda ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131klar\u0131n\u0131n 25. y\u0131l\u0131n\u0131 kutlad\u0131lar. Sovyet sonras\u0131 co\u011frafyada devletler farkl\u0131 siyasi y\u00f6netim bi\u00e7imlerine ge\u00e7tiler. Azerbaycan\u2019da bir KGB lideri devlet ba\u015fkan\u0131 oldu. Moldova ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da iki eski Sovyet b\u00fcrokrat\u0131 politikac\u0131l\u0131\u011fa ba\u015flayarak, devletin ba\u015f\u0131na ge\u00e7ti. Azerbaycan\u2019da babadan-o\u011fula bir sistemkuruldu. \u00d6zbekistan ve Kazakistan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fc\u00e7l\u00fc ba\u015fkanlar\u0131 da ayn\u0131 yolu denediler. Ermenistan\u2019da ise Orta \u00c7a\u011f S\u00fcryani belgeleri alan\u0131nda bilim adam\u0131 olan Ter Petrosyan tek Kom\u00fcnist olmayan liderdi. Ermenistan, bir bu\u00e7uk parti devleti ama Azerbaycan\u2019da oldu\u011fu gibi onda da muhalefet yoktur. Azerbaycan\u2019da muhalefetin kilit isimleri ya s\u00fcrg\u00fcnde ya da hapishanededir. Azerbaycan ve Ermeni halk\u0131, otoriter liderlere esir d\u00fc\u015fm\u00fc\u015f, onlar da Rusya\u2019n\u0131n esiridir. Putin bu \u00fclkelere satt\u0131\u011f\u0131 silahlar\u0131, rejimin devam\u0131 i\u00e7in koz olarak da kullan\u0131yor. Silah yoksa sava\u015f yok, sava\u015f yoksa liderin kalmas\u0131 i\u00e7in me\u015fru zemin yok. Bu k\u0131s\u0131r d\u00f6ng\u00fc hem \u00fclkenin \u00f6zg\u00fcr ve demokratik bir y\u00f6netime kavu\u015fmas\u0131n\u0131 hem de aralar\u0131ndaki sava\u015f\u0131n bitmesini engelliyor.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da, \u00fc\u00e7 \u00f6nemli \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma b\u00f6lgesi d\u00fcnyan\u0131n en s\u0131cak b\u00f6lgelerinden biridir; Karaba\u011f, Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da rejim sorunlar\u0131 ve sava\u015f riski alarm zilleri \u00e7al\u0131yor. B\u00f6lge \u00fclkeleri olan G\u00fcrcistan, Ermenistan ve Azerbaycan farkl\u0131 i\u00e7 ve d\u0131\u015f politika rotalar\u0131na girerken, \u00fc\u00e7\u00fc de etkisini art\u0131rmak isteyen Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bask\u0131s\u0131 alt\u0131ndad\u0131r. Sert ve y\u00fcksek co\u011frafi yap\u0131s\u0131 ile Kafkasya, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n yumu\u015fak kar\u0131nlar\u0131ndan biridir. \u00c7e\u00e7enistan kontrol alt\u0131na al\u0131nd\u0131ktan sonra, s\u0131ra Bat\u0131yla b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fme olas\u0131l\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u00fcksek olan Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a geldi. Ermenileri cesaretlendirerek ve fiili olarak destekleyerek Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan\u2019\u0131 sava\u015ft\u0131ran Rusya, iki \u00fclkeyi d\u00fc\u015fman h\u00e2le getirmeyi ba\u015fard\u0131. B\u00f6ylece, Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n Nahc\u0131van \u00fczerinden T\u00fcrkiye ve Bat\u0131 ile b\u00fct\u00fcnle\u015fmesini engelledi<a href=\"#_edn65\" name=\"_ednref65\">[65]<\/a>. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan h\u00e2l\u00e2 aralar\u0131ndaki Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmas\u0131na odaklanm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r ve ate\u015fkes ihlalleri, g\u00f6\u00e7menler gibi sorunlar \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131 her an yeniden ba\u015flatabilir. Hazar Denizi\u2019nin ekonomik faydalar\u0131 iki \u00fclke aras\u0131ndaki gerilimi azaltmad\u0131\u011f\u0131 gibi Ermeni yetkililer s\u0131k s\u0131k s\u0131n\u0131rlar\u0131 yak\u0131n\u0131ndan ge\u00e7en boru hatlar\u0131na asker\u00ee harek\u00e2t yapma tehdidinde bulunmaktad\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn66\" name=\"_ednref66\">[66]<\/a>. Karaba\u011f Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019n\u0131n arabulucusu Rusya, sorunun devam\u0131n\u0131 da sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Ermenistan ve Rusya aras\u0131nda on y\u0131llard\u0131r devam eden siyasi ve asker\u00ee anla\u015fmaya ra\u011fmen, Azerbaycan, ne ABD\u2019nin ne de NATO veya AB\u2019nin deste\u011fini arkas\u0131na alabildi. Ermenistan ise Rusya\u2019ya tamamen ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 ama Azerbaycan, G\u00fcrcistan, Moldova ve Ukrayna\u2019dan fark\u0131 hen\u00fcz Rus askerleri \u00fclke i\u00e7ine bir i\u015fgal harek\u00e2t\u0131 yapmamas\u0131. Karaba\u011f\u2019da bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm Rusya i\u00e7in silah sat\u0131\u015f\u0131n\u0131n durmas\u0131, G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da siyasi n\u00fcfuzunun azalmas\u0131, Rus enerji projelerine yeni rakipler \u00e7\u0131kmas\u0131 demektir. Sahnenin arkas\u0131nda asl\u0131nda Rusya ve ABD aras\u0131nda bir payla\u015f\u0131m oyunu bulunmaktad\u0131r. ABD, bu y\u00fczden Kafkasya\u2019ya bug\u00fcne kadar hep uzaktan bakmay\u0131 ye\u011fledi.<\/p>\n<p>Ukrayna ve Suriye krizleri G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkelerine genel olarak olumsuz etki etti. Ukrayna\u2019da Maydan Meydan\u0131\u2019ndaki g\u00f6r\u00fcnt\u00fcler Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131 muhalif hareketlere kar\u015f\u0131 daha s\u0131k\u0131 tedbir almaya itti. Ermenistan ise Rusya taraf\u0131ndan Ukrayna\u2019n\u0131n yolunu izlememe bask\u0131s\u0131 alt\u0131nda al\u0131nd\u0131. AB ile Ortakl\u0131k Anla\u015fmas\u0131\u2019n\u0131 imzalamaktan vazge\u00e7ti ve yerine Rusya\u2019n\u0131n Avrasya Birli\u011fi\u2019ne kat\u0131ld\u0131. Suriye\u2019deki \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma b\u00f6lgesi de G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya \u00e7ok uzak de\u011fildir. Ermenistan, Suriye\u2019deki Ermenilerden on binlerce g\u00f6\u00e7 ald\u0131. Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019dan oldu\u011fu gibi Azerbaycan ve G\u00fcrcistan\u2019dan da I\u015e\u0130D\u2019e kat\u0131lanlar\u0131n oldu\u011fu g\u00f6r\u00fcld\u00fc ve onlar\u0131n d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015fleri ile ilgili tedbirler al\u0131n\u0131yor. Ukrayna krizinin ard\u0131ndan G\u00fcney Kafkasya \u00fclkeleri kendilerini ABD ve Rusya \u00e7eki\u015fmesi i\u00e7inde buldular. G\u00fcrcistan, Rusya\u2019dan m\u00fcmk\u00fcn oldu\u011fu kadar uzak durarak Avrupa-Atlantik entegrasyonuna s\u0131k\u0131ca sar\u0131ld\u0131. Ermenistan, Bat\u0131 ve Rusya ile ba\u011flar\u0131n\u0131 s\u00fcrd\u00fcrecek bir yol buldu. Rusya\u2019ya jeopolitik ortam\u0131 ve g\u00fcvenlik ihtiya\u00e7lar\u0131 nedeni ile ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131 olan Ermenistan, NATO ve AB ile \u00e7ok yak\u0131nla\u015famaz. Azerbaycan ise hem Rusya ve hem de Bat\u0131y\u0131 kol mesafesinde tutmak istedi. Azerbaycan, Bat\u0131n\u0131n renkli devrimleri ve \u00fclkesine y\u00f6nelik otoriter rejim ele\u015ftirileri nedeni ile olduk\u00e7a ihtiyatl\u0131d\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn67\" name=\"_ednref67\">[67]<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>Aliyev, son y\u0131llarda Bat\u0131ya yakla\u015fmak i\u00e7in pek \u00e7ok kamu diplomasisi gayreti i\u00e7inde oldu; 2015 Avrupa Oyunlar\u0131, 2015 D\u00fcnya Satran\u00e7 \u015eampiyonas\u0131, 2015 D\u00fcnya Tenis Turnuvas\u0131 ve 2016 Avrupa Grand Prix Bak\u00fc\u2019de yap\u0131ld\u0131. Ancak, art\u0131k Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n resm\u00ee politikalar\u0131nda Bat\u0131 kar\u015f\u0131t\u0131 ve Rus yanl\u0131s\u0131 e\u011filim g\u00fc\u00e7lenmektedir. Bunun temel nedeni ise ABD\u2019nin t\u0131pk\u0131 Ukrayna\u2019daki Maydan kalk\u0131\u015fmas\u0131 gibi Bak\u00fc\u2019de de bir ayaklanma \u00e7\u0131karaca\u011f\u0131 s\u00f6ylentileridir<a href=\"#_edn68\" name=\"_ednref68\">[68]<\/a>. Petrol ve gaz fiyatlar\u0131n\u0131n d\u00fc\u015fmesi Azerbaycan b\u00fct\u00e7esine darbe vururken rejime sad\u0131k kesimlere verilen krediler nedeni ile bankac\u0131l\u0131k sistemi krizdedir. 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda G\u00fcvenlik Bakan\u0131 ve yedi \u00e7al\u0131\u015fan\u0131n\u0131n g\u00f6revden al\u0131nmas\u0131n\u0131n ard\u0131ndan, Haberle\u015fme Bakan\u0131 hakk\u0131nda ortaya \u00e7\u0131kan yolsuzluk iddialar\u0131 Aliyev\u2019in bakanl\u0131klar\u0131 kontrol zafiyeti olarak de\u011ferlendirilmektedir. Rusya iki taraf\u0131 da silahland\u0131r\u0131rken, Karaba\u011f konusunda ya\u015fanacak bir asker\u00ee ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131zl\u0131k Aliyev\u2019in pop\u00fclaritesini yok edebilir. Aliyev, Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n Rusya ile bir savunma pakt\u0131 oldu\u011funu ve bunun bir ma\u011flubiyet getirebilece\u011fini unutmamal\u0131d\u0131r. Aliyev, \u015fimdiye kadar paranoya, pop\u00fclizm, belirsizlik ve cesurca giri\u015fimlerle halk deste\u011fini yan\u0131nda tutabildi. AG\u0130T Minsk Grubu\u2019nu da \u00f6nemsemiyor. S\u00f6ylentilere g\u00f6re, Putin, Aliyev\u2019e Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131 almas\u0131 i\u00e7in d\u00f6rt g\u00fcn s\u00fcre vermi\u015fti. Azerbaycan\u2019\u0131n D\u00f6rt G\u00fcn Sava\u015f\u0131 ile Aliyev, asker\u00ee zafer ve kamuoyu deste\u011fi ummu\u015ftu ama petrol fiyatlar\u0131 d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnce manat\u2019ta b\u00fcy\u00fck bir deval\u00fcasyon krizi ortaya \u00e7\u0131kt\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>Ermenistan\u2019da ise siyasi durum nispeten sakindir. Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bask\u0131s\u0131 ile AB \u0130\u015fbirli\u011fi Anla\u015fmas\u0131 yerine Avrasya Ekonomik Birli\u011fi\u2019ni (AEB) se\u00e7en Ermenistan ve AB yeni bir anla\u015fma \u00fczerinde g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmelere ba\u015fl\u0131yorlar. Ermenistan, Karaba\u011f konusunda Azerbaycan\u2019a y\u00f6nelik d\u00fc\u015fmanca tutumuna devam ediyor ve \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm i\u00e7in Rusya\u2019y\u0131 kullanmak istiyor. Minsk Grubu\u2019nda yer alan \u00fc\u00e7 \u00fclkede (Fransa, Rusya ve ABD) kalabal\u0131k Ermeni diasporas\u0131 var. Bu \u00fc\u00e7 milyon ki\u015fi milyarlarca dolarla, Ermenistan i\u00e7in lobi yap\u0131yor. Ermenistan, S\u00fcnni T\u00fcrkiye ve Kazakistan\u2019a kar\u015f\u0131 \u015eii \u0130ran ile i\u015fbirli\u011fi yap\u0131yor. Avrasya G\u00fcmr\u00fck Birli\u011fi i\u00e7inde olmas\u0131na ra\u011fmen en \u00e7ok AB ile ticaret yap\u0131yor ve yat\u0131r\u0131mlar en \u00e7ok oradan geliyor. Rusya\u2019y\u0131 memnun etmek i\u00e7in G\u00fcmr\u00fc\u2019de asker\u00ee \u00fcs teklif etti ve Kosova\u2019y\u0131 tan\u0131may\u0131 reddetti. ABD\u2019yi memnun etmek i\u00e7in ise Bar\u0131\u015f Kolordusu g\u00f6n\u00fcll\u00fclerini \u00fclkeye buyur etti ve Rusya\u2019n\u0131n kontrol\u00fcndeki Abhazya\u2019y\u0131 tan\u0131may\u0131 reddetti. Azerbaycan\u2019da petrol, Ermenistan\u2019da ise etki g\u00fcc\u00fc var. Ermeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti ile diasporas\u0131 aras\u0131nda da \u00f6nemli sorunlar vard\u0131r. Ermeni h\u00fck\u00fcmeti, diasporan\u0131n \u00fclkeye yat\u0131r\u0131m yapmak yerine oyun sahas\u0131 h\u00e2line getirmesini istememektedir. Diaspora ise Ermenistan\u2019daki ger\u00e7ek ekonomi yerine siyasi reformlar\u0131 desteklemekte, yurt d\u0131\u015f\u0131ndaki Ermeniler paralar\u0131n\u0131 kiliselere, k\u00fclt\u00fcrel projelere veya yabanc\u0131 parlamentolarda as\u0131ls\u0131z Ermeni iddialar\u0131n\u0131n tan\u0131nmas\u0131 gibi lobicilik faaliyetlerine harcamak istemektedirler. B\u00fct\u00fcn bunlar Amerikal\u0131lar\u0131 G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da k\u0131sa ve orta vadeli stratejik ittifaklar yerine uzun vadeli devlet in\u015fas\u0131n\u0131 desteklemeye itmektedir. \u00d6te yandan Rusya\u2019ya ba\u011f\u0131ml\u0131l\u0131k Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n ulusal egemenli\u011fini olduk\u00e7a a\u015f\u0131nd\u0131rd\u0131. 2008 itibar\u0131 ile Ermenistan alt yap\u0131s\u0131n\u0131n %80\u2019i Ruslar taraf\u0131ndan kontrol ediliyor. Haziran 2015\u2019te Erivan, Gazprom\u2019un Ermenistan-\u0130ran do\u011fal gaz hatt\u0131 projesini a\u00e7\u0131klad\u0131.<\/p>\n<p>2016\u2019daki D\u00f6rt G\u00fcn Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan sonra Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan devlet ba\u015fkanlar\u0131, Rus D\u0131\u015fi\u015fleri Bakan\u0131 Sergey Lavrov\u2019un 2007\u2019de haz\u0131rlad\u0131\u011f\u0131 safhal\u0131 bar\u0131\u015f plan\u0131 i\u00e7in ilk safhan\u0131n temel prensipleri \u00e7er\u00e7eve dok\u00fcman\u0131n\u0131 g\u00f6zden ge\u00e7irmeye ba\u015flad\u0131lar. Bu, taraflara nihai \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fc d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcnmeden muhtemel bir bar\u0131\u015f\u0131n ilk ad\u0131mlar\u0131n\u0131 atma imk\u00e2n\u0131 verecek. Bu safhan\u0131n beklentileri aras\u0131nda Ermenilerin Karaba\u011f\u2019da i\u015fgal ettikleri baz\u0131 b\u00f6lgelerden geri \u00e7ekilmesi, on binlerce yerinden edilmi\u015f ki\u015finin geri d\u00f6nmesi, ileti\u015fim hatlar\u0131n\u0131n yeniden a\u00e7\u0131lmas\u0131, b\u00f6lgeye bir bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc yerle\u015ftirilmesi var. Sergey Lavrov\u2019un bir Rusya Bar\u0131\u015f\u0131 (Pax Russian) pe\u015finde oldu\u011funa dair \u00f6zellikle Azerbaycan taraf\u0131nda uzun zamand\u0131r \u015f\u00fcpheler var. Ruslar\u0131n Yukar\u0131 Karaba\u011f\u2019da Ermenistan\u2019a verdi\u011fi deste\u011fin arkas\u0131nda \u015funlar var; T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin etkisini s\u0131n\u0131rlamak, Azerbaycan\u2019daki\u00a0Rus kar\u015f\u0131tl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131\u00a0dizginlemek\u00a0\u00a0ve Rusya\u2019daki b\u00fcy\u00fck Ermeni diasporas\u0131 ile uzun s\u00fcreli k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ba\u011flar\u0131 korumak&#8230; G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019daki etnik gruplar b\u00f6lgeye Rus politikalar\u0131n\u0131n giri\u015fine manivela olmaktad\u0131r. Minsk Grubu\u2019nda yer alan ABD ve Fransa ise Rusya\u2019n\u0131n tek tarafl\u0131 inisiyatif y\u00fcr\u00fctmesine fren yapmak istiyorlar ve \u00f6rne\u011fin Rus kuvvetlerinin bar\u0131\u015f g\u00fcc\u00fc olarak b\u00f6lgeye yerle\u015fmesini istemiyorlar. Karaba\u011f, Kafkasya\u2019daki en tehlikeli yerlerden biri olmaya devam etmektedir. CSTO ve AEB i\u00e7inde Ermenistan\u2019a destek i\u00e7in konsens\u00fcs yoktur. Moskova ve Bak\u00fc aras\u0131ndaki ili\u015fkilerin bozulmas\u0131 2008 G\u00fcrcistan senaryosunun benzeri bir durum ortaya \u00e7\u0131karabilir ve T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Azerbaycan\u2019a asker\u00ee deste\u011finin artmas\u0131 gerekebilir.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da Abhazya ve G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019da bir \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm\u00fcnden bahsetmek ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i de\u011fil. 2008\u2019deki G\u00fcrcistan Sava\u015f\u0131\u2019ndan sonra Rusya\u2019n\u0131n bu iki b\u00f6lgeyi birden ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131z devlet olarak tan\u0131mas\u0131 g\u00f6r\u00fc\u015fmeleri geri d\u00f6n\u00fclmez bir noktaya getirdi. 2010 y\u0131l\u0131nda imzalanan anla\u015fmalar ile bu b\u00f6lgelerin y\u00f6netimleri ve ekonomileri Rusya Federasyonu\u2019na entegre oldu. Abhazya ile G\u00fcrcistan halk\u0131n\u0131n s\u0131n\u0131r boyunca temas\u0131 \u00e7ok s\u0131n\u0131rl\u0131 G\u00fcney Osetya ile ise hi\u00e7 yok. ABD ve AB, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n toprak b\u00fct\u00fcnl\u00fc\u011f\u00fc ve bar\u0131\u015f\u00e7\u0131 bir \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcm deste\u011fini ifade ediyor. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019da AB bayra\u011f\u0131, ABD bayra\u011f\u0131n\u0131n arkas\u0131nda durur. ABD, G\u00fcrcistan\u2019a 2017\u2019de 930 milyon ABD dolar\u0131 yard\u0131m sa\u011fl\u0131yor. Yard\u0131m\u0131n temelinde Ukrayna gibi yeni bir Rus sald\u0131r\u0131s\u0131na haz\u0131rl\u0131ks\u0131z yakalanmay\u0131 \u00f6nleme var. AB\u2019nin yakla\u015f\u0131m\u0131 biraz farkl\u0131; tan\u0131ma yok ve ili\u015fki var. Osetya kapal\u0131 olsa da AB\u2019nin Abhazya i\u00e7in e\u011fitim, sa\u011fl\u0131k ve polis program\u0131 var. G\u00fcrcistan\u2019\u0131n NATO \u00fcyeli\u011fine Fransa, Almanya ve \u0130talya ba\u015fta olmak \u00fczere ittifak \u00fcyelerinden itiraz gelince 2014 y\u0131l\u0131nda \u201cGeli\u015ftirilmi\u015f F\u0131rsat Orta\u011f\u0131\u201d stat\u00fcs\u00fc verildi. Bu kapsamda, 2015 y\u0131l\u0131nda NATO-G\u00fcrcistan M\u00fc\u015fterek E\u011fitim ve De\u011ferlendirme Merkezi a\u00e7\u0131ld\u0131. Bu merkez, verilen yard\u0131m paketi kapsam\u0131nda G\u00fcrc\u00fc ordusunu e\u011fitiyor. Azerbaycan ve Ermenistan ordular\u0131n\u0131n ise birbiri ile sava\u015fa haz\u0131rlanmas\u0131 nedeni ile iki \u00fclke ordusu i\u00e7indeki reformlar i\u00e7in do\u011frudan rol oynanam\u0131yor. \u0130ki \u00fclkenin de ana silah tedarik\u00e7isi olan Rusya, ayn\u0131 zamanda Ermenistan\u2019\u0131n g\u00fcvenlik patronu.<\/p>\n<p>Afganistan\u2019daki NATO kuvvetlerine lojistik destek ihtiyac\u0131n\u0131n azalmas\u0131 ile G\u00fcney Kafkasya bu y\u00f6nden de \u00f6nemini kaybediyor. NATO, Karadeniz\u2019deki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131n\u0131 geli\u015ftiriyor, Moskova\u2019ya kar\u015f\u0131 sald\u0131r\u0131 kabiliyeti art\u0131yor. ABD\u2019nin ba\u015f\u0131n\u0131 \u00e7ekti\u011fi NATO \u00fcyeleri \u015eubat 2017\u2019de <em>Sea Shield 2017<\/em> asker\u00ee tatbikat\u0131n\u0131 icra ettiler. Tatbikata Bulgaristan, Romanya, Kanada, Yunanistan, \u0130spanya, ABD, T\u00fcrkiye ve Ukrayna\u2019dan 28 bin asker kat\u0131ld\u0131. Tatbikatta sava\u015f gemileri, jetler ve denizalt\u0131lar kullan\u0131ld\u0131. Tatbikat, NATO \u00d6zel \u0130leri Varl\u0131k (TFB) stratejisi kapsam\u0131nda \u00f6zellikle K\u0131r\u0131m ve Karadeniz\u2019de Ruslar\u0131n manevralar\u0131n\u0131 kontrol alt\u0131na almay\u0131 ama\u00e7l\u0131yordu<a href=\"#_edn69\" name=\"_ednref69\">[69]<\/a>. Ruslara y\u00f6nelik olarak ABD; Polonya, Romanya ve Bulgaristan\u2019daki asker say\u0131s\u0131n\u0131 art\u0131rd\u0131 ve Romanya-Deveselu\u2019daki Balistik F\u00fcze Savunma b\u00f6lgesini operasyonel hale getirdi. Rus yetkililer ise NATO\u2019nun kuvvet art\u0131\u015f\u0131 ve son asker\u00ee tatbikat\u0131n\u0131 kendi g\u00fcvenli\u011fi ve \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na tehdit olarak de\u011ferlendirdi. Moskova, kar\u015f\u0131l\u0131k olarak Karadeniz\u2019deki deniz kuvvetini art\u0131rd\u0131, K\u0131r\u0131m ve Rostov b\u00f6lgesindeki asker\u00ee kuvvetlerini takviye etti. Bu takviyeler i\u00e7inde geli\u015fmi\u015f f\u00fcze savunma sistemleri ve Kaliningrad\u2019a yerle\u015ftirilen n\u00fckleer kabiliyetli \u0130skender sistemleri var.<\/p>\n<p>Rusya\u2019n\u0131n 19. y\u00fczy\u0131lda G\u00fcney Kafkasya ve T\u00fcrkistan\u2019a geni\u015flemesi 21. y\u00fczy\u0131l politikalar\u0131 i\u00e7in \u00f6nemli bir miras olmaya devam ediyor. Rusya, \u00f6zel \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 i\u00e7in bu miras\u0131 sanki iki b\u00f6lgeye de m\u00fcdahale etmek yasal hakk\u0131 imi\u015f gibi kullan\u0131yor. Moskova g\u00f6n\u00fcls\u00fcz bir \u015fekilde bir daha Sovyet d\u00f6nemindeki gibi olamayaca\u011f\u0131n\u0131 kabul ediyor ama modern ve kabul edilebilir \u015fartlarda eski etki b\u00f6lgesini korumak istiyor. Bunun i\u00e7in Bat\u0131 ve uluslararas\u0131 \u00f6rg\u00fctlerin izleyemeyece\u011fi daha kurnaz ve yumu\u015fak y\u00f6ntemler se\u00e7iyor<a href=\"#_edn70\" name=\"_ednref70\">[70]<\/a>. Hem G\u00fcney Kafkasya hem de T\u00fcrkistan\u2019da k\u00fclt\u00fcrel ba\u011flar\u0131, hidrokarbon kaynaklar\u0131 ve g\u00fcvenli\u011fi \u00fczerinden oynayacak oyunlar\u0131 bulunmaktad\u0131r. Ekonomik ve k\u00fclt\u00fcrel olarak s\u0131zd\u0131\u011f\u0131 Ermenistan ve K\u0131rg\u0131zistan en \u00e7ok etkili oldu\u011fu \u00fclkelerdir. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019daki varl\u0131\u011f\u0131 tarafl\u0131d\u0131r ve kulland\u0131\u011f\u0131 y\u00f6ntemler kendine yaramaktad\u0131r. Rus yak\u0131n co\u011frafyas\u0131 veya arka bah\u00e7esi gittik\u00e7e anlams\u0131z h\u00e2le gelmektedir. Kendilerini ge\u00e7mi\u015f imparatorluklar\u0131n modern temsilcisi olarak g\u00f6ren Rus y\u00f6neticiler, Avrasya Birli\u011fi gibi yeni fantezilerle hayallerini s\u00fcrd\u00fcrmek istemektedirler.<\/p>\n<p>G\u00fcney Kafkasya i\u00e7in gelecek pek parlak g\u00f6z\u00fckmemektedir. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da bar\u0131\u015f s\u00fcre\u00e7leri 10-15 y\u0131l \u00f6nce olduk\u00e7a dinamikti ve \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n tamamen sona ermesi i\u00e7in radikal tavsiyeler yap\u0131l\u0131yordu. \u015eimdi ise b\u00f6lgesel olarak sosyal geli\u015fme kapsam\u0131nda uzam\u0131\u015f \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar i\u00e7in daha ger\u00e7ek\u00e7i ve yava\u015f de\u011fi\u015fimler \u00f6ng\u00f6r\u00fcl\u00fcyor. 1990\u2019larda Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkeler ile olan romantik beklentilerin yerini art\u0131k \u00e7ok daha pragmatik ili\u015fkiler al\u0131yor. Bat\u0131l\u0131 \u00fclkeler 15 milyonluk G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019ya \u00f6ncelik vermiyor. ABD\u2019nin G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da \u00e7ok \u00f6nemli \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131 olmakla birlikte bunlar\u0131n hi\u00e7biri hayati de\u011fildir, bu y\u00fczden ABD i\u00e7in b\u00f6lge asker\u00ee riske girmeye de\u011fmez. B\u00f6lge \u00fclkelerine derinden angaje olarak i\u00e7 d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcmlerini sa\u011flamak ve Bat\u0131ya entegre etmek ABD\u2019nin b\u00f6lge politikas\u0131n\u0131n \u00f6zetidir. G\u00fcrcistan ile Derin ve Geni\u015f Serbest Ticaret B\u00f6lgesi anla\u015fmas\u0131 imzalad\u0131. Bug\u00fcne kadarki d\u00f6n\u00fc\u015f\u00fcm projeleri ba\u015far\u0131s\u0131z olmu\u015f veya \u00e7ok az ilerleme sa\u011flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. ABD, bunlardan vazge\u00e7mek yerine nelerin yolunda gitmedi\u011fine bakarak, yeni sosyal m\u00fchendislik projeleri geli\u015ftirmeye \u00e7al\u0131\u015fmaktad\u0131r. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da yava\u015f ve d\u00fczenli geli\u015fmelerin ABD\u2019nin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na hizmet etmek i\u00e7in en uygun strateji oldu\u011fu d\u00fc\u015f\u00fcn\u00fclmektedir. Azerbaycan, otoriter rejimi nedeni ile ABD i\u00e7in en zor ortak olarak g\u00f6r\u00fclmektedir<a href=\"#_edn71\" name=\"_ednref71\">[71]<\/a>. Bu \u00fclkedeki demokrasi geli\u015ftirme akt\u00f6rleri son y\u0131llarda ka\u00e7mak zorunda kalm\u0131\u015ft\u0131r. Bu y\u00fczden ABD\u2019nin Azerbaycan \u00fczerinde etki kurgusu, sivil topluma n\u00fcfuzu olduk\u00e7a zay\u0131flam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Sonu\u00e7 olarak G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019da \u00fc\u00e7 b\u00f6lgesel \u00e7at\u0131\u015fma h\u00e2l\u00e2 \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fclmemi\u015f durumdad\u0131r ve yeniden \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n ba\u015flama riski vard\u0131r. Kafkasya\u2019daki \u00e7\u00f6z\u00fcmlerin temelinde Rus i\u015fgalinin \u00f6nlenmesi veya son verilmesi var. Ancak, Rusya\u2019n\u0131n da bu b\u00f6lgelere uzun vadeli yat\u0131r\u0131mlar yapt\u0131\u011f\u0131 g\u00f6z \u00f6n\u00fcne al\u0131n\u0131rsa \u00fcmitsizlik art\u0131yor. \u00dc\u00e7 \u00fclke i\u00e7inde sadece Azerbaycan ekonomisi ba\u011f\u0131ms\u0131zl\u0131k \u00f6ncesi seviyeye gelmi\u015f, G\u00fcrcistan ve Ermenistan bu seviyeye ula\u015famam\u0131\u015ft\u0131r<a href=\"#_edn72\" name=\"_ednref72\">[72]<\/a>. \u00dc\u00e7\u00fcnde de geni\u015f yolsuzluklar vard\u0131r (G\u00fcrcistan son y\u0131llarda yolsuzlukla m\u00fccadelede \u00f6nemli yol kat etti) ve hepsi Rus bask\u0131s\u0131na kar\u015f\u0131 hassast\u0131r. G\u00fcrcistan ve Azerbaycan, s\u0131n\u0131rda\u015f olduklar\u0131 Rusya\u2019daki Kuzey Kafkasya Cumhuriyetlerinden gelebilecek tehditlere a\u00e7\u0131kt\u0131r<strong>. <\/strong>G\u00fcney Kafkasya b\u00f6lgesi son y\u0131llardaki geli\u015fmelerle gittik\u00e7e daha karma\u015f\u0131k h\u00e2le gelmektedir. So\u011fuk Sava\u015f sonras\u0131 yeniden \u015fekillenen b\u00f6lgedeki siyasi d\u00fczen; Rusya\u2019n\u0131n K\u0131r\u0131m\u2019\u0131 ilhak etmesi, de\u011fi\u015fen enerji pazarlar\u0131, Orta Do\u011fu \u00e7at\u0131\u015fmalar\u0131n\u0131n b\u00f6lgeye yans\u0131malar\u0131, ABD\u2019deki yeni y\u00f6netim ve AB\u2019nin i\u00e7 zorluklar\u0131n\u0131n etkileri ile yeni bir evreye gelmektedir. Ulusa\u015fan ve yasal olmayan trafik ile m\u00fccadele edilmelidir. B\u00f6lge ile ilgili pasiflik, T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin \u00e7\u0131karlar\u0131na daha \u00e7ok hizmet edecek uzun vadeli bir strateji ile yer de\u011fi\u015ftirmelidir. Bununla birlikte bu strateji devrimsel de\u011fil evrimsel bir \u00e7izgi izlemelidir. Enerji alan\u0131nda da yeni bir de\u011ferlendirmeye ihtiya\u00e7 vard\u0131r. \u00dclkelerle ili\u015fkiler g\u00fcvenlik odakl\u0131 olmaktan kurtar\u0131lmal\u0131d\u0131r. G\u00fcney Kafkasya\u2019n\u0131n enerji koridoru rol\u00fcn\u00fcn, Karadeniz, Ukrayna ve Kuzey Kafkasya\u2019daki geli\u015fmelere etkisi kadar T\u00fcrkistan\u2019a projeksiyonu da dikkate al\u0131nmal\u0131d\u0131r.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong>KAYNAK\u00c7A<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>ABRAHAMYAN, E. <em>The South Caucasus: United, and Divided<\/em>, NATO Policy Forum Armenia, (June 9, 2016).<\/p>\n<p>AKINER,\u00a0\u00a0 S.\u00a0\u00a0 (Ed.)\u00a0\u00a0 (2004)\u00a0\u00a0 <em>The\u00a0\u00a0 Caspian:\u00a0\u00a0 Politics,\u00a0\u00a0 Energy\u00a0\u00a0 and Security<\/em>,\u00a0 Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon.<\/p>\n<p>American Presidency Project,\u00a0 \u201cPress Briefing by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson \u2026. ,\u201d (November 18, 1999), <u>http:\/\/www.presidency.ucsb.edu\/ws\/?pid=47642<\/u><\/p>\n<p>ArmeniaNow, \u201cPutin Signs Armenia\u2019s Eurasian Union Deal,\u201d (December 24, 2014).<\/p>\n<p>AV\u015eAR, B.Z. <em>Kafkasya-Rusya Federasyonu ve T\u00fcrkiye<\/em>, Yeni T\u00fcrkiye, Y\u0131l:3, Say\u0131:16, T\u00fcrk D\u00fcnyas\u0131 \u00d6zel Say\u0131s\u0131 II, Temmuz A\u011fustos 1997, (Ankara).<\/p>\n<p>BARSOUMIAN, N. \u201cTo Greener Shores: A Detailed Report on Emigration From Armenia,\u201d <em>Armenian Weekly<\/em>, (January 22, 2013).<\/p>\n<p>BAYEV, P. 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(1994) <em>The Making of the Georgian Nation<\/em>, 2nd edn, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.<\/p>\n<p>TARAK\u00c7I, N. <em>Soyk\u0131r\u0131m Bahane Ama\u00e7 Kafkasya\u2019ya S\u0131zmak<\/em>, May\u0131s 2015.<\/p>\n<p>TISHKOV, V. et al., <em>Migration in the Countries..<\/em>, Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), September 2005, http:\/\/www.gcim.org\/attachements\/RS3.pdf.<\/p>\n<p>UNHCR, \u201c2005 Global Refugee Trends: Statistical Overview of Populations of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, and Other Persons of Concern to UNHCR,\u201d United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (June 9, 2006).<\/p>\n<p>U.S. Congress, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.<\/p>\n<p>VELIYEV, C. <em>Can Trump Shake Up the South Caucasus? <\/em>Center for Strategic Studies, Baku, (December 18, 2016).<\/p>\n<p>YALOWITZ, K. &amp; W. Courtney, <em>Georgia Wants Reassurance That America Will Help Deter Russia<\/em>, RAND Corp., (May 24, 2017).<\/p>\n<p>YILMAZ, S. Karadeniz\u2019de De\u011fi\u015fen Dengeler ve T\u00fcrkiye, <em>Karadeniz Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Dergisi<\/em>, Cilt 4, Say\u0131 15, G\u00fcz 2007, (\u00c7orum, 2007).<\/p>\n<p>WINROW, G. (2001) <em>Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns<\/em>, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.<\/p>\n<p>World Bank, (2004) \u201cArmenia,\u201d http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia.<\/p>\n<p>World Bank, <em>Migration and Remittances Factbook<\/em>, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008.<\/p>\n<p>World Bank, (2016) http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.<\/p>\n<p>World Bank, (2016) <em>Azerbaijan,<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/azerbaijan\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/azerbaijan<\/a>; <em>Armenia,<\/em>\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia?view=chart\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia?view=chart<\/a>; <em>Georgia,<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/georgia?view=chart\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/georgia?view=chart<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>NOTLAR<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref1\" name=\"_edn1\">[1]<\/a> Kolga, M. <em>The Red Book of the Peoples of the Russian Empire<\/em>, Tallinn: NGO Red Book, 2001; <a href=\"http:\/\/www.eki.ee\/books\/redbook\/\">http:\/\/www.eki.ee\/books\/redbook\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref2\" name=\"_edn2\">[2]<\/a> Karny, Y. \u00a0(2000) <em>Highlanders: A Journey to the Caucasus in Quest of Memory<\/em>, New York: Farrar, Straus &amp; Giroux.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref3\" name=\"_edn3\">[3]<\/a> Rus\u00e7a: Zakavkasiya; Kafkas\u00f6tesi.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref4\" name=\"_edn4\">[4]<\/a> Azerbaycan, 1991\u2019de Da\u011fl\u0131k Karaba\u011f\u2019\u0131n \u00f6zerkli\u011fini kald\u0131rd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref5\" name=\"_edn5\">[5]<\/a> G\u00fcney Osetya\u2019n\u0131n da \u00f6zerkli\u011fi G\u00fcrcistan taraf\u0131ndan kald\u0131r\u0131ld\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref6\" name=\"_edn6\">[6]<\/a> Av\u015far, B. Zakir. <em>Kafkasya-Rusya Federasyonu ve T\u00fcrkiye<\/em>, Yeni T\u00fcrkiye, Y\u0131l:3, Say\u0131:16, T\u00fcrk D\u00fcnyas\u0131 \u00d6zel Say\u0131s\u0131 II, Temmuz A\u011fustos 1997, (Ankara), s.1875.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref7\" name=\"_edn7\">[7]<\/a> McCarthy, J. (2001) \u2018The population of the Ottoman Armenians\u2019, in <em>The Armenians in the Late Ottoman Period<\/em>, Ankara: Turkish Historical Society for the Council of Culture, Arts and Publications of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, s.73.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref8\" name=\"_edn8\">[8]<\/a> Suny, R. G. (1994) <em>The Making of the Georgian Nation<\/em>, 2nd edn, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref9\" name=\"_edn9\">[9]<\/a> \u201cGeorgia: Introductory Survey\u201d, The Europe World Book, 1997, Europa Pub.Ltd., Vol.I, 1998, p.1386-1387<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref10\" name=\"_edn10\">[10]<\/a> Rosen, R. (1999) <em>Georgia: A Sovereign Country of the Caucasus<\/em>, Hong Kong: Odyssey.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref11\" name=\"_edn11\">[11]<\/a> Coppieters, B. and Legvold, R. (eds) (2005) <em>Georgia after the Rose Revolution<\/em>, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref12\" name=\"_edn12\">[12]<\/a> World Bank, <em>Migration and Remittances Factbook<\/em>, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2008.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref13\" name=\"_edn13\">[13]<\/a> Kasim, K. \u2018Russian\u2013Armenian relations: a strategic partnership or hegemonic domination\u2019, <em>Review of Armenian Studies<\/em>, 1\/2 (2003), p. 29.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref14\" name=\"_edn14\">[14]<\/a> Libaridian, G. (1999) <em>The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking since Independence<\/em>, Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref15\" name=\"_edn15\">[15]<\/a> World Bank, (2004) \u201cArmenia,\u201d http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref16\" name=\"_edn16\">[16]<\/a> Barsoumian, N. \u201cTo Greener Shores: A Detailed Report on Emigration From Armenia,\u201d <em>Armenian Weekly<\/em>, (January 22, 2013).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref17\" name=\"_edn17\">[17]<\/a> UNHCR, \u201c2005 Global Refugee Trends: Statistical Overview of Populations of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, and Other Persons of Concern to UNHCR,\u201d United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), (June 9, 2006).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref18\" name=\"_edn18\">[18]<\/a> World Bank, (2016) http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/indicator\/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref19\" name=\"_edn19\">[19]<\/a> Ishkanian, A. (2008) <em>Democracy Building and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Armenia<\/em>, London: Routledge.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref20\" name=\"_edn20\">[20]<\/a> Van der Leeuw, C. (2000) <em>Azerbaijan: A Quest for Identity<\/em>, New York: St Martin\u2019s Press.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref21\" name=\"_edn21\">[21]<\/a> Vladimir Isachenkov, \u201cMore Than Two Decades After 30,000 People Were Killed and 1 Million Were Displaced, Conflict Has Exploded Again Between Azerbaijan and Armenia Around the Region of Nagorno-Karabakh,\u201d <em>US News &amp; World Report<\/em>, April 5, 2016, \u201cAzerbaijan: After More Than 20 Years, IDPs Still Urgently Need Policies to Support Full Integration,\u201d Internal Displacement Monitoring Center, March 26, 2014.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref22\" name=\"_edn22\">[22]<\/a> Nuriyev, E. (2007) <em>The South Caucasus at the Crossroads: Conflicts, Caspian Oil and Great Power Politics<\/em>, Berlin: LIT.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref23\" name=\"_edn23\">[23]<\/a> Clapp, A. <em>Prisoner of the Caucasus<\/em>, National Interest, (February 16, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref24\" name=\"_edn24\">[24]<\/a> \u00c7at\u0131\u015fmalar ba\u015flamadan \u00f6nce Karaba\u011f\u2019da yakla\u015f\u0131k 140,000 Ermeni ve 48,000 Azeri ya\u015famaktayd\u0131.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref25\" name=\"_edn25\">[25]<\/a> Galtsyan, A. <em>Armenia Prepares a Red Line in the Caucasus<\/em>, Russia in Global Affairs, (May 12, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref26\" name=\"_edn26\">[26]<\/a> CSTO: Collective Security Treaty Organisation.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref27\" name=\"_edn27\">[27]<\/a> Galtsyan, <em>ayn\u0131 yer<\/em>, (May 12, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref28\" name=\"_edn28\">[28]<\/a> Cornell, S. E. (2001) <em>Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus<\/em>, Richmond: Curzon Press, p.69.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref29\" name=\"_edn29\">[29]<\/a> Minahan, J. (2000) <em>One Europe, Many Nations: A Historical Dictionary of European National Groups<\/em>, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, p.410.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref30\" name=\"_edn30\">[30]<\/a> Government of the Russian Federation, \u2018Prime Minister Vladimir Putin meets with First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov to discuss progress made on the programme for economic cooperation with South Ossetia and Abkhazia\u2019, (6 August 2010), http:\/\/premier.gov.ru\/eng\/events\/news\/11659\/.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref31\" name=\"_edn31\">[31]<\/a> Michael, T. \u00a0(2001) <em>Resource Wars: The New Landscape of Global Conflict<\/em>, New York: Metropolitan Books.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref32\" name=\"_edn32\">[32]<\/a> CIA World Factbook, 2011.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref33\" name=\"_edn33\">[33]<\/a> Bayev, P. (1997) <em>Russia\u2019s Policies in the Caucasus<\/em>, London: Royal Institute for International Affairs.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref34\" name=\"_edn34\">[34]<\/a> Bishku, Michael B. \u2018The South Caucasus Republics and Russia\u2019s Growing Influence: Balancing on a Tightrope\u2019, <em>MERIA Journal, <\/em>Vol. 15, No. 1, March 2011.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref35\" name=\"_edn35\">[35]<\/a> Pavelenko, A. \u2018Russian in Post-Soviet Countries\u2019, <em>Russian Linguistics<\/em>, Vol. 32 (2008), pp.59\u201380.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref36\" name=\"_edn36\">[36]<\/a> Nixey, J. <em>The Long Goodbye: Waning Russian Influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia<\/em>, Chatham House, (June 2012).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref37\" name=\"_edn37\">[37]<\/a> Tishkov, V. et al., <em>Migration in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union: A Paper Prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration<\/em>, Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), September 2005, http:\/\/www.gcim.org\/attachements\/RS3.pdf.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref38\" name=\"_edn38\">[38]<\/a> Veliyev, C. <em>Can Trump Shake Up the South Caucasus? <\/em>Center for Strategic Studies, Baku, (December 18, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref39\" name=\"_edn39\">[39]<\/a> Tarak\u00e7\u0131, N. <em>Soyk\u0131r\u0131m Bahane Ama\u00e7 Kafkasya\u2019ya S\u0131zmak<\/em>, May\u0131s 2015.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref40\" name=\"_edn40\">[40]<\/a> de Waall, T. (2015) <em>Eastern<\/em> <em>Voices: Europe\u2019s East Faces an Unsettled West Whither the South Caucasus?<\/em> Carnegie Europe, Working Paper Series.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref41\" name=\"_edn41\">[41]<\/a> U.S. Congress, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref42\" name=\"_edn42\">[42]<\/a> de Waal, T. (2003) <em>Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War<\/em>, New York: New York University Press.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref43\" name=\"_edn43\">[43]<\/a> Nation, R. C. (2007) <em>Russia, the United States, and the Caucasus<\/em>, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref44\" name=\"_edn44\">[44]<\/a> Akiner,\u00a0\u00a0 S.\u00a0\u00a0 (Ed.)\u00a0\u00a0 (2004)\u00a0\u00a0 <em>The\u00a0\u00a0 Caspian:\u00a0\u00a0 Politics,\u00a0\u00a0 Energy\u00a0\u00a0 and Security<\/em>,\u00a0 Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref45\" name=\"_edn45\">[45]<\/a>American Presidency Project, \u00a0\u201cPress Briefing by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson and Special Advisor to the President and to the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy Diplomacy John Wolf,\u201d (November 18, 1999), <u>http:\/\/www.presidency.ucsb.edu\/ws\/?pid=47642<\/u><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref46\" name=\"_edn46\">[46]<\/a> Yalowitz, K. and W. Courtney, <em>Georgia Wants Reassurance That America Will Help Deter Russia<\/em>, RAND Corp., (May 24, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref47\" name=\"_edn47\">[47]<\/a> Galstyan, A. <em>Will Trump&#8217;s Presidency Overturn the Fragile Peace in Russia&#8217;s Backyard?<\/em> Global Affairs<em>, <\/em>(November 21, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref48\" name=\"_edn48\">[48]<\/a> Galstyan, <em>ayn\u0131 yer<\/em>, (November 21, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref49\" name=\"_edn49\">[49]<\/a> Gardner, A. \u201cArmenia Chooses Russia Over EU,\u201d <em>Politico<\/em>, May 23, 2014, http:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/armenia-chooses-russia-over-eu\/; \u201cPutin Signs Armenia\u2019s Eurasian Union Deal,\u201d <em>ArmeniaNow<\/em>, December 24, 2014.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref50\" name=\"_edn50\">[50]<\/a> BBC, \u201cEU Signs Pacts With Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova,\u201d (June 27, 2014).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref51\" name=\"_edn51\">[51]<\/a> Kramer, H. (2001) <em>De\u011fi\u015fen T\u00fcrkiye<\/em>, \u0130stanbul: Tima\u015f Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, \u00c7ev.: Ali Sirmen, s.236.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref52\" name=\"_edn52\">[52]<\/a> Lesser, I.O. &amp; Fuller, G.E. (2000), <em>T\u00fcrkiye\u2019nin Yeni Jeopolitik Konumu<\/em>, \u0130stanbul: Alfa Yay\u0131nlar\u0131, s.203.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref53\" name=\"_edn53\">[53]<\/a> YILMAZ, S. Karadeniz\u2019de De\u011fi\u015fen Dengeler ve T\u00fcrkiye, <em>Karadeniz Ara\u015ft\u0131rmalar\u0131 Dergisi<\/em>, Cilt 4, Say\u0131 15, G\u00fcz 2007, (\u00c7orum, 2007), s. 45-66.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref54\" name=\"_edn54\">[54]<\/a> Kramer, <em>age<\/em>, (2001), s. 154.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref55\" name=\"_edn55\">[55]<\/a> Winrow, G. (2001) <em>Turkey and the Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security Concerns<\/em>, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref56\" name=\"_edn56\">[56]<\/a> Kalafat, Y. &amp; Aslanl\u0131, A. \u2018<em>T\u00fcrkiye-Azerbaycan \u0130li\u015fkileri\u2019<\/em>, Ankara: AGAM Yay\u0131n Merkezi, Edt.: \u0130. Bal, \u201821.Y\u00fczy\u0131lda T\u00fcrk D\u0131\u015f Politikas\u0131\u2019, 2006, s.424.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref57\" name=\"_edn57\">[57]<\/a> Abrahamyan, E. <em>The South Caucasus: United, and Divided<\/em>, NATO Policy Forum Armenia, (June 9, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref58\" name=\"_edn58\">[58]<\/a> Abrahamyan, <em>ayn\u0131 yer<\/em>, (June 9, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref59\" name=\"_edn59\">[59]<\/a> Mkrtchyan, T. (2005) \u2018The Prospects of \u201cPhysical\u201d Border-Spanning at the Neighbours of Europe (the case of South Caucasus) and the Role of NATO \u00a0in that process\u2019, <em>Expanding Borders: Communities and Identities<\/em>, Riga: University of Latvia, p.219.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref60\" name=\"_edn60\">[60]<\/a> Geistlinger, M. (ed.) (2008) <em>Security Identity and the Southern Caucasus: The Role of the EU, the US and Russia<\/em>, Vienna: Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref61\" name=\"_edn61\">[61]<\/a> Abrahamyan, <em>ayn\u0131 yer<\/em>, (June 9, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref62\" name=\"_edn62\">[62]<\/a> Commission of the European Communities, (2003) <em>Wider Europe \u2013 Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours<\/em>, Brussels: EU. \u00a0<a href=\"http:\/\/www.ec.europa.eu\/world\/enp\/pdf\/com03_104_en.pdf\">http:\/\/www.ec.europa.eu\/world\/enp\/pdf\/com03_104_en.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref63\" name=\"_edn63\">[63]<\/a> PCAs: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref64\" name=\"_edn64\">[64]<\/a> Mammadov N. EU, Which Proposes Association Agreement, Once Refused to Recognize Azerbaijan\u2019s Territorial Integrity,\u201d <em>Kaspi<\/em>, (February 22, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref65\" name=\"_edn65\">[65]<\/a> Melvin, N. (2007) <em>Building Stability in the North Caucasus: Ways Forward for Russia and the European Union<\/em>, Solna, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref66\" name=\"_edn66\">[66]<\/a> Khojoyan S. &amp; Zulfugar Agayev, Z. <em>Armenian-Azeri Conflict Threatens to Spread as Casualties Grow<\/em>, Bloomberg, (April 5, 2016); Gurbanov, I. Four-Day Karabakh War Highlights Threats to Energy Security on NATO\u2019s Southeastern Flank, <em>Eurasia Daily Monitor <\/em>13, No. 100 (May 23, 2016).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref67\" name=\"_edn67\">[67]<\/a> Mamadov, E. \u201cEU and Azerbaijan: Breaking Up or Muddling Through?,\u201d <em>Eurasianet<\/em>, September 16, 2015.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref68\" name=\"_edn68\">[68]<\/a> Corboy, D. &amp; Kauzlarich, R. &amp; Yalowitz, K.<em> The Next Crisis You&#8217;re Not Watching: Don&#8217;t Ignore the South Caucasus<\/em>, National Interest, (November 17, 2015).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref69\" name=\"_edn69\">[69]<\/a> Rabil, R.G. <em>The Syria Crisis Has Evolved into an International Power Struggle<\/em>, National Interest, (April 18, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref70\" name=\"_edn70\">[70]<\/a> Kuhrt, N. \u2018<em>Soft Power? The Means and Ends of Russian Influence Abroad\u2019<\/em>, presented at Chatham House seminar, 31 March 2011.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref71\" name=\"_edn71\">[71]<\/a> Rumer, E., &amp; Sokolsky, R. &amp; Stronski, P. <em>U.S. Policy Toward the South Caucasus: Take Three,<\/em> Carnegie Endowment, (May 31, 2017).<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ednref72\" name=\"_edn72\">[72]<\/a> World Bank, (2016), <em>Azerbaijan,<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/azerbaijan\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/azerbaijan<\/a>; <em>Armenia,<\/em>\u00a0 <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia?view=chart\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/armenia?view=chart<\/a>; <em>Georgia,<\/em> <a href=\"http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/georgia?view=chart\">http:\/\/data.worldbank.org\/country\/georgia?view=chart<\/a>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>D\u00fcnya siyaseti i\u00e7in &#8220;B\u00fcy\u00fck Satran\u00e7 Tahtas\u0131&#8221; denilmi\u015fti. G\u00fcney Kafkasya da uluslararas\u0131 siyasetin b\u00fct\u00fcn incelik ve entrikalar\u0131n\u0131n yans\u0131d\u0131\u011f\u0131 bir ba\u015fka ve epey b\u00fcy\u00fck bir satran\u00e7 tahtas\u0131. \u00dcstelik bu oyun T\u00fcrkiye&#8217;yi ve T\u00fcrkleri yak\u0131ndan ilgilendiriyor.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":19,"featured_media":337,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_ef_editorial_meta_date_first-draft-date":"","_ef_editorial_meta_paragraph_assignment":"","footnotes":"","_links_to":"","_links_to_target":""},"categories":[2,70,66,68,69],"tags":[],"coauthors":[20],"class_list":["post-334","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-genel","category-rusya","category-siyaset-tarih","category-turkluk-turkculuk","category-yakin-cografya"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/334","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/19"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=334"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/334\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/337"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=334"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=334"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=334"},{"taxonomy":"author","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/millidusunce.com\/misak\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/coauthors?post=334"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}